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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that the Italian Nobel Prize winning author,
Luigi Pirandello, far from being merely a rather cerebral writer
with a philosophical bent, as he has been called by many of his

critics, should in fact be recognised to occupy a place within wha
is often referred to as the field of Contemporary Continental
Philosophy, as a "pre-existentialist" or an existentialist avant
la let tre.

The idea of so categorising him is not new, but no systematic
examination of the entire corpus of his works has ever been
attempted from a purely philosophical point of view in order to
draw from them a coherent and comprehenisive philosophy. In
the field of philosophy, at least in the Anglo-Saxon world, Luigi
Pirandello remains unstudied.

This thesis deals with such existentialist themes as freedom,
responsibility, anguish, the absurd, bad faith, the nature of

reality, the self and the relation of the self to others. Pirandel
views in these areas are compared with those of the recognised
existentialist philosophers, Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus,
in order to attempt to prove a similarity great enough to enable

Luigi Pirandello to be classed as an existentialist avant 2a Jet t
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PREFACE

The origin of the idea for this study dates back to a chance

re-reading of some Pirandellian short stories in which I discovere
much to my amazement, passages which seemed hauntingly Sartrian,

Had I been the first to notice this? Research brought to light the

small amount of previous literature in this area and while proving
that the idea was not, in fact, new, presented a fascinating but
challenging invitation. Could a study examining the entire corpus
of Pirandello's works from a rigorously philosophical point of
view, prove the hypothesis which had been merely suggested by
the letteratP, The present study is an attempt to respond to
that challenge,

Due to the difficulty and the delay which was involved in
obtaining certain Italian books in Australia, there are several
slight irregularities in the references to Pirandello's works,
which, while not affecting the precision of the references, make
them less uniform than otherwise would have been the case. No
complete single edition of Pirandello's works could be obtained,
Therefore, two separate editions had to be used. One includes
the five volumes which contain the short stories, the plays, the
essays, poetry and miscellaneous writings, and the other includes
the two volumes in which are contained all of the novels. Because

of the great delay in obtaining these last two volumes, references
to several of the novels (U fu Mattia Pascal. Uno. nessuno e
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Centomila. II turno and Si gira ...) refer instead to other editi
in which these novels were published separately.

Being qualified in the Italian language and wishing to remain
as faithful as possible to the original works, I have chosen to

use my own translations of all quoted passages from Italian works
The translations of passages from Sartre's L'existentialisme est
un humanisme are also mine. The only exception to this regards

the novel Si gira .... Due again to the delay involved in obtaini

this volume, I have used as my source of reference the translatio
by Charles Scott Moncrieff, entitled Shoot... .

In quoting sections of passages, the symbol C...) has been
used to indicate that a portion has been omitted. The more usual
symbol ... has been reserved for those instances in which the
author himself has chosen to use it to indicate a pause or an
incomplete thought,

En all footnotes and bibliographic references the standard
practice has been followed of underlining only the title of the
volume in which collected works such as novels, plays or short
stories have been published. Within the body of the thesis,
however, for the sake of clarity, the titles of all works have
been underlined. Footnotes are to be found in a separate section
at the end of the thesis and are numbered consecutively for each
chapter.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

Where can the line be drawn between a philosopher and an
ordinary writer? Does the distinction stem from the form of
his writing? Is the philosophical essay de rigueurl Does
the distinction lie in the clarity and consistency of the views
expressed? Would this lead to the conclusion that in order to
be termed a "philosopher", a writer must present ironclad or
at least rigorously defended solutions to all of the problems
he raises? In fact, while commonly assumed, especially amongst
professional philosophers, to be somehow fundamental and obvious,
the distinction between a philosopher and an "ordinary" writer
is an unclear one at best.

On what basis, then, can we argue that the Italian, Luigi
Pirandello, far from being merely a rather cerebral writer with
a philosophical bent, as he has been called by many of his
critics, including Benedetto Croce, should in fact be recognised
to occupy a place within what is often referred to as the field
of Contemporary Continental Philosophy, as a "pre-existentialist"
or an existentialist avant la lettre^. Leaving to one side any
search for an exhaustive definition of the term "philosopher",
let us proceed using two criteria: given an obvious and vast
similarity between recognised existentialist philosophical works
and much of the literary output of Luigi Pirandello, 1) can
Pirandello's works be better or more fully understood in the
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light of an existentialist interpretation? and 2) can a study of
existentialist philosophy be made more fruitful by the inclusion
of Pirandello's works?

I shall endeavour to demonstrate that

the answer to both o£ these questions must be an unqualified
affirmative since an existentalist interpretation provides the
key to many of Luigi Pirandello's works which seem sterile or
superficial in the light of any other interpretation and since if
indeed the novels, short stories and plays of Pirandello embody
so fully and illustrate so well the major existentialist themes,
then a study of this philosophy cannot but be more fruitful in
the light of these works.

What remains to be proven is the

assumption that there is indeed an "obvious and vast similarity"
between recognised existentialist philosophical works and those of
Luigi Pirandello. Before attempting to establish this similarity,
let us first proceed to a brief biographical statement, the point
of which is to show that much of Pirandello's work comes well
before that of the major French existentialists and then to a
discussion of his choice of literary forms.
A. Biographical Statement

Luigi Pirandello was born in Agrigento Cthen known as Girgenti),
Sicily, on June 28, 1867. After completing his studies at the liceo
cJassico, during which time he read on his own most of the Greek
and Latin classics, he enrolled at the University of Palermo and
after a year transferred to the University of Rome.

In 1891
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he received his doctoral degree from the University of Bonn,
where he had gone to study after a minor disciplinary problem
at the University of Rome. His dissertation was on the Italian
dialect spoken in Agrigento. He remained in Bonn two years before
returning to Italy.

Pirandello began his literary career writing poetry. (Mai
Giocondo written between 1883 and 1888). The first volume of his
innumerable short stories was published in 1894 ( Amori senza am

Around the same time (1893) he wrote his first novel ( L'esclusa).
Pirandello's first play ( L'epologo - La morsa) was published in

1898. There followed over three-hundred short stories, forty-three
plays and seven novels as well as a series of scholarly articles
and several essays. By 1923 Pirandello's fame was world-wide,
primarily on account of his plays, which have been translated
into the major languages of the world. In the Proceedings of the
International Congress of Pirandellian Studies which took place
on the 25th anniversary of his death, there is an entire section
composed of fourteen articles all devoted to the history of this
author's fame in various countries around the world: from America
2
to Egypt, from Belgium to Bulgaria. In 1934, Pirandello won the
Nobel Prize for literature and by the time of his death in 1936,
he was truly an international figure of great literary renown.

Jean-Paul Sartre, on the other hand, completed his initiation

into Husserl's phenomenology in Berlin in 1933-34 and didn't publ
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his principal philosophical work Being and Nothingness until 1943.
Albert Camus was born in 1913, five years after the publication
of Pirandello's essay on the absurd, L'umorismo. and nine years
after the publication of his major work on personal liberty, JX
fu Mattia Pascal, Camus' famous essay on the absurd. The Myth of

Sisyphus wasn't published until 1942, six years after Pirandello'
death.
B. Choice Between Literary Forms: Essay Versus Fiction

It is not possible to state with certainty why Pirandello
was never recognised as a "proper" philosopher, however, there
are several factors which undoubtedly contributed to this. Of
course, the time and place of his life could be cited. Italy
has always had a strong tradition of Aristotelian philosophy.
Existentialism is not consistent with the Italian philosophical
tradition. The opposition of the then leading philosopher of
the day in Italy, Benedetto Croce, was certainly a contributing
factor. "For Croce, as is well-known, it was a question of a

sterile and inconclusive philosophising, an obscurity which could

not but suffocate - according to the principles of the Aesthetics
- artistic creation. But perhaps the three major causes of
Pirandello's being relegated to the post of a philosopher manquS
were".
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1. the labelling of Pirandello as the philosopher of form
versus life by Adriano Tilgher,

2. Pirandello's preference for the novel, the play, and
the short story, and

3. his own specific refusal to call himself a philosopher.

In 1922 Adriano Tilgher published a book on the contemporary

theatre in which he reduced all of Pirandello's philosophical work
to a statement of the doctrine of life as a continuous flux which
is killed by the "forms" which we attach to it. This, of course,

is indeed one of Pirandello's themes. It is not, however, his majo
one; and it must be interpreted in the light of the rest of
his philosophy. Since it was not, and still is not by many, so
interpreted, it was easy to discount Pirandello as any kind of
a serious thinker. One idea does not a philosopher make,

Perhaps the chief reasons, however, were and regain Pirandello's steadfast refusal to call himself a philosopher and his
preference for the play, the novel and the short story over
the essay. To understand the reasons for this refusal and
this preference is integral to understanding Pirandello as a
philosopher. For him, a philosopher was, above all, a logical and
formally ordered thinker in the tradition of Aristotle, one who
contemplated life, the world and its meaning almost as if he were
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outside of it.

Pirandello refused the feigned external stance

presupposed by this world-view and rejected logic as its primary
tool.

(Logic) is an infernal little machine (...) a type of
filter pump which puts the brain in communication
with the heart. (...) The brain uses it to pump
feelings from the heart, from which it forms
ideas. A feeling leaves behind in the filter all
that is warm and turbid: it is cooled, purified,
idealised.

Thus, some poor emotion roused by

some particular case, some contingency, often
painful, is pumped and filtered by the brain,
by means of that little machine, and becomes
a general abstract idea; and what follows from
this? What follows is that we no longer have to
upset ourselves about one particular case, one
passing contingency; but we have to poison our
whole life with the concentrated extract with
the sublimated corrosive of logical deduction.
Any many unfortunates think they can cure all
the ills of the world with this, and they pump
and filter, and pump and filter, until their
heart is pumped dry as a cork and their brain
is like a chemist's cupboard full of those little
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bottles which bear on their labels a skull and
4
crossbones and the legend: POISON.

Pirandello refuses to deal in this "poison" and hence he refuses t

title of philosopher. It must be noted, of course, that Pirandello
is not dealing with linguistic analysis and might very well have
got on splendidly with Frege or Quine. This "rejection of logic"

is not to be misconstrued as some facile espousal of illogic, whic
whatever else might be its consequences would necessarily remove
one permanently from the realm of philosophy. Pirandello, like

other existentialists, is merely stressing the value of individual
human experience as opposed to rigid a priori systems.

One of the most basic tenets of existentialism (if existentialism

may be said to have tenets) is that which stresses the irreducible
value of personal experience. Communication of the content of
that uniquely personal phenomenon is held to be impossible. No
one person can prescribe for another what life is or how the
other should act. To do so on the basis of one's own personal

experience would be, among other things, to attempt to communicate
the incommunicable. For this reason, most existentialists have
used essays only in conjunction with their other works: short
stories, plays, and novels, in order to provide a more formal
background or a frame of reference against which to interpret

these. In a way reminiscent of the early Wittgenstein's distinctio
between "saying" and "showing", these latter are thought the
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proper media for the existentialist writer because they have the
power to evoke in the reader (or the audience) those responses,
albeit vicariously, which cannot be "explained', "taught", or "said"
in an essay.

...existentialists see the right method of philosophising as descriptive or revelatory.

The

philosopher is not so much concerned to explain
or to systematise as to evoke, to show, to reveal.
As Heidegger says: "I cannot prove anything
in philosophy; but I think I can show some
things."

And novels, plays, poetry, biography

and autobiography can be just as "revealing"
as formal philosophical analysis.

Of course, non-existentialist philosophers have also been tempted
by this dichotomy between showing and saying or telling, but
the existentialists have made this distinction central to their
philosophy, and historically they have made more use of the novel
and the play than have other philosophers.

In her introduction to Being and Nothingness Mary Warnock
describes Sartre's own use of example as not only an illustration
but an essential element in Sartre's argumentation. She explains;

(...)we are made to feel and, as it were, experience in our own persons, the shock which
the eavesdropper experiences, the change that
his internal feelings undergo at the moment when
he is aware of being watched. It would have
been possible to present an argument which would
have led in the same direction, in a far more
external, Aristotelian way; we might, that is,
simply have been asked to agree to the fact
that the emotion of shame entails the idea of
another person, and therefore to agree that, if
anyone experiences shame, that person at least
must believe that other people exist. This would
have been possible; but it would not have been
an existentialist form of argument. As it is,
we are asked not to agree to a proposition but
to experience, in imagination a familiar emotion.
And while we are under the impact of it, we
are asked whether we do not therefore necessarily believe that other people exist, and that
they determine our own mode of existence. To
understand the anecdote and reject the general
conclusion would be to assert a contradiction.

10
There is, of course, a similar use of illustrative example in
Pirandello. Whether it is indeed possible for a literary work
to express a philosophic thesis is a question which need not
concern us here. The point is that Pirandello has chosen the
same set of literary forms as Sartre, and they have both tried
to expound their theses by causing the reader or the audience
to experience a certain realitS vScue, If this is not a valid
philosophical methodology—as well it may not be—then Sartre
too must be excluded from philosophy, in which case what is
to be done with the term "existentialist philosopher"? Hence,
the usefulness or legitimacy of an "illustrative" rather than a
deductive methodology is not at issue. Rather, given that the
recognised existentialist philosophers used such a methodology,

Pirandello's choice of literacy form cannot of itself exclude him
from the title "philosopher".
C. Previous Works in the Area

We have seen that Pirandello was not recognised as a
philosopher during his own life-time. Is, then, the idea of
classifying him as a philosopher, and in particular a preexist entialist philosopher completely new? As far back as 1953

Eric Bentley in his essay "Pirandello's Joy and Torment" suggeste

that Pirandello's vision had much in common with that of the then
8
contemporary existentialist novelists. In 1961 at the International

Congress of Pirandellian Studies held in Venice, Vera Passeri Pig
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presented a paper, entitled "Luigi Pirandello and Existentialist
Philosophy", (published in the Congress Proceedings six years
later in order to mark the hundredth anniversary of Pirandello's

birth). In 1962 Sergio Pacific! included in A Guide to Contemporar

Italian Literature a section on existentialism in which Pirandello
figures quite prominently, and in which he specifically refers
to Pirandello as an existentialist avant la Jet tre. In 1964,
Franz Rauhut published a book entitled Per Junge Pirandello (The
Young Pirandello) in which he discusses the existentialist themes
found in Pirandello's youthful works, particularly his poetry.
The concept of Pirandello as some sort of an existentialist "or
9
pre-existentialist or a forerunner of today's existentialists"
therefore, is not new.

What is the purpose then, of going beyond these articles and
this book? What in fact is the aim of this thesis? Vera Passeri
Pignoni's article, like all other previous works on Pirandello,
is written from the point of view of a literary critic and, in
the way of literary critics, certain hypotheses are taken as
conclusion without sufficient substantiation. This may be due
to the fact that it was written for an audience of Pirandello
scholars who, the author may have assumed, were both sympathetic
to her interpretation as well as being entirely familiar with the

supporting examples which were evidently considered too obvious to

mention. Nevertheless, construed as a contribution to philosophica
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scholarship the article is not sufficiently thorough and rigorous
to establish Pirandello as an existentialist. Sergio Pacifici's
article is more substantial, and important existentialist themes
are noted in Pirandello's works. However, it is a short article
which once again has no pretentions at being an in-depth study
of the subject. Rauhut's book Per Junge Pirandello is a much more
exhaustive study, but it deals primarily with Pirandello's poetry
in which are found many very trite themes which are then given an
existentialist interpretation. The author defends this by stating
that while these themes are platitudes, "platitudes are the most
10
important themes of human thought".

As well, many of Rauhut's

conclusions are interesting but mere assertions, as, for example,
the claim that Pirandello should be classed with the Christian
existentialist Gabriel Marcel based only on the "evidence" of two
rather mysteriously pantheistic poems of his youth - 0 Notte. 0
Sacra notte and 0 gloriosa pace. Finally, the book limits itself
to an examination of Pirandello's youthful works rather than to
an examination of the entire corpus of his writings.
D. Purpose. Scope and Format

This thesis, therefore, attempts to examine all of Pirandello's
works in order to discover whether he can be justifiably termed
an existentialist avant la lettre. Wo attempt is being made to
justify existentialism itself, as this would be a quite different
task and one better done by someone more sympathetic to that
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philosophy. Nor is it asserted that Pirandello's ideas are wholly
12
original,

any more than are those of Sartre, for example. The

interesting question presents itself whether Sartre may have
derived some of his philosophy from Pirandello, whose plays, after
all, were translated into French and presented before enthusiastic
Parisian audiences, M. Sartre, himself, before his death refused
to enlighten us on this matter, either in print or by way of
personal correspondence, and such a conclusion remains outside of
the scope of this thesis. The research contained herein, however,
will, it is hoped, be of use to some future historian of ideas who
may perhaps be able to establish some causal relation between
the similarities found in these two writers.

It is assumed that the reader will have some general knowledge
of French existentialism, but it is not assumed that he will be in
any way familiar with the works of Pirandello. For this reason,
extensive use has been made of quotations, and of any story to
which reference has been made, the plot and themes have been at
least briefly discussed.

The principle of division of this thesis into chapters has
been a thematic one. Thus each chapter will deal with a major
existentialist theme and will be further divided into relevant
minor themes.
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Let us now proceed to an analysis of the works of Luigi
Pirandello to see if we can establish an "obvious and vast
similarity" to recognised existentialist works, a similarity which
will be sufficient for us to term him an existentialist avant la
lettre.

The major themes which will be examined in this thesis include
freedom; the "absurd" with its effect on a theory of values and
the related notion of "bad faith"; the nature of reality; and the
self and its relation to others.
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CHAPTER II - FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY
A. Sartre and Pirandello; a General Comparison

Individual freedom and responsibility are the fundamental

concepts which lie at the basis of Sartre's existentialism. As he
states in his popular essay L'Exi31entialisme est un humanisme:

(...) there is no determinism, man is free, man is
freedom. (...) Thus, we have neither behind us
nor before us, in the luminous domain of values,
either justifications or excuses. We are alone,
without excuses. It is this which I will express
by saying that man is condemned to be free. (...)
he is responsible for all that he does.

Comparing the ideas of Sartre and Pirandello yields some
very interesting parallels. The following are several well-known

views concerning individual freedom, as held by Jean-Paul Sartre,
(at least in the earlier part of his career before he became
Marxist and then Maoist). Let us examine how closely the ideas
of Pirandello resemble these.

1, According to Sartre, for men there is no such antecedently giv
thing as what Medieval philosophers called "essence". Existence
precedes essence. First man exists. He then becomes aware of

himself and begins to define himself.

At first he is nothing.

For Sartre freedom is identical with man's existence.

(...) freedom in its foundation coincides with the
nothingness which is at the heart of man. Human
reality is free because it is not enough. It
is free because it is perpetually wrenched away
from itself and because it has been separated by
a nothingness from what it is and from what it
will be. It is free, finally, because its present
being is itself a nothingness in the form of the
"reflect ion-reflecting". Man is free because he
is not himself but presence to himself. The being
which is what it is can not be free. Freedom is
precisely the nothingness which is made-to-be
at the heart of man and which forces human
reality to make itself instead of to be. As
we have seen, for human reality, to be is to
choose oneself; nothing comes to it either from
the outside or from within which it can receive
or accept.

Freedom is the being of man.

Thus freedom is not a being; it is the being of
man - i,e. his nothingness of being. If we start
by conceiving man as a plenum, it is absurd
to try to find in him afterwards moments or
psychic regions in which he would be free. As
well look for emptiness in a container which one
has filled beforehand up to the brim! Man can
not be sometimes slave and sometimes free; he
is wholly and forever free or he is not free at
all.

Pirandello was not worried about justifying his position,
so he did not bother about the "technical" matter of whether
existence precedes essence or not. However, Pirandello questions
over and over what the "essence" of man is. Time and time again
his characters (as Sartre would say) rise up in the world, meet
themselves and find that they are nothing until and unless they
will use their freedom to make themselves whatever it is they
choose. In fact, the final line of Pirandello's play Trovarsi is
precisely this conclusion; "One must create oneself, create! And
then only one finds oneself."

2. For Sartre, the decision as to what one would like to be
is not a decision made by the will alone; that is, the decision
cannot be said to have been made until whatever thoughts one
may have are translated into acts, for it is acts which count.
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not words or intentions. Intentions and motives cannot be looked
at separately as if they were the "causes" of an act for we
choose our intentions and our motives as well,

(...) it is in fact impossible to find an act
without a motive but this does not mean that
we must conclude that the motive causes the
act; the motive is an integral part of the
act.

For as the resolute project toward a

change is not distinct from the act, the motive,
the act, and the end are all constituted in a
single upsurge. Each of these three structures
claims the two others as its meaning. But the
organised totality of the three is no longer
explained by any particular structure, and its
upsurge as the pure temporalizing nihilation of
the in-itself is one with freedom. It is the act
which decides its end and its motives, and the
act is the expression of freedom.

Feelings too are made up of acts, which we choose. Passions
have no power of themselves because we choose our own passions.
"There is no love except that which we show in acts and no genius
but that which is expressed in works of art.'
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Pirandello is in perfect accord with Sartre here. He stresses
the existence of conflicting passions and how one must choose
freely between them as does Sartre in his (Sartre's) famous example
of the young man who cannot choose between patriotism and duty,
and love toward his mother and so cannot decide if he should stay
home by her side or go off to join the Resistance. Pirandello's
play La Siqnora Morli. una e due is very much to the point here.
Should the Signora remain true to her lover or leave him and
return to her husband? What values should be chosen and on what
basis? Pirandello stresses another difficulty, however. While it
is true that words do not have the value that acts have and to
simply "wish" to be something which one is not has no value at
all, even acts are extremely subjective. For Pirandello, there is
no "objective" value to a particular act. There is the act as
I intend it to be. There is the completed act as I see it, the
act as it is seen by another person and another and another, an
infinite series of act3 which can therefore have no "objective"
value. We do have, however, total responsibility for our acts and
therefore our existence, as we shall see in more detail later on.

Nor, insists Sartre, is a temperment an act, "There is always
the possibility for the coward to cease being a coward or for
the hero to cease being a hero."

(...) for consciousness (there is) the permanent
possibility of effecting a rupture with its own
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past, of wrenching itself away from its past so
as to be able to consider it in the light of
a non-being and so as to be able to confer on
it the meaning which it does not have. Under
no circumstances can the past in any way by
itself produce an act.

Pirandello agrees but stresses the difficulty of such a

change, Pirandello uses the image of a mask (or many masks) which

each of us wears. After a shock or some kind of bizarre experienc
or sometimes merely as the result of reflection, with a feeling
of nausea and vertigo, we see ourselves as we are, unmasked, and
this may be the turning point (as in Sartre's Nausee. which was

written two years after Pirandello's death!) in our lives at whic
point we either sink into "nothingness" or affirm our liberty.

3. Because of the great weight of responsibility placed upon
us by this total freedom from any objective values, one lives
continuously in a state of "metaphysical anguish". It would be
so much easier to act according to some a priori code or because
of some inner necessity. If we succumb to the temptation to deny
our responsibility and make our human nature, society or some
other so-called necessity the arbiter of our actions so as to
escape this anguish, we are in what Sartre calls "bad faith".
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We are not free not to be free. This would be to deny our
own being which is freedom. It would be a form of "bad faith".

We said that freedom is not free not to be free
and that it is not free not to exist. This is
because the fact of not being able not to be
free is the facticity of freedom, and the fact of
not being able not to exist is its contingency.
Contingency and facticity are really one; there
is a being which freedom has to be in the form
of non-being (that is, of nihilation). To exist
as the fact of freedom or to have to be a being
in midst of the world are one and the same
thing, and this means that freedom is originally
g
a relation to the given.
Pirandello also illustrates this theme, especially in II fu
Mattia Pascal, but he sees all around himself examples of people
choosing not to be free and he shows an attitude toward them
which is perhaps somewhat more compassionate than Sartre's.

However Pirandello is in complete agreement with Sartre (see
especially Hon si sa come and II Fu Mattia Pascal). Over and
over again, while stressing the difficulties, he contrasts those
characters who assume their responsibility and live their freedom
with those who see themselves as prisoners of life, society or
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whatever other excuse they have constructed for themselves. The
difficulty of changing from being this latter type of person to
one who accepts his freedom and his consequent responsibility
is a major Pirandellian theme as will be seen in the following
section concerning U, fu Mattia Pascal.

4. Sartre insists that we must draw the full consequences of
atheism. Not only is God a useless and costly hypothesis which
we must give up, but Sartre believes that since He does not
exist, there can be no a priori values. This is an obvious non
sequitur, but in order to avoid what, for present purposes, would
be an irrelevant discussion on this issue, let us take these as
two separate postulates of Sartre's existentialism: there are no
a priori

values, and God does not exist. We choose the values

which we want, and it is our choice alone which confers upon them
their value. We are free to choose as we think best.

Mary Warnock, in her introduction to Being and Nothingness
puts quite succinctly Sartre's ideas concerning the origin of
values:

We can understand, moreover, how it is that
human beings inevitably ascribe values to things.
Without any contrivance, just by perceiving the
world, they perceive values. Values 'spring up
around them like partridges.'

But the chief
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lesson which we should learn is to avoid the
'spirit of seriousness'.

This is definedC.) as

that which makes us pretend that values are
absolute, given somehow independently

of any

human subjective judgment. This spirit makes us
pretend that the quality of being desirable or
undesirable is somehow a quality of the things
themselves, like redness or roundness. Once this
spirit has been dismissed, then it necessarily
follows that a man will recognise himself as the
source of all values, and when he has done this
it will follow that he realizes that he can choose
to value whatever he likes, and is free from the
restraint of the conventional, the established
or the apparently inescapable bonds of duty or
taboo.10

Pirandello came from a society where the notion of God
permeated the entire social structure. Because of this, Pirandello
treads rather lightly in this area. Certainly he rejects organised
religion, and if he believed in God at all, it was plainly not in
a traditional Christian concept of Him. How is one to interpret
a statement like, "God is what is the best in each of us"? Was
Pirandello espousing some type of pantheism? In my opinion, unable
or unwilling because of social conditions in Italy at the time, to

24
make a clear statement of atheism, Pirandello used this ambiguous
statement to express the same views as Sartre. This seems to me
to be clearly indicated, although of course, not proven, in such
works as La Sagra del Signore della nave. Lazzaro. and Non si sa
come. God, namely the supreme value, is what is best in each of
us, namely our freedom. Liberty is the supreme value. Sartre
states that in choosing our own liberty we are choosing others'

liberty as well. While Sartre wouldn't call this kindness, I think
Pirandello would. The case for Pirandello's being a Christian
existentialist a" la Gabriel Marcel has been made, (in my opinion
very poorly) on the basis that kindness seems to be for him an
a priori absolute value. Such an argument is a difficult one
to sustain, because aside from the problem of connecting theism
and absolute values, at no point does the author place kindness
above the affirmation of one's personal liberty, in fact, quite
the contrary.

5. According to Sartre since there is no God, there is no
determinism. Man is freedom, says Sartre. On the other hand,
since God doesn't exist and there are no absolute values to which
to refer, we have no justification, no excuses. We are condemned
to be free,

Pirandello's ideas coincide so much with Sartre's on the point
of being condemned to freedom that he actually uses that precise
term in Non si sa come, written in 1934, a number of years before
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Sartre uses it. He explores the seeming need for law and its
ultimate uselessness or destructiveness in La nuova colonia. and
he deals time and time again with characters in their attempts,
successful or not, to defy social convention.

6. Although there is, according to Sartre, no human nature, there
is a human condition, the historical and physical circumstances
in which one finds himself. These have both a subjective and

an objective value, objective because omnipresent, and subjective
because they have no meaning except as we live them and exercise
our freedom in relation to them.

Thus I shall apprehend myself at any moment
whatsoever as engaged in the world at my
contingent place. But it is precisely this
engagement which gives meaning to my contingent
place and which is my freedom. To be sure, in
being born I take a place, but I am responsible
for the place which I take. We can see clearly
here the inextricable connection of freedom and
facticity in the situation. Without facticity
freedom would not exist-as a power of nihilation
and of choice- and without freedom facticity would
12
not be discovered and would have no meaning.
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Nearly all of Pirandello's works deal with man trying to assert
his freedom in the historical, social, and physical circumstances
in which he finds himself. The problem of the extent of the power
of these circumstances over the individual is a central theme
of his writings. In fact, Gaetano Munaf6 in his recent work on
Pirandello writes:

(...) it seems to me that form all of the works o£
the great writer and dramatist one can really
draw several conclusions which could, for example,
be summarised like this: (...Affirmation of our
absolute interior freedom from any tie which
13
would tend to limit it (...)
As we have seen from the above six examples comparing

Pirandello's ideas with those of Sartre, the Sicilian bears a clos
resemblance to the famous existentialist. Let us now turn to
a closer examination of Pirandello's ideas concerning freedom as
exemplified in his works.
B. Freedom as Exemplified in U. Fu Mattia Pascal

Although the question of the possibility of individual human

freedom appears numerous times in Pirandello's works, it is nowher

treated as deeply as it is in II Fu Mattia Pascal (The Late Mattia

Pascal). Most other allusions to this problem found in Pirandello'
writings take on meaning only in reference to this work. It is
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appropriate here to note that any philosophical interpretation of
a literary work will be subject to the familiar general criticism
suggesting that the evidence for any particular interpretation
is inevitably less than conclusive. Moreover, it is notoriously
difficult to separate the meaning of a philosophical thesis from

the support provided for it, and it is especially difficult when w

want to attribute a philosophical position based on evidence which
is atypical. Assuming, of course, that a proposed interpretation
is not simply vacuous, its consistent applicability to the whole
of an author's works must be taken as sufficient evidence for
giving the validity of that interpretation weighty consideration.

Let us proceed then to an examination of the evidence. Mattia
Pascal is a novel concerning a rather poorly educated young man
whose family has been reduced from modest wealth to poverty by
the thieving of Malagna, the manager of the Pascal estates since
the death of Mattia's father. Pirandello paints the picture of
a person who seems to lack any will of his own, prey to the
events of the life which surrounds him but in which he doesn't
seem to really participate. There are elements of Gide's hero of
the acte gratuit, available for whatever adventure comes his way
and at the same time Sartre's prototype of bad faith {mauvaise
foi). Mattia falls into a job, the most boring and useless one

imaginable. He allows himself to be pushed into an odious marriage

and family situation. In a misguided attempt to save an old family
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friend (Malagna's second wife) from the beatings and censure given
to a sterile woman, he impregnates her, and thus his own child is
abandoned to the care of his bitterest enemy. In short, through
episode after episode, life becomes more and more unbearable for
Mattia until he decides to run away to America. Physical freedom
from all ties seems to him to be the only answer.

Taking with him a small amount of money which his brother
had sent for other purposes, he makes his escape.

Frightened,

however, of arriving in a new country with hardly any money, he
gets off the train in Marseilles, and in his meandering about the
town he sees a book on roulette in a shop window. On impulse he
buys it, and in a twelve day stint at the Monte Carlo Casino,
he wins a fortune.

Returning home on the train, he reads in

a newspaper the news of his own death.

At first shocked and

horrified, he realises that this combination of circumstances will,
at last, give him the opportunity of experiencing the complete
freedom he has been seeking.

Taking a new identity, rich, with no ties, he sets about finding
this much-prized liberty. In what does it consist? Freedom from
family ties, geographical freedom, freedom from one's past? Mattia
Pascal tries all of these and finds that they are but the illusions
of true freedom. Feeling himself suffocated by nausea, anger, and
hatred

14
of himself,
he awakens to the realisation that true

liberty consists in a free choice made within the confines of our
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historical and social conditions. Mattia feels the great difficulty
in accepting such liberty and therefore such responsibility, but
he throws off his false identity, goes back to his village, and
begins a truly new life as the "defunct Mattia Pascal",

The major themes of this novel are therefore: bad faith, the
illusion of complete materialistic liberty which little by little
is changed into the realisation of the nature of true freedom,
and the acceptance of this latter.

1. Mattia's Bad faith

Bad faith is defined by Sartre as the masking of one's anguish

over his total responsibility, his absolute freedom of choice. This
is usually accomplished either by making someone else responsible

for a particular action or choice, or by asserting that we couldn't
have chosen or acted other than we did. On the very first page
of the book Mattia Pascal blames circumstances for his fate:

(...) one must really become indignant (...) over
the corruption of morals, and the vices and the
sadness of the times which can be the cause of
such harm to a poor innocent.

As Mattia is becoming involved in the adventure which will lead
to his wretched marriage, he questions his motives,
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Why was I showing such anxiety to marry off
Romilda?

For nothing.

I repeat: for the sole

pleasure of impressing Pomino.

There is no question of responsibility here. It is almost an acte
gratuit, except that it is in no way in conformity with Mattia's
"inner self".

Another example of bad faith which has always been, as it
happens, extremely common in Italy, is to take refuge in history,
a continuous study of the past, not as a source of wisdom for
choice of actions in the future, but only as a means of furthering
humanism, the glorifying of all of the human race. Pirandello uses
the occasion of Mattia Pascal's useless job as caretaker of a
collection of books which someone had donated to the town but
which no one ever reads, to express some views on the subject.

(...) he hoped that his bequest would with time
and with availability kindle in their souls the
love of study. Until now, I can testify, it hasn't
been kindled: and this I say in praise of my
fellow citizens.

Sig. Romitelli, Mattia's companion in the library, deaf, one foot
in the grave, spends his time reading and memorising the minute
details of the lives of musicians, artists, lovers.

He is the
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caricature of the great humanists. Little by little, Mattia also
takes up this pastime, but;

I read a little of everything, disorganisedly,
but especially books on philosophy. They weigh
so much and yet he who is fed on such food and
18
swallows it lives in the clouds.
It is interesting to note here the similarity between Pirandello's
rejection of such food and that of the famous pre-existentialist
Gide, as found in Les Caves du Vatican.

It depends on the stomach. It pleases you to
give the name of paradox to what yours refuses.
As for me, I would let myself die of hunger in
front of such a hash of bare bones as the logic
19
which I see you feed your characters on.
Mattia Pascal has one physical defect, his eye. This
ungovernable organ of sight represents Mattia's search for true
freedom, and it is fixed only when he finds it. Mattia put down
his reading but then:

(...) I took it up again: and ... yes sir, I also
began to read (along with Sig. Romitelli) with
one eye because the other one didn't want to
20
have anything to do with it.
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Another refuge from our anguish is in the belief that if
circumstances had been different, we would have been better.
Pirandello gives an example which is very similar to Sartre's

example of the woman who says: "I haven't had any children to whom

I could devote myself because I didn't find a man with whom I coul
have made my life. There remains, therefore, in me, unused and

entirely viable a host of dispositions, inclinations, possibilitie
which makes me worth more than the simple series of my acts
. ,. „21
implies,
(Miss CaporaleX...) wanted to live, she did, poor
thing, and she judged as ungenerous those men
who only pay attention to exterior beauty. So,
intimately, in her soul, did she feel beautiful?
Oh, who knows how many or what sacrifices she
would have been capable of, if she had found a
'generous man'. Perhaps she wouldn't have drunk
22
even a drop of wine anymore.
Little by little Mattia Pascal begins to realise what bad faith
is.

We always have to blame someone for our hurts
and our misfortunes (...) But how could I listen
to it, this blessed voice of reason, if it spoke
to me precisely through Papiano's mouth, who
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was for me wrong, obviously wrong, blatantly
wrong (...) Oh, is it possible that the voice of
reason had to choose just Papiano's mouth to
make itself heard by me? Or perhaps it was I,
who, in order to find myself an excuse, put it
into his mouth so that it should seem wrong to
23
me.
Or again:

We fool ourselves so easily! The most when we
24
want to believe something (...)
The way isn't easy. Even after these discoveries, Pascal is
tempted to fall back into bad faith,

'My fault? How?' I said. 'That good woman makes
a mistake, first of all, recognising the body of
some poor fellow who drowned himself, then she
hurriedly marries again, and the fault is mine?
25
and I should take her back?
Back in the library, by choice now rather than chance, at
the insistence of his friend don Eligio, the new librarian, Mattia
Pascal writes his memoires. From these don Eligio draws the lesson
that:
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(...) outside of the law and outside of those
particulars, happy or sad as they may be, because
of which we are who we are, dear Mr. Pascal, it
26
is not possible to live.
But Pascal makes him note that in fact he was doing just that.
He neither revised his civil status under the law nor re-entered
into those particulars. Who is he?
27
'Eh, my friend ... I am the late Mattia Pascal.'
2. Illusion of Complete Liberty

We hide our anguish in some instances by pretending we aren't
really free or to the other extreme, we feel chained, impotent
and seek a kind of liberty which will free us from any and all
ties or bounds. We feel that if we can change our circumstances,
we will be free. It is this kind of freedom which first attracts
Mattia. Returning home in the train, he sees the notice of his
own death in the paper.

(...) in a flash I saw ... but of course! ray
liberation, freedom, a new life.

Having begun this new life, Mattia reflects:

Now I would have liked that not only exteriorly
but also in the most intimate part of me that

there not remain any further trace of him (the
old Mattia Pascal). I was alone now, and more
alone than I was, I could not ever be on the face
of this earth, released from every tie and every
obligation, free, new, and absolutely master of
myself, without even the burden of my past and
with the future before me that I could shape
29
as I liked.
As much as to obey fortune as to satisfy my
30
own need, I began to make myself a new man.
'And above all,' I said to myself, 'I will take care
of my freedom: I will lead it over comfortable
and always new roads: neither will I ever make
it wear any heavy garment. I will close my eyes
and pass by as soon as the spectacle of life
at any point becomes unpleasant. I will take
care to make my life rather with things which
are called inanimate and I will go in search of
beautiful views, of pleasant tranquil places. I
will give myself little by little a new education:
I will transform myself with loving and patient
study, so that in the end, I will be able to say
not only that I have lived two lives but that
31
I have been two men.

(...) I wanted to live for myself too, in the
present. From time to time I was assailed by
the idea of my unbounded and unique liberty,
and I would feel a sudden happiness so strong
that I would nearly loose myself in a blessed
stupor.

I wanted to believe that (...) I, Adriano Meis, after
having wandered for a while in that new unlimited
freedom had finally gained my equilibrium, reached
the ideal that I had set before me, to make of
myself another man, to live another life that
now, here, I felt full within me.

These excerpts serve the same purpose as Sartre's description
of M. Roquentin. Maurice Cranston writes:

Roquentin is, we might fancy, a remarkably free
man. He is thirty and has a modest private
income; he has no family and no job, none of
the so-called 'ties'. He has travelled widely; he
can do what he wants and live where he chooses.
'Free' we may want to call him: but Sartre is
out to persuade us that Roquentin is not really
free. He is degagS or uncommitted; and it is
one of Sartre's central beliefs that dSgagement
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is only a mockery of freedom, is, in fact, a form
of running away from freedom,

3. False liberty versus True Liberty

At first, Mattia Pascal, convinced that he has found liberty,
is merely annoyed at small inconveniences which life, nevertheless,
imposes upon him.

Even the fortune he has made will not last

forever.

I would have liked to go beyond Cologne, at least
to Norway, but then I thought I had better impose
a little restraint on my liberty.

Walking along one day, Pascal sees a little puppy which he would
like to buy, but he sees that this would involve the first
compromise of his liberty, and he passes on.

I went away, considering, however, for the first
time that it was beautiful, yes, undoubtedly,
this liberty of mine so boundless, but also just
a bit of a tyrant.

The cause of all our ills, (...) do you know what
it is? Oemocracy, dear friend, democracy, that
is government by the majority.

Because when

power is in the hands of one alone, this one
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knows he is alone and must satisfy the many;
but when the many govern, they only think of
satisfying themselves, and so you have then the
most stupid and hateful of tyrannies: tyranny
masked as liberty. But surely! Oh, why do you
think that X suffer? I suffer precisely for this
tyranny masked as liberty.

Mattia would like to settle down and have a home of his own, but
this is impossible because he would then have to be registered
on the tax role, etc. and eventually found out. He discovers the
impossibility of even having a real friend.

'Free', I kept on saying: but already I began
to penetrate the meaning and to measure the
confines of this my liberty.

Little by little, Mattia realises that this unbounded freedom from
all social ties is an illusion. Not that it couldn't be achieved
- after all he could have solved all of his problems by obtaining
false papers - but in the sense that even if it is achieved, it
isn't true freedom because this kind of liberty means that one
doesn't live. There is no life without some kind of commitment.

You will always and everywhere be a stranger
39
... a stranger to life, Adriano Meis.

The truth was perhaps this: that in my boundless
liberty, it turned out to be difficult for me
to begin to live in some way. On the point of
making a decision, I felt myself held back. I
seemed to see so many impediments and shadows
40
and obstacles.
I could almost believe myself to be really drowned
at the Stia and that in the meanwhile, I am
41
illuding myself that I am alive.
I had seemed to me to be a streak of luck to
be believed dead. Well, I am really dead. Dead?
Worse than dead ... the dead don't ever have to
die again, and I do. I am still alive for death
and dead for life. What life, in fact, can mine
v 42
ever be.
The life which I had seen in front of me free,
free, free was nothing at bottom but an illusion
which could not become reality except very
superficially and more of a slave than ever,
slave to pretending, to the lies which with such
disgust I saw myself forced to use, slave to the
fear of being discovered, even though I committed
no crime.

40
Realising that he had chosen the wrong path to liberty or rather
chosen an illusion of liberty instead of the real thing, Mattia
Pascal decides to give up his life as Adriano Meis and return to
his village.

Crazy! How could I have deluded myself into
believing that the trunk could live cut off from
44
its roots.
That had seemed to me to be liberation! Yes,
with the leaden weight of lies on my back. A
leaden weight on the back of a shadow ... now I
would have again my wife on my back and that
mother-in-law ... but didn't I have them on my
back even as a dead man? Now at least I was
45
alive, and on the war path.
But of course, I'm going back! (...) I'm not the
same person as before, you know.

Thus Mattia Pascal rejects the illusion of complete liberty in
the popular sense of being without ties or encumbrances. He
realises that true freedom consists of a conscious choice within
the personal and historical circumstances in which one finds
oneself.

It was a moment, but eternity.

I felt inside

myself all the confusion of blind necessities,
of things which can't be changed: the prison of
time; being born now, and not before or after;
the name and the body which is given to us; the
chain of causality; the seed thrown out by that
man: my father without wanting to be; my coming
into the world, from that seed; involuntary fruit
of that man; tied to that branch (...)

Another illustration of the necessity to choose within given
circumstances in contrast with the illusory freedom found in the
escape from those circumstances is found in the short story
Lontano.

The nausea, the anger, the suffocation, the strange

sensations of his final awakening to the true nature of liberty
are reminiscent of Sartre's M. Roquentin. He would have almost
wished to reject this new-found liberty.

I could have put out that eye with my own
finger! What did it matter to me anymore its
being fixed?

And how could I go on living? No, no, enough! 1
stopped. I saw everything waver before my eyes,
I felt my legs begin to give way at the sudden
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welling up of an obscure feeling which made me
49
shiver from head to foot.
Two further examples of people choosing freedom despite the

acknowledged difficulty of doing so are found in the short stories

Fuga. in which the choice is represented somewhat symbolically and
Volare. in which a young woman goes contrary to the expectations
of society and chooses to leave her destitute family in order to
find a life of her own.

Pirandello describes the moment of Mattia's final complete
rejection of his past (lives), his passage from bad faith to true
freedom,

I remained, I don't know for how long, there in
that chair, thinking, now with my eyes wide open,
now retreating into myself, angrily, as if to rid
myself of a terrible inner spasm. I saw, finally; I
saw in all its crudeness the fraud of my illusion;
what it was at bottom that had seemed to me the
greatest of fortunes in the first drunkenness of
my liberation. I had already experienced how my
liberty which had at first seemed limitless, in
fact, was limited by the lack of money; then I had
also realised that instead of liberty it could
have been called solitude and boredom and that

43
it condemned me to a terrible punishment: that
of my own company; I had then tried to get close
to others; but the resolution to keep myself
carefully from re-attaching even ever so loosely
the cut cords, of what use had it been? See: they
had re-attached themselves, those ties; and life,
as much as I, already on guard, opposed it, life
dragged me along, with its irresistible pull; life
that wasn't for me any longer. Ah, now I really
was aware, now that I could stand no longer the
vain pretexts, the almost puerile pretendings,
the pitiful, low excuses which prevented me from
assuming consciousness of my feeling.

Each person alone must make his own way. Mattia cannot

follow in the footsteps of his brother, for example. When he is in
Monte Carlo on his extraordinary winning streak, he must refuse
to play with anyone else's money. No rule or law set by anyone
else can govern his life if he is to find his freedom. The choice
is between liberty and nothingness,

Who was I? No one.

Again the thought of my absolute impotence, of
52
my nothingness assailed me, crushed me.
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And yet, free to do anything, he is not free not to choose, for
that is death.

Whoever understands, in fact, says: I mustn't do
this, I mustn't do that, not to commit this or
that folly. Wonderful! But at a certain point
one realises that life is one large folly and so
you tell me then, what does it mean never to
have committed a folly? It signifies at least,

(...) illuding myself that I could become another
man, live another life.

Another man, yes, but

only provided that I didn't do anything.
so, then, what man?

And

The shadow of a man! And

what life? As long as I was content to remain
closed within myself and to watch others live,
yes, I could have to one extent or another held
onto the illusion that I was living another life,
but now (...)

Life, considered that way, as an extraneous
spectator, seemed to me now without form and
without reason.
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C. Summary

In this way, Pirandello has illustrated the major themes of JX

fu Mattia Pascal: bad faith, the illusion of complete liberty which
little by little is changed into the realisation of the nature of
true freedom and the acceptance of this latter.

Thus we can see emerging from this analysis of Jl fu Mattia
Pascal an existentialist philosophy of freedom with its related
notions of responsibility and bad faith, the necessary loneliness
of each man's search for liberty, the necessity of choice and the
condemnation of anything which tends to take away from man's
freedom,
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CHAPTER m

- THE ABSURD

A. Introduction

While for Sartre, the affirmation of man's absolute freedom
and his consequent responsibility is generally taken to be the
i

centre point of his entire philosophy, for Camus the focus is
on man's realisation of the absurd, of the futility of all action
in the face of the inevitable fact of death, and his reaction tc
this realisation. Ordinary man, like Meursault in Camus' novel
L'etranger. or Roquentin in Sartre's La Nausee continues in the

daily familiar routine of his life, taking for granted society's u
values, accepting unaware whatever life, fate or God sends. At a

certain point, man is confronted with the ultimate meaninglessness

of all action, the irrelevance of all values, the absurdity of his
existence, in short, the human condition. Sartre describes this
moment of realisation in physical terms as a feeling of dizziness
nausea. Camus describes it in terms perhaps a bit more poetical,
but it is the point at which this realisation is attained that
the emphasis of Sartre's philosophy differs somewhat from that
of Camus. While Sartre sees the absurd as being overcome by the

affirmation of one's absolute personal liberty in choosing to give
value to a particular course of action and thus giving meaning to
one's life; Camus views the absurd as man's permanent condition,
no matter what course of action he chooses or how freely he
chooses it. What is important is to act in full knowledge that
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life will nevertheless remain meaningless. The absurd cannot be
overcome. It is born of this confrontation between man's desire
for absolutes, for the rational, and his true condition in the
midst of an irrational universe. It is in the affirmation of
one's own existence by the rejection of suicide despite the awful
knowledge of sure defeat that man finds his victory,

Notoriously the quest is by no means unique historically; man,
it appears, has always looked for some sort of ultimate values,
some absolute around which to shape his life, to guide his choice
of actions. What is the status of this absolute or these values

in a philosophy which takes as its basic premiss, the contingency,
the superfluity, the meaninglessness of all existence?

According to Sartre, all men live in the state of what he
2
describes as a type of "anguish" because they are aware of their
true condition. Camus, rather than make such a boldly general

claim, may usefully be regarded as envisioning three states of man

1) the time when he is unaware of the absurd, 2) the actual moment

of realisation and 3) the life of a man after this realisation. He
thus leaves open at least the theoretical possibility that a mar

might live his entire life unaware of his condition with regard to
the absurd. Leaving aside for the moment this possibility, what
other reactions can man have to his awareness of the absurd? He
may overcome it by the affirmation of his own freedom, as Sartre
recommends; he may simply continue to live with his awareness of
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it, as Camus suggests; or he may try in various ways to hide
his anguish even from himself and live in a state of what Sartre
calls "bad faith". What forms can this "bad faith" take? Is it
to some extent inevitable in all of us?

In order to answer these questions and see the relationship
between Pirandello's philosophy and those of Sartre and Camus

concerning the question of the absurd, we must first of all examin
the nature of the absurd as it is explained in the works of
Sartre, Camus and Pirandello. Next we must compare the moment
of realisation of the absurd as described by the recognised
existentialists and by Pirandello. And lastly we must examine
the treatment by Sartre, Camus and Pirandello of the various
possible reactions to the absurd, distinguishing between those
which involve "bad faith" and those which may be said to affirm
existentialist "values".
B. The Nature pf the Absurd

In The Mvth of Sisyphus. Camus defines what he means by
the notion of the absurd. He describes the continual search by
man for some kind of absolute: truth, knowledge, understanding,
reason, - and the failure of the world to give this.

I want everything to be explained to me or
nothing. And the reason is impotent when it
hears this cry from the heart. The mind aroused
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by this insistence seeks and finds nothing but
contradictions and nonsense. What I fail to
understand is nonsense. The world is peopled
with such irrationals. The world itself, whose
single meaning I do not understand, is but a
vast irrational. If one could say just once:
'this is clear', all would be saved. But these
men vie with one another in proclaiming that
nothing is clear, all is chaos, that all man has
is his lucidity and his definite knowledge of
3
the walls surrounding him.
But it is not in the world itself that the absurd is found, but
in the confrontation between man in his continual search for an
absolute and the irrational world,

I said that the world is absurd but I was too
hasty. This world in itself is not reasonable,
that is all that can be said. But what is absurd
is the confrontation of the irrational and the
will longing for clarity whose call echoes in the
human heart. The absurd depends as much on

Camus explains that his choice of the word "absurd" is not
an arbitrary one but rather it is based on the common usage

of the word in circumstances where it draws attention to the
glaring ludicrousness of a particular juxtaposition of phenomena
or situations precisely as it does in this case between man's
desire for lucidity and the world's inherent irrationality.

In all these cases, from the simplest to the most
complex, the magnitude of the absurdity will be
in direct ratio to the distance between the
two terms of my comparison. There are absurd
marriages, challenges, rancours, silences, wars
and even peace-treaties. For each of them the
absurdity springs from a comparison. I am thus
justified in saying that the feeling of absurdity
does not spring from the mere scrutiny of a fact
or an impression but that it bursts from the
comparison between a bare fact and a certain
reality, between an action and the world that
transcends it.
divorce.

The absurd is essentially a

It lies in neither of the elements

compared; it is born of their confrontation,

In this particular case and on the plane of
intelligence, I can therefore say that the absurd
is not in man (if such a metaphor could have a
meaning) nor in the world, but in their presence
together.
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Thus Camus, in using the word "absurd", highlights what he sees
as the ludicrousness of man's desire for some kind of absolute,

some antecedently given "meaning", some eternal "plan" which would
explain all; in contrast with the inherent "meaninglessness" of
the world. For Sartre, instead, "absurd" is not a relative term.

Rather it is to be found in the total superfluity of any existant,
Every being is "in the way" {de trop, superfluous),

All these objects ... how can I explain? They
inconvenienced me; I would have liked them to exist
less strongly, more dryly, in a more abstract way,
with more reserve. The chestnut tree pressed
itself up against my eyes. (...) I realised that
there was no half-way house between existence
and non-existence and this flaunting abundance.
(...) We were a heap of living creatures, irritated,
embarassed at ourselves, we hadn't the slightest
reason to be there, none of us, each one, confused,
vaguely alarmed, felt in the way in relation to
the others. (...) In the way, the chestnut tree
there, opposite me, a little to the left. In the
way the Velleda. (...)

And I - (...) I, too, was in the way.

Pirandello, too, speaks of superfluity. It lies precisely in
man's awareness of the meaninglessness of his own life which
causes him to forever seek to create for himself a reality in
which his life will take on a meaning despite the realisation of
the impossibility of this task,

(...) men have in them a superfluity which constantly and vainly torments them, never making
them satisfied with any conditions, and always
leaving them uncertain of their destiny. An inexplicable superfluity, which, to afford itself an
outlet, creates in nature an artificial world, a
world that has a meaning and value for them alone,
and yet one with which they themselves cannot
ever be content, so that without pause they
keep on frantically arranging and rearranging
it, like a thing which, having been fashioned by
themselves from a need to extend and relieve
an activity of which they can see neither the
end nor the reason, increases and complicates
ever more and more their torments carrying them
farther from the simple conditions laid down by
nature for life on this earth, conditions to which
only dumb animals know how to remain faithful
and obedient.

(...)

Those actions that are fundamental and indispensable to life, he too is obliged to perform
and to repeat, day after day, like animals, if he
does not wish to die. All the rest, arranged and
rearranged continually, frantically, can hardly
fail to reveal themselves sooner or later as
illusions or vanities, being as they are the
fruit of that superfluity, of which we do not
see on this earth either the end or the reason.

Sartre's "superfluity" is a simple notion. It lies in the lack
of any sort of justification for the existence of any being.
All beings are, therefore, superfluous, meaningless, de trop. At
first, Pirandello seems to be attributing this superfluity to
man's awareness of the absurd, and that if man were to destroy
this awareness and live like the animals in harmony with nature,
he could escape his own superfluity. That this is not the case,
that in fact he is trapped by his superfluity is clear from the
following passage:

And for my friend Simone Pau the beauty of
it is this: that he believes that he has set
himself free from all superfluity, reducing all
his wants to a minimum, depriving himself of every
comfort and living the naked life of the snail,
And he does not see that, on the contrary, he
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by reducing himself thus, has immersed himself
altogether in the superfluity and lives now by
nothing else.

In fact, as has been seen, Pirandello's notion of superfluity
coincides with Sartre's,

It is the awareness of this superfluity which causes Roquentin's famous feeling of nausea. He tries to put a label on
it.

The word absurdity is coming to life under my
pen; a little while ago, in the garden, I couldn't
find it, but neither was I looking for it, I didn't
need it; I thought without words, on things, with
things. Absurdity was not an idea in my head,
or the sound of a voice, only this long serpent
dead at my feet, this wooden serpent. (...) I
understood that I had found the key to Existence,
the key to my own Nauseas, to my own life. In
fact, all that I could grasp beyond that returns
9
to this fundamental absurdity.

On the other hand, Sartre seems to differ from Camus in attributin
the absurdity of things to their gratuitousness, rather than to
the contrast between their gratuitousness and man's expectations
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of some sort of meaningfulness in the world; but he does say tha
absurdity is relative to the "accompanying circumstances",

Absurdity: another word; I struggle against
words; down there 1 touched the thing. But I
wanted to fix the absolute character of this
absurdity here. A movement, an event in the tiny
coloured world of men is only relatively absurd:
by relation to the accompanying circumstances.
(...) the world of explanations and reasons is
not the world of existence. A circle is not
absurd, it is clearly explained ... But neither
does a circle exist.

Sartre and Camus are in agreement,

This discomfort in the face of man's own inhumanity, this incalculable tumble before the
image of what we are, this 'nausea', as a writer
of today calls it, it is also the absurd.

Time and time again, Sartre and Camus see man as searching for

an externally given absolute, a certainty not within the realm o
logical certainties or mathematical truths but in the sphere of
the existant, the contingent. He is frustrated in his attempts
and can find peace only through illusion.

A stranger to myself and to the world, armed
solely with a thought that negates itself as
soon as it asserts, what is this condition in
which I can have peace only by refusing to know
and to live, in which the appetite for conquest
bumps into walls that defy its assaults? To
will is to stir up paradoxes. Everything is
ordered in such a way as to bring into being
that poisoned peace produced by thoughtlessness,
lack of heart or fatal renunciations. Hence the
intelligence, too, tells me in its way that this
12
world is absurd.
Those who exist let themselves be encountered,
but you can never deduce anything from them.
I believe there are people who have understood
this. Only they have tried to overcome this contingency by inventing a necessary, causal being.
But no necessary being can explain existence:
contingency is not a delusion, a probability
which can be dissipated; it is the absolute,
consequently, the perfect free gift. (...) they
cannot succeed in not feeling superfluous. And
in themselves, secretly, they are superfluous.

C...)13
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In JX Signore della nave Pirandello illustrates the theme of

a continual but fruitless search for the absolute. The pig lives

happily while he lives. Man cannot because of his continual thir
for an absolute, in the instance of this short story - and its

corresponding play - religion. Who, therefore, is more of a beas
the pig or man? What could be sadder, Pirandello asks, than men

who, having debased themselves to the level of pigs, cannot even
enjoy the earthly pleasure which this has brought but must run
weeping after the statue of the absolute which they seek.

No, no, you see? They're crying, they're crying!
They got drunk, they brutified themselves, but
no, here they are now crying after their bloody
Christ! And you want more of a tragedy than
this?14

The Sicilian discusses this thirst for the absolute in
L'umorismo. his major philosophical essay.

(...) life, not having, fatally for human reason,
a clear and determined end, it is necessary, in
order not to grope in the abyss, that it have
an individual, fictitious, illusory one for each
man, either low or exalted, it matters little;
since it isn't nor can it be, the real end, that
everyone is anxiously seeking, perhaps because

it doesn't exist.

What is important is that

one give importance to something, even if it is
vain: it will be worth any other value which is
taken seriously, because at bottom neither one
nor the other will satisfy: since the burning
thirst to know will always remain, the faculty of
desiring will never be extinguished, and nothing
says, unfortunately, that man's happiness will
be found in progress.

He, like Sartre and Camus, affirms the emptiness of objective
reality.

Pirandello, then (...) tends to sustain the the
absolute unreality of all things and at the same
time would like to demonstrate the reality of
relativism in all things (...) he would affirm
the

absolute vanity, he

is, the dualism
and

would

of Good and

Error, of Wisdom

impune, that

Evil, of Truth

and Folly, of Life and

Death, reconciling the opposites and reorganising
them

in the original unity of the absolute

and undifferentiated Ego, and he would show as
illusory the apparent differences, reducing them
to the common denominator of their essential
nothingness.
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And yet this continual search for something absolute, some truth
some meaning in the midst of the emptiness of objective reality
remains the human condition,

If the unease of the times is seen in the
contrast between an unsuppressible demand of
man and the discovery of the constitutional
impossibility of his satisfying it, Pirandello,
while he defines the crisis of this historical
moment, already he theorises about it as an
absolute condition. The indisposition of the
moment, in fact, is not made up of exclusively
temporal circumstances like the passage between
two systems of beliefs, as it is of the consciousness of a perennial tearing apart of the
human condition held between self-deception and
dissatisfaction. The critical characteristics incommunicability, meaninglessness of action and
oppressiveness of every rule and condition defined in the analysis of the historical moment
they will constitute themselves as characteristics of the absolute and perennial crisis which
only now are appearing to consciousness.

As Roquentin contemplates his discovery of the contingency
of all existants, their superfluity, the very first word which
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comes to his mind to describe these beings was "comic". He then

rejects this word in favour of the "absurd".18 Pirandello, instea
chooses the word "humour". In his long essay on this topic,

while attempting first of all to define the word and then discus

its relation with rhetoric and irony, its various characteristics
in different cultures, the distinction between mere comedy and

humour, its presence or absence in Italian literature and finally
coming to conclusions regarding the essence, characteristics and
subject matter of humour; it is clear that rather than analysing
the concept of humour as commonly understood, Pirandello was

speaking of a different concept, one which had up until that poin
barely been acknowledged and had never, until then, been clearly
defined: the absurd.

Every feeling, every thought, every movement
which arises in the humourist is immediately
doubled into its opposite; every yes into a no,
that comes at last to assume the same value as
the yes. The humourist might perhaps pretend
sometimes to hold to one side: inside meanwhile
the other feeling is talking to him, the one
which seems not to have had the courage to be
the first to reveal itself; it speaks to him and
begins to put forth now a timid excuse, now some
attenuating circumstance, which cools the ardour
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of the first sentiment, sometimes a pointed
reflection which takes apart the seriousness
19
and causes laughter. '
This very special laughter is but one reaction man can have
to his sudden awareness of the absurd. Nothing can be taken
too seriously once the artificiality of its value is seen. For
Pirandello, the essence of humour is a sense of the contrary, an

awareness of life as a parody, a continuous illusion to mask from
ourselves the abyss which surrounds us.

All phenomena are either illusory or the reason
for them escapes us, inexplicable. Our knowledge
of the world and ourselves lacks completely that
objective value which we commonly presume to
attribute to them. It is a continuous illusory
construction. (...) the humourist (...) through
the ridiculousness of this discovery, will see
the serious and painful side; he will take apart
this construction, but not merely to laugh at
it; and instead of scorning it, while laughing,
20
he will perhaps even feel compassion.
Thus we can see that what Pirandello calls humour is far from
comedy. It could more properly be called a sense of the absurd,
and our reactions to it as described by Pirandello are the same
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feelings of dizziness or nausea or fear - quite literally - that
are so aptly described by Camus and Sartre.

In certain moments of interior silence, in which
our soul divests itself of all its habitual
frauds, and our eyes become more acute and more
penetrating, we see ourselves in life and life in
itself, almost in a disquieting, arid nudity; we
feel ourselves assaulted by a strange impression,
as if, in a flash, a reality was revealed to us
different from the one we normally perceive, a
reality living outside human sight, outside of
the forms of human reason. Then, most lucidly
the structure of everyday existence, almost
suspended in the emptiness of that interior
silence of ours, appears horrid to us in its
impassible and mysterious crudeness, since all of
our customary fictitious relations of sentiment
and images are separated and disjointed in it.
The internal emptiness becomes larger, crosses
the limits of our body, becomes a void around us,
a strange emptiness like a stopping of time and
of life, as if our interior silence sank in the
abysses of the mystery. (...) It was a moment; but
there remains in us long after the impression of
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it, as of a vertigo, with which is contrasted the
stability though vain, of things, ambitious or
mean appearances. Life, then, small, commonplace,
which pivots between these appearances seems
to us almost as if it is no longer for real,
as if it were like a mechanical fantasmagoria.
And how can we give it importance? How can we
respect it/

Life, seen in this light, can no longer be taken seriously and
hence the laugh, albeit tearful, of the humourist.

Even the power of blind, senseless nature defeats the
grandness of human designs, the ideals of his fictions. And
so the humourist, or the absurd man, reflects:

'What if Cleopatra's nose had been longer, who
knows what other vicissitudes the world would
have had/ And this if, this miniscule participle
which one can note, insert like a wedge in all
events, how many and what disjunctions can it
produce, of what disorder can it be the cause,
22
in the hands of a humourist.
Pirandello illustrates the power of nature over man's designs
in a short story entitled JX buon cuore. in which by superb
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planning everything is arranged to procure the greatest good for
the greatest number, but due to nature or man's good intentions
themselves, or the absurd, all of the good is turned into evil
and the author reflects:

How true it is that it always happens that way,
that the force of nature is worth more than
..,. 23
any artifice.
Despite our intuition of the absurd, we still search for
absolutes, although at every attempt we are frustrated. As
Camus writes:

Faced with this inexctricable contradiction of the
mind, we shall fully grasp the divorce separating
us from our own creations. So long as the mind
keeps silent in the motionless world of its
hopes, everything is reflected and arranged in
the unity of its nostalgia. But with its first
move this world cracks and tumbles (...) Of whom
and of what can I say 'I know that!' (•••) This
very heart which is mine will forever remain
indefinable to me. Between the certainty I have
of my existence and the content I try to give
to that assurance, the gap will never be filled,
24
(...) there are truths but no truth.
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Pirandello is in complete agreement.

(...) the pretension of the part of the individual
and of society to determine a definitive and
immutable truth is absurd.

This absurdity is dramatised in the short story JX tabernacolo.
A usurer who is known as an atheist and a socialist has a

shrine built. Upon its completion he dies, before having paid the
labourer. No one will believe that it was he who ordered the

work and so the worker isn't paid. Still believing in the ideal o

justice, the labourer goes to court and loses. His faith in divin

justice destroyed, he realises that he himself creates justice (o
any other value). He dresses up like Christ and goes to live
in the shrine. Despite this revelation, this knowledge, he still
prays, although he is aware all the while of some doubt, or some
recurring but vague thought that gnaws him from the inside,

Another illustration of the ridiculousness of a search for
ready-made values is found in Fuoco alia paglia. Simone, having
been very wealthy but having lost nearly everything, has had a
glimpse of the absurd. He is a miser and part mad, a reaction

which Pirandello sees as a possible consequence of trying to face
the void which is within us and live the absurd. As he writes
in L'umorismo:
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In this normal state of consciousness, in these
re-connected ideas, in this usual feeling of life,
we can no longer have faith, because at length
we know that they are a fraud of our own
construction in order for us to live and that
underneath there is something else, which man
cannot face without dying or going mad.

Simone, half mad, is trying to live with this knowledge. Nazzaro

is a poor man but happy in his own self-deception. He represents
a certain set of values and because of his name, it is difficult
to resist the thought that he is perhaps the symbol of Christ,
Simone becomes Nazzaro's friend and tries to buy his salvation

(like his namesake in the Bible) from Nazzaro. The conditions are
however, strict. He must release the thousands of birds he has
been keeping as a possible source of food and burn the field of

grain, his last possession. The results, of course, are disastrou
Salvation cannot be bought with someone else's values.

In II bottone della palandrana. Pirandello depicts one of those

perfectly honest, neat, exemplary people who think there is order

in the world. Discovering that there is in fact none, he realises
that he might as well throw away the button of his over-coat
which has come off in his hand, he might as well walk down the

street with his coat undone, with his sleeves inside-out, or even
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with his hat upside down on his head. In a world with no order,
no values, everything is permitted.

Camus sees a longing for death as man's first reaction to
his awareness of the absurd. As soon as man finds himself in an

alien world with no illusions, he must contemplate his own suici

A world that can be explained even with bad
reasons is a familiar world. But, on the other
hand, in a universe suddenly divested of illusions
and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. (...)
This divorce between man and his life, the actor
and his setting, is properly the feeling of
absurdity. All healthy men having thought of
their own suicide, it can be seen, without further
explanation, that there is a direct connection
97
between this feeling and the longing for death.
Sartre's M. Roquentin, contemplating the discovery of his own

superfluity thinks first of all of suicide, but realises that ev
his death would be superfluous,

I dreamed vaguely of killing myself to wipe out
at least one of these superfluous lives. But
even my death would have been in the way. In the
way, my corpse, my blood on these stones, between

these plants, at the back of this smiling garden.
And the decomposed flesh would have been in the
way in the earth which would receive my bones,
at last, cleaned, stripped, peeled, proper and
clean as teeth, it would have been in the way:
28
I was in the way for eternity,
Pirandello notes this reaction to the absurd and discussing it
in his essay Arte e coscienza d'oggi he quotes The Confessions
of Tolstoy:

Science told me only: life is an evil deprived of
29
any sense. I wanted to kill myself.
In fact, the theme of suicide in the works of Pirandello is so
frequent that it must be dealt with in a separate section, in
which all of the instances of suicide appearing in these works
must be noted and an attempt made to derive a cohesive account
of Pirandello's attitude toward it.

The universality of man's condition in an absurd world is
stressed by both Sartre and Camus. Pirandello, too, speaks of
the ubiquitousness of this "life-malady",

Useless, almost a non-entity; but he existed,
and was walking beside me, and was suffering.
It was true that he was suffering, like all the

rest of us, from life which is the true malady
, n30
of us all,
C. Realisation of the Absurd

We have already examined Sartre's primary example of the
realisation of the absurd in his novel La Nausee. In Being and
Nothingness. Sartre states that man as a "being-for-itself" is
consciousness. He further states that:

Consciousness is a being, the nature of which
is to be conscious of the nothingness of its
being.

thus denying the possibility that man could exist in the world
without being aware of his condition with regard to the absurd,
Camus and Pirandello do not see this awareness as something
intrinsic within man, but emphasize rather the effect which the
moment of realisation of the absurd has on a person. Camus
writes in The Myth of Sisyphus:

It happens that the stage-sets collapse. Rising,
tram, four hours in the office or the factory,
meal, tram, four hours of work, meal, sleep and
Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and
Saturday, according to the same rhythm - this
path is easily followed most of the time. But one
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day the 'why' arises and everything begins in
that weariness tinged with amazement. (...) What
follows is the gradual return into the chain or
it is the definitive awakening. At the end of
the awakening comes, in time, the consequence:
. ., 32
suicide or recovery.
While Camus in this passage mentions only two responses: suicide
recovery, it must be noted that the term "recovery" is ambiguous
here because as is evident from other passages, it may indicate
a suppression of the newly-acquired awareness with a return to

normal daily existence, a refuge in some type of hope of salvatio

from the absurd, or it may indicate the "heroic" decision to live
with the absurd. Pirandello, too, sees various stages in a man's
life. According to Gaetano Munafd these consist of a life of
ordinary daily routines, a first moment of real contact with the
world, with the contrast between the emptiness of the interior
content and the ostentatious exterior appearances of people, a
search for the reason for this discrepancy, the discovery of the

absurdity of trying to force reality into forms, of trying to giv
it meaning, and a final moment of an attempt at reconstruction.

For Camus, it is the acceptance of this consciousness which is
important.
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A sub-clerk in the post-office is the equal of
a conqueror if consciousness is common to them.
All experiences are indifferent in this regard.
There are some that do either a service or
a disservice to man. They do him a service
if he is conscious. Otherwise, that has no
importance; a man's failures imply judgment, not
of circumstances, but of himself.

The various alternatives to the acceptance of this consciousness
will be dealt with in a later section. For the moment let us
be concerned with how this consciousness of the absurd can come
about,

Pirandello, like Camus, sees this awareness as a possible
result of almost any untowarded event.

Man acquires an awareness of his condition
through some unexpected circumstance ... Moscarda's nose in Uno. nessuno e centomila: the
news of Mattia Pascal's suicide learned of by
chance; the drunks in the Gala's house in JX
giuoco delle parti: the elections for Cirincid in
Maschera dimenticata: the fall from the horse for
Henry IV; the meeting with his step-daughter at
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Madame Pace's in Sei personaggi in cerca d'autore

C...)36

This awareness, however, is also a sign of the times as Pirandello
writes in Arte e coscienza d'oggi:

We have set aside or lost traditional values.
What can take their place? (...) we feel bewildered,
even lost, in an immense blind labyrinth, surrounded on all sides by an impenetrable mystery.
Paths, there are so many. Which will be the
right one?37

According to Pirandello, finding nothing in heaven or on earth
to satisfy his longing for a system of values, for truth, for
something absolute, man is nevertheless unwilling to accept a

world which exists for itself, peopled by little beings intent upo
procuring for themselves what possible happiness they can find.
Instead he beats his breast and desperately demands that nature
38
give him some reason for all that it has done.
Pirandello reasons that with the coming of science, faith
must die, but ironically it does not bring with it man's longed
for certitude, but rather an even greater awareness of the void.
In the past, man had faith in a certain truth. This was the star
which illuminated his whole way. Science, to demonstrate that
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there was in fact no such star but only a tiny lamp which fed
on oil not always pure, blew on the lamp and put it out. Since
man could then no longer see, science gave him an electric light.
But no matter how many at lit, man's way is still in darkness.
Science is insufficient to light the path. In Segni dei tempi
Pirandello writes:

There is then no way out. Science is impotent to
work out the problem. It succeeds in annihilating
the explanations which fantasy and sentiment
had created and vested with the forms of the
positive religions; but of substituting for these
destroyed explanations a new and sufficient one,
40
it is incapable.
Whatever the immediate cause of a man's moments of confrontation
with the absurd, it is clear that Pirandello, like Camus, is
preoccupied with their nature. The description of special,
privileged moments is a repeated theme in Pirandello's works.
They may be moments of a kind of pantheistic participation in
life, or moments of alienation and a feeling of the strangeness
of familiar things. They may be moments of a heightened joyful
41
awareness in which everything seems new and alive.

Whatever

their nature, they provoke an immediate confrontation between
this awareness, these ideals, this sense of the infinite and our
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ordinary perception of things, of life's daily realities, of death.
In this confrontation is born the absurd.

Camus states that the theatre is the perfect medium for
eliciting an awareness of the absurd.

The actor has three hours to be Iago or Alceste,
Phedre or Gloucester.

In that short space of

time he makes them come to life and die on fifty
square yards of boards. Never has the absurd
been so well illustrated or at such length. What
more revelatory epitome can be imagined than
those marvellous lives, those exceptional and
total destinies unfolding for a few hours within
a stage set?
to count.

Off the stage, Sigismundo ceases

Two hours later he is seen dining

out. Then it is, perhaps, that life is a dream.

According to Camus, art cannot be a refuge for the absurd man,
as Sartre had tentatively concluded at the end of La Nausee.
It is, itself, an absurd phenomenon and cannot afford an escape
from the confrontation. Rather it is but one symptom of man's
awareness of the absurd.

Thus it serves two functions: 1) it

reflects the quandry of the artist, as an absurd man himself,
and 2) it can precipitate this awareness in the spectators.
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Pirandello, according to Gino Cucchetti in his article "Assoluto

e relativo nei tre miti di Luigi Pirandello" in the Proceedings of.
the International Congress of Pirandellian Studies, wanted to try
something which had not been fully attempted since the pomp of the
ancient Greek theatre. He wanted to reveal the great darkness
which "determines and accompanies the life of human souls, in
the vast tragicity of the events which accompany it". A prime
example, himself, of the humorist of which he writes, Pirandello
fulfils the description of the absurd man.

The humorist knows that ordinary events, common
details, the materialness of life in sum, so
varied and complex, bitterly contradict those
ideal simplifications, compel to actions, inspire
thoughts and feelings which are contrary to
all of that harmonious logic of facts and of
characters conceived by ordinary writers (.. J
that search for contrasts, contradictions on
which the work is based, in opposition to the
unity sought by the others; it is from this that
comes that certain disorder, that unboundedness,
that capriciousness - all of those digressions
that are found in the humorous work, as opposed
to ordinary contrivance, to the composition of
45
the work of art in general.
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A great number of Pirandello's fictional works - plays, short

stories and novels - are in this sense "humorous" or as the later
existentialists would call it "absurd". These works seem to fall
into two main categories: 1) those works in which a character or
characters either philosophise on the subject of the absurd or
In which their moment of awareness of the absurd is described
and 2) those works which manifest to the reader or the audience,

though not necessarily to the characters within the work, certain
situations or anomalies in life which tend to bring about a
consciousness of the absurd. To the first category belong such

short stories as Tu ridi, Dal naso al cielo. C'fe aualcuno che rid

La mano del malato povero. Un'idea. II guardaroba dell'eloguenza.

La carriola. Rimedio la geografia. Canta l'epistola, Una giornata
and La cattura and portions of such novels as Si gira. U. fu
Mattia Pascal and Suo mar it o.

In Tu ridi. Pirandello continues his theme of "humour" and
the absurd. A man in the most difficult of situations, leading
a most serious life, is heard to laugh every night in his sleep.
He doesn't know why himself. Eventually it is discovered that
the laughter is the result of a recurring and absurd dream
concerning very "serious" people behaving ludicrously and in a
manner very unbecoming to their dignified positions. If we are
to make anything of this story at all, the only interpretation
which appears reasonable is that the author is suggesting that
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life itself is nothing but an absurd dream and our situation is
as ludicrous as that of the professor in his friend's world of
sleep,

In C^ qualcuno che ride, a "serious" meeting is called.
Everyone in the whole town is there, but no one knows why. When
two young people dare to be themselves and laugh, a scandal
is caused. They themselves must, as punishment, be derided and
ostracised. The mask (see Chapter V) cannot be dropped for a
moment or the absurdity of the world is too evident.

In Dal naso al cielo. after a discussion of moral idealism
versus life experience, the idealist sees the absurdity of his

position in the discovery of the body of his opponent, dead under
mysterious circumstances. Death is indeed the end of everything;
all that remains of the link which the idealist thought he saw
between man's life and some sort of absolute is a spider web
which goes up, it seems, into heaven, from the nose of the dead
man.

In La mano del malato povero it is the protagonist himself

who speaks to the reader of his understanding of man's condition.

The real difficulty is another. - Which? Eh,
you, dear friends, want to know too much! The
opposite of me who doesn't ever want to know
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anything. If X have to tell you what the real
difficulty is, that indicates that you aren't
aware of it. And then why should X tell you.

This passage is, of course, similar to several others, particularl
the previously cited one from Si gira ... in which it is clear
that Pirandello sees life, or the human condition, as the true
malady of us all,

Un'idea is the story of the gradual formation of an obscure
thought, an idea which comes as the result of the awareness
of that life malady and which cannot be identified, Unable to
understand the reason for anything, feeling a terrible disgust
for his own "good" actions in a meaningless world the protagonist
48
would almost rather be a beast, so as to escape this condition.
He tries to define his feeling:

- Weariness! Too many times has he exclaimed
this. In the end it has come to seem someone
else's exclamation; for some comforts, though
useless, we still try to give ourselves. If it
is really tiredness, moreover, being no longer a
temporary thing, and neither sleep nor anything
else being enough to make it pass, what relief,
what comfort can there be any longer in his
calling the idea that? And it isn't even disgust
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with his life. No, it's that he just doesn't know
what that idea is precisely, or where it comes
from, now so often, like a sudden stopping which
holds him suspended and absorbed in an opaque
waiting.

At last the idea takes form and he realises that he is contemplat
suicide,

Man's relationship with the objects which surround him is a
recurring theme in Pirandello's works. In many of these passages
one is reminded of Sartre's distinction of Being-in-itself and

Being-for-itself. In II guardaroba dell'eloauenza Tudina alternat
between a vicious dislike for these objects and a gentle and
solicitous care for them. They represent a reality which she
cannot understand.

(...) apparently moved by a savage impulse, but
in reality by an unconscious instinctive need
to rid herself of and destroy certain things
the sense or the value of which she couldn't
succeed in grasping.

La carriola is devoted precisely to this theme of the
consciousness of the absurd and a man's reaction to it.

I saw, suddenly, in front of that dark, bronze
coloured door, with the oval brass plate on which
was engraved my name preceded by my titles
and followed by my scientific and professional
qualifications, I saw suddenly as if outside of
me, myself and my life but without recognising

In this remarkable story of the absurd, the protagonist now
realises that he must live with this awareness of the unreality
of things. He goes back to his "ordinary" life, to his work, to
his family, but he has a remedy for this feeling of alienation
or rather a unique way of forcing himself to remain always in
confrontation with the absurd, the meaninglessness of his position
with all its titles and privileges. Every so often, when no one
is about, he performs the ludicrous act of holding onto the hind
legs of his dog and walking him around like a wheelbarrow.

There are other remedies. In Rimedio la geografia. a man seeks
to remove himself from all distress by remembering the smallness
of earth in comparison to the universe.

Taken by itself, this

story might be interpreted as a recommendation to suppress all
personal feelings and live in a state of sublime indifference which
can be achieved by keeping always before one the immensity of
the universe and the smallness of earth. In fact, there is some
justification in this interpretation since it corresponds with the
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commonly accepted interpretation of the novel Si gira ... However
it can also be argued that such indifference is impossible. We
cannot really isolate ourselves from reality except through a

supreme act of what Sartre would take to be "bad faith". This typ

of indifference is the result of acceptance of the meaninglessnes
of life rather than a confrontation with it. In the short story
Quando si comnrende for example, Pirandello clearly illustrates
the impossibility or the fraudulence of such indifference, and
over and over again he, like Camus, stresses the importance of

living life, being one with its "flow" rather than discussing it o
trying to capture it in "form" or categories. Also, the novel Si

gira ... can be even better interpreted as an illustration not of

much sought indifference, but rather as a perfect example of that
"quietism" which Sartre so forcefully rejects as a form of "bad
faith". Therefore, although this particular short story does not
present a clear idea of Pirandello's beliefs on indifference in

the face of the absurd, considering it together with Pirandello's
other works in this area it must be interpreted as a type of
"remedy" which tries to annihilate the absurd or avoid it rather
than confront it,

In Canta l'epistola a young man, becoming aware of the absurd,
rejects his former life as a seminarian and begins to develop a
very special relationship with nature. For him, a blade of grass
takes on monumental importance. After all, if nothing has any
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meaning, why should any one thing have less meaning than another?
No one understands his unique perceptions, and as he dies trying
to make them understand, they think he was delirious to the end,

Una giornata uses a stream-of-consciousness technique to
illustrate the feeling of alienation experienced as a common
reaction to an intuition of the absurd. In it, a man feels as
if he had amnesia, a3 if there were a meaning to his everyday
activities which he had somehow lost. Of course, there has never

been one and at one point time, the enemy of us all (as Camus call
it in The Myth of Sisyphus catches up with the protagonist as
he realises finally that he is old, his whole life has passed in
the meaninglessness of daily tasks without his being aware of it.

In La cattura. a man bereaved by the death of his son becomes
aware of the vanity of everything.

Alone, among the trees and with the boundless
expanse of the sea in sight, as if from an
infinite distance, in the long and light rustling
of those trees, in the dark and slow murmuring
of that sea, he became used to feeling the vanity
of everything and the anguished tedium of life.

In the following passage from the novel Si gira ..., the protagoni
who later will close himself up in passivity and indifference,
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describes another character, and thus reveals indirectly his own
experience with the absurd:

(Cavalina) has acquired a clear perception of the
futility of everything and has seen himself thus
lost, alone, surrounded by shadows and crushed
by the mystery of himself and of everything. (...)
Illusions? Hopes? Of what use are they? Vanity
... And his own personality, prostrated, annulled
in itself, has gradually re-arisen as a pitiful
consciousness of other people, who are ignorant
and deceive themselves, who are ignorant and
labour and love and suffer.

Mattia Pascal, whom we have seen in his search for the true
nature of freedom, has glimpsed the absurd as well. Commenting on

a passage from 11 fu Mattia Pascal. Claudio Vicentini in his recen

book L'estetica di Pirandello states that ; "Heaven, understood a

a system of beliefs and values is a recurrent image in Pirandello,

(...) The humorist (emphasis mine), aware of the illusion, destroys
the conventional wholeness by means of 'the hole in the paper
sky' and introduces criticism into the work of art".

Mattia Pascal, alias Adriano Meis, feels a great
envy for marionettes above which the fake sky
remains unbroken. They can love, and hold

themselves in consideration as valuable, without
59
ever suffering vertigo or dizziness.
In the novel Suo marito is found another description of the
experience of the absurd.

She had a horror of that mirror where the
image of her own soul denuded of all necessary
fictions, necessarily had to also appear to her
as deprived of' any light of reason.

How many times, in insomnia, while her husband
and master slept placidly next to her, did she see
herself assaulted in that silence by a strange
and sudden terror, that snuffed out her breath
and made her heart beat tumultuously! So lucidly
then the structure of daily existence, suspended
in the night and in the emptiness of her soul,
without sense, without reason, tore her apart
allowing her to glimpse in a moment a very
different reality, horrid in its impassible and
mysterious crudeness, in which all the usual
false relationships of sentiments and images
would divide and fall apart.
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Having now gathered together representative examples of the
first category of Pirandello's "humorous" works, those in which a
character or characters either philosophise on the subject of the
absurd or in which their moment of awareness of the absurd is
described, let us turn now to the second category, that is, those
works which manifest to the reader although not necessarily to
the characters within the work, certain situations or anomalies
in life which tend to bring about a consciousness of the absurd,
To this category belong such short stories as La levata del sole.
Al valor civile. Richiamo aH'obbligo. L'illustre estinto. Marsina
stretta. Se ..., Un'idea. Pi sera un geranio. La rallegrata. JX

marito di mia mogiie. Distrazione. Notizie del mondo. Soffio. Lumi

di Sicilia, Un cavallo nella luna. II vitalizio. II buon cuore. an
Nell'albergo £ morto un tale. While these two categories do to
a certain degree overlap, the distinction is useful to see how
Pirandello has illustrated the theme of the absurd. In accord
with the general existentialist contention that there are many
paths to an awareness of the absurd, Pirandello has illustrated
a number of these. The realisation of the lack of seriousness
of life, the "games" that fortune plays or reflection upon the
weighty effect of even the most trifling of circumstances may
lead to an awareness of the absurd. In La levata del sole we see
how even the most serious of human intentions can be frustrated.
A man burdened by gambling debts as well as a host of other
difficulties sees no other solution but suicide. He stays up the
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entire night in order to watch his last sunrise, but he fails
even at this, his last desperate act. Instead of watching the
sunrise and then putting an end to his life, he falls asleep.

In Al valor civile the laughter of fate is evident. A woman
has left her husband to go and live with another man and have
children by this second relationship, thus setting herself up in
a respectable position in society. Her former husband is alone.
He never risked much in life, and when he did he always lost.
Now he is poor and very cynical. One night a man is seen to be
drowning in the sea. It is a moment for heroism. Who will go
to rescue him in the midst of the storm? A number of decorated
and be-medalled heroes stand about. Instead, in order to attain
a place for himself in society, in order to risk all, for once,
the deserted husband swims to the rescue. Amid the praise and
applause of the crowd he sees that the man he has saved is his
wife's lover,

Richiamo all'obbligo is a comical short story concerning a
"love potion" and its effects on a straying husband, to the
benefit of the wife's lover. Neither marriage, nor love, nor faith

in science, nor even fatherhood, nothing can be taken too seriously

Another game of fate occurs with its victim the protagonist
of L'illustre est into. A very famous, powerful man lies dying. He
imagines the enormous pomp and ceremony which will attend his
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funeral. Instead, he is buried in a pauper's grave, and all the
ceremony is attendant upon the body of an unknown corpse because
of an inadvertent switch of the bodies by the train personnel.

Reflection on the results of such "tricks" of nature, (tricks

which, however, it must be noted, are not ascribed to any intentio
action on the part of a somehow rational "nature" or "fate")
leads to consciousness of the power of the "if" and hence to
an awareness of the absurd. In Marsina strettar a suit of
clothes which is too tight is the tiny catalyst needed to change
the disposition of the wearer, which in turn cause him to act

differently from the way he normally would and hence to alter the
whole course of certain serious events which change the lives of
several people,

In the short story Se ..., this theme is developed more fully.

If a soldier had not been given his discharge in one particular t
rather than another, his entire life would have been different,
At first, one is tempted to interpret this as a short story of
"bad faith". However, the protagonist rejects the idea of fate

(which would place the responsibility on some other knowing being

or force). He simply reflects on the disparity of the unimportance
of random circumstances and what may be their final result.
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All that happens, had to fatally happen? False!
I could have not happened, if ... And here I lose
61
myself: in this ifj

If it is not clear that the protagonist goes beyond the realisatio
Df the power of the "if" to an awareness of the absurd, there is
certainly portrayed in this short story one of the paths which
may lead to this awareness.

While Sartre sees the absurd as he contemplates the fullness

and superfluity of being, Camus often finds it in the contemplatio
of death. The relationship between death and the absurd is an
interesting one in that a contemplation of the finality of death
may lead to an awareness of the absurd, and this latter may
lead to a contemplation of suicide. For the moment, let us
confine ourselves to the consciousness of death as it leads to an
intuition of the absurd. With the exception of a certain interest

in spiritism, Pirandello sees death as in a profound sense, final,
and hence "useless" and "without meaning", that is, a man's death

is the end of his personal existence. It fulfils no "eternal plan"
and (contrary to man's desire) has no more "meaning" than any
other natural event. In Notizie del mondo, the theme of life's
continuation after the death of a person is illustrated; however,
it is life for the others and illustrates the absurdity of his
own life, now that it is past. The best friend of the deceased
"corresponds" with him and through this correspondence little by
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little we see what little difference it would have made if he had
never lived.

In Jl marito di mia moglie. Pirandello states clearly that
an awareness of death is at the basis of all philosophy. The
protagonist, quoting a book whose title and whose author he
cannot remember, states:

The horse, - then - , who doesn't know that he
has to die, doesn't have any metaphysics. But if
the horse knew that he had to die, the problem
of death would, in the end, become, also for him,
much more serious than that of life.

Finding hay and grass is, certainly, a most
serious problem. But behind this problem the
other one arises: 'Why ever, after having toiled
for twenty, thirty years to find the hay and
grass, must one have to die, without knowing
why one has lived?'

The horse doesn't know he has to die, and
he doesn't ask himself these questions. To
man, however, who - according to Schopenhauer's
definition - is a metaphysical animal (which means
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precisely, an animal which knows he has to die).
62
that question is always before him.
The protagonist of this story not only knows that he will
eventually die, but that he is, in fact, dying and so must face
the "philosophical question". His first reaction is to wish to
be the non-metaphysical horse, but of course he cannot, and he
has a clear picture of the absurdity of his own position and how
life will be after he is gone,

While comical in nature, Distrazione illustrates man's instinctive flight from death and anything connected with it. It
is the story of a former taxi driver who loses his present job
as the driver of a hearse because of a brawl which is brought
about by a moment of distraction. Forgetting his new position, he
beckons a by-stander and offers him a ride. In La rallegrata, the
distinction between man and beast and their respective attitudes
toward death is shown. Horses in the stall of a funeral director
are conversing with each other and trying to understand what
it is that they do.

Man's confrontation with death and the consequent meaninglessness of life are illustrated in PX sera, un geranio,

He saw now those things; no longer as they used
to be, when they had some meaning for him; those
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things which for themselves have no meaning
at all and which now, therefore, are no longer
anything for him.

And this is dying.

Perhaps the most striking illustration of death and the absurd
in Pirandello is Soffio. In this short story, a man discovers
quite by accident that he has a strange and unique power. Just
by blowing on his fingers to illustrate the transcience of life,

he can kill anyone. On the one hand, life is nothing, on the other
is depicted all its sweetness and joy,

Another path to the absurd is the realisation of the relativity
of values (see Chapter III Section D). A good example of this,

contrasting in this case, city values and country values, is Lumie

di Si cilia. In D_X sera, un geranio. while we have already seen t
"death confrontation", we can also see illustrated the theme of
the relativity of values. A man lies dying. What is life? It

has no meaning except what we give it, like a flower in the night
- who knows why it has sprung up? The "why" is all-important
because it leads to the realisation that there is no answer. It

is seen as well in Notizie del mondo. Science can invent machines
and aparata to make us do more or do it better, but:
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What is important isn't to fly faster or slower,
higher or lower, but to know why one flies.

The power of an uncaring nature over man's most serious
undertakings is illustrated once again in Un cavallo nella luna.
JX vitalizio. IX buon cuore and NeH'alberqo A rnorto un tale. There
is no "seriousness" in nature. It has complete power over the
affairs of men, but unlike the reasoning "fate" of the Greeks,
this modern "force" is uncaring, and repeatedly manifests the
gratuitousness, the meaninglessness of human life.

If then, life is meaningless, is suicide the answer, or is it,
as Camus suggests, precisely in the refusal of suicide that man
finds some type of happiness? Is it in the affirmation of personal
freedom that man finds himself, or is it in some sort of agape
that must be lived. Indeed, what values if any can "exist" in an
absurd world? In other words, upon becoming aware of the absurd,
a man will according to existentialist theory, react in one of
many possible ways. Some of these reactions are "authentic", that
is, consistant with the person's newly acquired consciousness of
the absurd; and some are "inauthentic", that is, seeking to reject
or hide from this consciousness. In the following section, we will
examine these various possible reactions and, categorising each
as "authentic" or "inauthentic", we will compare Pirandello's views
with recognised existentialist ones.
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D. Reactions to the Absurd and Values in an Absurd World

As has been noted, for the atheistic existentialist, life has
no special a priori "meaning". From this, along what some would
regard as a logically dubious chain, they pass to the assertion
that everything is therefore meaningless and that value judgments
are totally arbitrary, thence to the discussion of what reactions
to the absurd are "authentic" and which values are to be choson
in an absurd and meaningless world.

In the conclusion of The Myth of Sisyphus. Camus identifies
man's happiness with the acceptance of his condition in an absurd
world. He likens all men to Sisyphus, that ceaseless and "futile
labourer of the underworld" who was condemned by the gods to
roll a rock to the top of a mountain where it would forever fall
back into the valley and from which he would forever have to
roll it up the mountain. Human life, for Camus, is as futile and
meaningless as Sisyphus' labour, but:

The absurd man (...) knows himself to be the
master of his days. At that subtle moment when
man glances backward over his life, Sisyphus
returning toward his rock, he contemplates that
series of unrelated actions which becomes his
fate, created by him, combined under his memory's
eye and soon sealed by his death. Thus, convinced
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of the wholly human origin of all that is human,
a blind man eager to see who knows that the
night has no end, he is still on the go. (...) This
universe henceforth without a master seems to
him neither sterile nor futile. (...) The struggle
itself towards the heights is enough to fill a
man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy.

Thus for Camus, the acceptance of the futile struggle, the
affirmation of life in the face of inevitable and meaningless
death is seen to be, paradoxically, the only meaningful value in
a meaningless world.

Sartre's view diverges only slightly from Camus' here, and the
difference is much more in emphasis than in substance. He does
not speak at all of "happiness", in the face of the absurd, but
rather of the acceptance of man's complete freedom to affirm what
value he chooses, since in an absurd world, according to Sartre,
no values are given. In the affirmation of this liberty and in
the commitment of oneself to a self-chosen value, no happiness
or victory is found, but only the avoidance of what Sartre calls
"bad faith" or "self-deception".

For Camus, to react in any way other than that which accepts
the absurd condition and determines to live in the full knowledge
of it, means to be defeated and overwhelmed by the absurd and
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be, in effect, less than a man. Hence, suicide is to be rejected
as is the search for that which those in this tradition call
an "absolute"—meaning in this context something possessing an
externally generated value, something capable of giving an a
priori "meaning" to life and thus taking away the despair. The
only solace which may be allowed is that agape, fraternal love,
or charity, which reaches out to all other men since they too
must live the absurd, (see for example The Plague).

For Sartre, it is only through the acceptance of our complete
liberty to choose, the realisation of which is brought about by
an awareness of the absurd, that we may live as men. Any device
which would seek to mask this feeling of anguish or take away
one jot of our responsibility for our choices or deceive us into

believing that we are not, in fact, free is a form of "bad faith".
There is no solace for our anguish. No value or system of values
is held to be more worthy than any other except in that it either
affirms each man's liberty or restricts it.

What is Pirandello's position regarding the various reactions
to the absurd? How does he deal with the "existentialist" values
such as freedom or the affirmation of life as compared to the way
in which he deals with traditional moral values? With a view to
forming a coherent interpretation of the place of value sytems
in Pirandello's works let us examine all the various reactions
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to the absurd found therein and see the extent to which this
author may be termed a "pre-existentialist".

1. Relativity (Subjectivity) of Values

For Camus one of the direst consequences of the realisation
of the absurd and the decision to live with it is the awareness
of a paradoxical type of freedom.

(...) hitherto he was bound to that postulate of
freedom on the illusion of which he was living,
(...) To the extent to which he imagined a purpose
to his life, he adapted himself to the demands
of a purpose to be achieved and became the
slave of his liberty. (...) Thus the absurd man
realises that he was not really free. (...) To the
extent to which (...) I arrange my life and prove
thereby that I accept its having a meaning,
I create for myself barriers between which I
confine my life. (...) The absurd enlightens me
on this point: there is no future. Henceforth
this is the reason for my inner freedom. (...) He
enjoys a freedom with regard to common rules.

Hence within the existentialist framework commonly accepted moral
values lose their force,
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There is a widely-held although fallacious line of reasoning
among atheistic existentialists that by denying the existence
of God they, thereby, take away the force of moral imperatives.
They are fond of that famous line by Dostoievski "If God does
not exist, then everything is permitted." They also spend great
amounts of energy and endless pages fighting what to many is the
straw man of absolute values, values which always and everywhere
override any possible circumstances. Pirandello's short story La
morta e la viva is a perfect example of these lines of reasoning.
A man who all his life had had faith in the infinite power of
God, who had respected Him in all circumstances finally comes
upon a situation which cannot be neatly arranged according to
any previously constructed value system, and the man realises
that he must construct his own since no values are absolute in
this sense, Pirandello's ideas concerning the relativity of all
reality are well-known, (see Chapter IV). Based on a rejection
of God's existence (see below), the realisation of the absurd, and
this notion of relativity, Pirandello also concludes that values
are relative; and the only absolute that will be found is within

ourselves, our freedom to choose within the limits of our historic
context and in the face of our ultimate death. The phrase

"relativity of reality" is typically Pirandellian and in order not
to substitute some other locution for this already well-accepted
- within Pirandellian studies - phrase, I have continued to use
it, but it must be noted that Pirandello's "relativism" could
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more properly be termed "subjectivism" since he is an ontological
absolutist but an epistemological relativist.

Interestingly, in a recent article within the field of Pirandellian studies (June 1982) Ludovico steidl in fact refers to
Pirandello's philosophy as "soggrestivistica", thus going against
the already established usage and perhaps happily starting a
trend toward more philosophically correct terminology.68

In the short story Zuccarello distinto melodista this search
for the absolute is illustrated. At first the reader is led to
believe that the protagonist is searching for an "absolute" in a

name or a title which would exhaust all the possibilities of being
of an individual or an object. In fact, it is upon the discovery
of a sign advertising the performance in an unkown and tawdry
cafe of a certain "Zuccarello, distinguished melodist" that the
protagonist thinks that he has found the "absolute", the title
which would exhaust all the possibilities of being of its owner.

I was (...) in one of those moments, unfortunately
not rare, in which reason (I still have, unhappily,
a little of that), sure of having reached at last
that absolute which everyone, without knowing
it, anxiously seeks in life (...) Reason, moreover,
realises all of a sudden that it holds in its
hand, victoriously, a little tail, understand?
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instead of the absolute; the little tail of a
wig, the kind of a wig tail to which Baron von
Munchhausen held onto to pull himself out of the
pond into which he had fallen.

(...) sooner or

later, the good which we have set for ourselves,
toward which we aim all of our affections, all of
our thoughts, and which has, therefore, acquired
for us the intrinsic value of our own life, an
absolute value, understand?; as soon as it is
reached, or even before, it reveals itself to us
as vain. (...) Because the absolute, dear friends,
that absolute in which alone, our spirit could
find rest, can never be reached.

The protagonist, in desperate need of finding the 'absolute' is su
that Zuccarello must have reached this "absolute" and therefore
be a god.

The confusion between the protagonist's search for

the "absolute" and his own statement that it cannot be found is
finally resolved in the conclusion that the "absolute" is nothing
more than the place inside each one of us from which can grow
an entire world. Zuccarello had found the only "absolute" that
there is in this world: the understanding of himself and his life
condition, the understanding that is, of the subjectivity or, as
Pirandello would have it, the relativity of all reality.
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It must be noted here again, that neither those existentialist

claims concerning the relativity (subjectivity) of values, nor tho

concerning the possible existence of an "absolute" and the alleged
consequences of these claims is at issue here. What is relevant

is only the finding of identical claims in the works of Pirandello

In the philosophy of Pirandellian drama is the
immoral affirmation that 'It is for each that
which it appears to each.' Sceptical affirmation
which is equivalent to 'Truth does not exist.'

In L'uomo la bestia e la virtu, the questions are raised; What
is man? What is beast? What is virtue? Conventional notions
of these are not accepted.

The relativity (subjectivity) of all reality according to the
perceiver is affirmed again in La mano del malato povero:

I really have never understood what pleasure
there is in posing questions to others in order
to know how things are. They tell you the way
they know them. Are you happy with that? Thank
you very much! I want to know them for myself,
and I want them to enter into me as they appear
to me/1
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In fact, according to Pirandello, it is impossible to see things t
way others do no matter how much one tries. This is illustrated

in Quand'ero matto, A man who finds total peace in a contemplation

of nature, feeling as if he himself could become the world with th
trees as his members, the earth as his body, the rivers as his
veins and the air his soul, awakes from this revery to realise
that he has really been raving.

Let us come back into our own consciousness ...
- But I re-entered into it, not to see me, but
to see the others in me as they see themselves,
to feel them in me as they in themselves feel
and to want them as they wanted themselves.

The entire segment of his life during which time he tried to be
one with nature and one with other people is refuted as the time
"when I was crazy". In fact, these desires, this way of life has
made him incapable of taking care of himself or functioning in
the world. It is only when he accepts the necessity of being an
egotist that he learns to be "wise". The ironic ending of the
story is his marriage to the wealthy widow of the man who robbed
him of everything. Thus he judges that he has been saved by
the great virtue of foresight on the part of his "good" thief.
Although it is undoubtedly true that it was for merely pragmatic
reasons that the protagonist of the story "could" not succeed
in seeing the world as others saw it, it is also true that he
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could only see through the eyes of other people and feel as
they did in his own idealised manner. In other words, he only
imagines himself to be thinking the way they were and feeling
the way they did. It was not, as it first appears, because of
his extreme goodness that he was robbed and ruined, but because
of the goodness which he thought was in others. Thus, studying
this story along with La sign or a Frola e JX signor Ponza suo
genero (and its dramatic equivalent Cos!- £ (se vi pare) which is

the classic example of Pirandello's illustration of the relativity
(subjectivity) of reality, and which will be discussed at more
length in Chapter IV on reality, we can see that it is not merely
a pragmatic impossibility of seeing the world as others see it;
such an objective world-view is impossible in principle as well.

In the face of this discovery Pirandello affirms in L'uomo in frak
that:

Loyalty, loyalty is a debt, and the most sacred
toward ourselves even before that toward others.
To betray is horrible.

In Niente we see the full force of Pirandello's treatment of
"common" values. They are niente, nothing. What is love once we
have attained it? What is glory once we have achieved it? What
is learning, or even life itself? Niente. (It must be noted that
Pirandello is not asserting that this experience is or should be

universal but only that it is one way of coming to an awareness of
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the relativity (subjectivity) of values to the importance which th

individual places upon them,) In the face of death, in the case of
this particular story - suicide, it is realised that nothing has
value and death is, in fact, the easiest way out. (For a further
discussion of life as the only value, however, see subsection 6
of this chapter.)

In the stories: Ritorno. Tutt'e tre. La prova. and X fortunati.
the "common" values of marriage and religion are questioned. In

fact, in La prova we find a situation almost identical with Sartre
classic example of the choice of values as illustrated in the
Biblical story of Abraham and his willingness to sacrifice his
son, Isaac. For Sartre, even Abraham being tested by God, was
entirely free and entirely responsible for his actions. He could
not blame it on God because it was he who had to first of all
decide whether in fact it was God who was calling, and whether
he was indeed calling Abraham, and whether he was in fact that
Abraham. The relativity of time itself that is, the subjectivity
of its perception, is illustrated in X due giganti.

The ambivalent traditional Christian values of poverty and
humility even within the Church itself are shown in La Messa di
quest'anno. If one examines logically and follows to their final
strict conclusion the teachings of Christ, the Church should not
be rich. It should give all it has to the poor. Christmas should
not be celebrated with feasts and decorations and pomp, but with

104
stark simplicity in its wholly spiritual value. The new priest in
a small village wishes to do this, to the great disappointment
of everyone. The narrator tells us:

'I am sure that the bishop will remedy everything,'
(...) This priest Don Grotti is too logical and
cannot succeed, he follows too much to the letter
the teachings of Christ. (...) No capons, no yellow
bread ... no nothing. (...) even more logical
was Catholicism which was well aware that men
couldn't for an unsure good over there, beyond
life, last for very long in the bitter and hard
resignation and in the despising of the goods of
the earth here below, it wanted pomp, it wanted
feasts ... and so many other things it wanted
and permitted. Go on, won't Monsignore want to
74
be a good Catholic?
On what basis then can values be chosen if even those which have
supposedly been sent down from Heaven can be and are interpreted
in contradictory ways?

The highest value, if there is one, must be the keeping of
faith with one's self-chosen values, whatever they may be, (This

is illustrated in Alia zappa. however the difficulty of doing this,
is also illustrated in Sopra e sotto and in La balia.)
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The existentialists insist upon the absurdity of life, its

ultimate meaninglessness. This leads them to a claim that there is

no such thing as an a priori value. At the same time, Sartre treat
the acceptance of man's utter freedom and total responsibility
as the highest value while Camus extols the acceptance of the
absurdity of man's condition as the only fully human mode of
behaviour. It is true that Sartre makes use of sophisticated
philosophical reasoning (or plain sophistry—depending on one's
point of view) in order to explain that he isn't really treating
freedom as a "value" but as man's "mode of being":

I am indeed an existent who learns his freedom
through his acts, but I am also an existent
whose individual and unique existence temporalizes itself as freedom. As such I am necessarily
a consciousness (of) freedom since nothing exists in consciousness except as the non-thetic
consciousness of existing. Thus my freedom is
perpetually in question in my being; it is not
a quality added on or a property of my nature.
It is very exactly the stuff of my being; and
as in my being, my being is in question, I must
necessarily possess a certain comprehension of
freedom.
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Camus seems to find it obvious that if man's condition is meaningless
and absurd, then the only manly thing to do about it is too
accept this absurdity. This great act of courage perhaps brings
happiness and a sort of victory and is hence to be valued.

One cannot help but observe here a certain contradiction.
One intuits an uncomfortable inconsistency. Either it is the case
that there are no a priori values and one cannot recommend
any particular mode of action, or this is not the case.
cannot have it both ways.

One

It is a tempting opportunity for

philosophical refutation of existentialist theses. However, even
more interesting is the observation of the same contradiction in
Pirandello.

On the one hand Pirandello illustrates the typically existentialist notion of freedom from "common" moral strictures because
of their "relativity" in the face of the absurd.

On the other

hand, he, like Camus, takes certain conclusions as obvious, e.g.
we are alive, there is this continual "flux" of life within us.
Being that this is all we have and the opposite of this, anything
which stops this flow is a form of death, choose life.

Being

that life lived to its fullest, life aware of the masks, the forms
which try to stifle it, life aware of its own absurd condition
in which it is forced on the one hand to construct itself and
accept certain masks while on the other it struggles to be free
from such killing forms —being that such a life seems more human,

107
more truly alive, Pirandello sees this kind of life as a sort
of ultimate value. Keeping faith with whatever values one has
chosen is also accepted intuitively as a positive value.

Thus we can see within the works of Pirandello a great
concern for the relativity—or subjectivity—of values as part of
the awareness of the absurdity of man's condition, a typically

existentialist theme. We can also see the same sort of inconsistenc
of claims in regard to ultimate values in Pirandello as in the
recognised existentialists.

2. God

What is Pirandello's position regarding the existence of
God? Religion, the Church, believers, miracles, and other themes
concerning God are numerous in the works of Pirandello. What are
their functions? Can Pirandello be classed with the atheistic
existentialists or does he affirm God's existence? Among the
literary critics we find many discussions in this area. Most
common is the opinion that Pirandello is a pantheist, but some

critics such as Pietro Mignosi have even maintained that Pirandello
is a perfectly orthodox Catholic. Pirandello's own claim that
one aspect of his work is "perfect orthodoxy in regard to the
position of religious problems. And such problems only allow of a
Christian solution," is, I would argue, misinterpreted and used
to support this dubious claim. Gino Cucchetti in his article
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Assoluto e relativo nei tre miti pU Luigi Pirandello states that
Pirandello does not in fact resolve these problems, then states
quite irrelevantly that Dante didn't either and asks the further
irrelevant question as to whether any of us has. This critic
further contradicts himself in stating that far from Pirandello's
thoughts is;

(...) the procedure of a certain deism which,
establishing with rational critical processes
the inconsistancy of all the positive religions,
believes to be able to abolish them, leaving each
78
individual to his own devices.
Either Pirandello does, in fact, leave each individual to his
own devices, or he resolves these religious problems. Cucchetti
further states:

(...) Pirandellian doubt is put in the service of
truth; irony and sarcasm punish perfidy, even
if it is overshadowed by the pretences of social
living, and even while negating it, he affirms
this life and the nobility of its struggles. And
not the 'absolute' in each man's actions, which
could represent the implacable march of destiny,
marked with the birth of the existence of each
one of us, but the 'relative' created by our will.
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by our sentiments, by our 'ego' conscious and
operating, is the most serene and comforting
significance that life is not that little breath
which is imposed upon us by a materialistic
force, based on a biological formula, but it is a
magnificent gift liberally given to us by a spirit
incalculably larger and more powerful than we,
a gift which we ^an use as we wish, according
to our desires, our tendencies, our aspirations,
a free will, in short, which makes us, according
to our thought, and each in a different way,
79
masters of the world.
In this section I will argue that: a) Pirandello's attitude
towards organised religion is a negative one, b) that his position
concerning God, in a Christian sense is that He is an invention
of man brought about by fear of the unknown or the inability to
face the absurdity of life, c) that the true nature of God - if
such a term can be applied to such a nature - is nothing more
than life itself which is envisioned as a force, a continual flow

or flux which has no meaning in itself, of which we are only a part
and to which it is we ourselves who must give a meaning, d) that
the acceptance of this concept is in some sense impossible for
men so they need their faith in God and e) that the recognition
of this need is the only true sense in which it may be said

no
that Pirandello's approach to religion only admits of "Christian
conclusions",

a. In La lega disciolta. Bombolo, a Mohammedan living in
Sicily, acting on "Christian" principles of justice and charity,
is contrasted with the Christians who, while outwardly preaching
the same principles, are actually less "Christian" than he, in
that they do not practise what they preach.

In La Madonnina

we see the faith of a small boy coming from an atheist family
contrasted with the scheming of the priest and other "faithful"
which deceipt destroys the boy's faith and drives him from the
Church. In Uno nessuno e centomila the narrator-protagonist of
the novel describes all nuns as at least partly crazy,

In the

play All'uscita the Philosopher describes how he had to explain
to his dog why he couldn't go into church.

'There stands the most respectable of human
sentiments, dear, which not content, not even
he, to live in men's breast, wanted to make
a house for himself on the outside, and what
a house!

Domes, naves, columns, gold, marble,

precious canvasses,' Now you, good man, perhaps
you can understand. As a house of God, the world
is undoubtedly infinitely grander and richer than
a church; incomparably more noble and precious
than any altar, the spirit of man in adoration

Ill
of the divine mystery. But this is the fate
of all sentiments which want to construct a
house for themselves: of necessity they become
smaller, and even become a little puerile, because
of their vanity. It is the same fate of that
infinite which is in us (...)

And again in Uno nessuno e centomila. we see the image of churches
as houses built by men to enshrine their own sentiments.

Men, you see? had to construct a house even
for their sentiments. It's not sufficient for
them to have them inside, in their heart, these
sentiments: they want to see them on the outside
also, to touch them, and they built for them a
house.

b. In L'Avemaria di Bobbio we see the torment of a man
wishing to live without faith. Bobbio, a sceptic and an atheist,
has continually recurring toothaches, but hates the dentist. It
is clear from the story that the pain represents man's anguish
over his condition, his recurring fear of the absurd. Can science
"cure" man of this fear, or is faith in God the answer? In
pain, almost as a childhood conditioned response, Bobbio says an
Avemaria. The pain goes away. This is repeated a number of
times. Should he believe or not? Finally, in order to solve the
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problem and not have these "games" anymore, he turns to science
and has all his teeth pulled out. Of course this cannot solve
the original problem of whether or not the Avemaria cured his
pain. In the novel Suo marito the authoress reflects upon her
own faith in God and begins to see this belief as a necessary
fiction in the face of the absurd.

(...) but wasn't God perhaps a supreme fiction
created by this dark and profound feeling in
order to calm herself. Everything, everything
was an illusion machine which one mustn't squelch,
which one had to believe, not through hypocrisy,
but out of necessity if one didn't want to die
or go crazy. But how to believe if one knew
them to be illusions? Alas, without a goal, what
sense did life have? Beasts live for living and
men couldn't and didn't know how; of necessity
men had to live, not for living but for something
fictitious, illusory which would give a sense and
82
a value to their lives.
In the face of the absurd, man's invention of God comforts him.
In ii vecchio Dio we read:

Hopes, illusions, riches and so many other beautiful things had Mr. Aurelio lost along the path

of life: faith in God was the only thing he had
left, faith which was, in the midst of the anguished darkness of his ruined existence, like a
little lantern; a little lantern which he, walking
hunched over, sheltered as best he could, with
timorous care, from the frigid breath of the
latest disillusionment s. He wandered as if lost
through life's disorder and no one was concerned
about him anymore.

- It is not important: God sees me! - he exorted
himself in his heart. And he was really sure of
this, Mr. Aurelio was, that God saw him because
of his little lantern. So sure, that the thought
of his proximate end, rather than dismaying him,
comforted him.

In Bereche e. la guerra we see man as the creator of God, the
Creator.

If only it were known in the heavens that
in the strip of tenuous half-light there are
millions and millions of restless beings, that from
that little grain of sand there they seriously
believe that they can dictate laws to the whole
universe, impose upon it their own reason, their

own sentiment, their own God, the little God
born in their little souls that they believe to
be the creator of those heavens, of all those
stars: and here, they take him, this God who has
created the heavens and all the stars, and they
adore him and they dress him up after their own
fashion and they demand that he account for
their little worries and provide protection also
in their most sordid affairs, in their stupid
84
wars.
In Pallottoline we see again, how man has created his own God out
of his fear,

- Are you afraid? - her husband shouted at her,
- Are you afraid that God, because I curse, as
you say, will send you a thunderbolt? There's
the lightening rod, fool. Do you see what your
God is born from? From that fear of yours. But
can you seriously believe, pretend that an idea
or a sentiment born in this nothing full of fear
which is called man should be God, should be the
one who formed the infinite universe.

In fact, it is the husband who is made to look foolish, not because
his lightening rod couldn't protect them from a thunderbolt from
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On High, but because he is naive enough to believe that by exposing
the origin of man's belief in God, he could rid man of his faith.
In fact, for most men this faith is a necessary illusion, as is
well illustrated in Lazzaro.

In this play, it is precisely the

realisation of this necessity which allows a man who has rejected
the priesthood to accept it once more.

- Now I understand and really feel the word
of Christ: CHARITY! Because men cannot remain
all and always standing, God himself wants his
house on earth which promises true life beyond;
his Holy House, where the tired and the poor
and the weak can kneel down and all sorrow and
all pride bend its knee. (...) now I feel myself
worthy again of putting on the habit for the
divine sacrifice of Christ and for the faith of
others.86

Man needs the comfort he seeks from faith in God. In Si gira ...
we read:

A man has died ... Myself, yourself, ... no matter:
a man ... And five people, in there, have gone
on their knees round him to pray to someone,
to something, which they believe to be outside
and over everything and everyone, and not in
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themselves, a sentiment of theirs which rises
independent of their judgment and invokes that
same pity which they hope to receive themselves,
and it brings them comfort and peace. Well,
people must act like that.

c. The "God" which Pirandello envisages is, therefore, not the
personal Judeo-Christian God who gives a meaning to the universe,
who planned and executed the redemption of man, and who will
judge and reward or punish each man according to his merits. It
is a "God" only in the sense that it is a force somehow beyond
man and yet is found in each man. It is the only "absolute";
life, a continuous flux, a force which is in each man and which
will continue after the death of each man. If it is any form of
theism at all, then it must be regarded as a pantheistic doctrine,
the equivalent of affirming that life is the ultimate value, an
affirmation which is hardly foreign to Camus. What is called
"God" by man in his necessity for faith is in reality, according
to Pirandello "pitch darkness". Man denies death in God, but
this does not render us immortal nor does it give meaning to our
lives. True resurrection consists in:

believing in only this Immortality, not ours, not
for us, hope of reward or fear of punishment:
believing in life's eternal present, which is God,
and that is enough.
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God is our own life within us and no need to search anywhere
else.

Our spirit is God within us.
(...) God (...) see you with your own eyes,
(...) What should I do?
Live.90

In Uno nessuno e centomila the narrator-protagonist contrasts
Pirandello's conception of God which is within oneself with that
which is a construction of man.

d. According to Pirandello, to accept that God is life within
each one of us means that we must accept each person's reality as
being as valid as our own; there is no God who has a priveleged
view. It is not possible for us to do this as we can only see
from our own point of view, and hence men reject this pantheistic
God and hold to their ancient faith. In Quand'ero matto a man
who had tried to accept this pantheistic world-view, realises the
impossibility of this.

(...) I agree now that this would be a difficult God
for wise people and even down-right impractical
because whoever would want to recognise him
would have to act towards others the way I used
to act, that is, like a crazy person: with equal

consciousness of oneself and of others, because
they are consciousness as we are. Whoever would
really do this and would attribute to others
the identical reality which he attributes to
his own, would of necessity have the idea of a
reality common to all, of a truth and also of

So we see that in one sense, because of man's weakness and fear
it is very pragmatically impossible, according to Pirandello, to
accept as the absolute what he proposes is, in fact, the only
absolute.

It is impossible also in principle, as we have seen

in the above section concerning the relativity of values. (More
will be said concerning the affirmation of life as well as the
inevitability of what Sartre calls "bad faith" later on in this
chapter.)

e. What attitude can then be taken in regard to the
need for an absolute, the need for faith?

More will be said

later on concerning Pirandello and fraternal love, agape', but
the above examinations of his attitudes toward the traditional
Judeo-Christian concept of God along with his espousal of what
may be regarded as a form of pantheism show that Pirandello's
so-called "Christian conclusions", if such they may be termed,
are Christian only to the extent that they take into account
the frailty of man and propose a loving, charitable, tolerant
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attitude towards these weaknesses. In no further respect can
he be termed an "orthodox Catholic". His pantheism is thus more
profitably classed with the atheistic existentialists rather than
the theistic or Catholic existentialists.

3. Suicide

Camus, considers the question of suicide the most vital one
in all of philosophy.

My reasoning wants to be faithful to the evidence
that aroused it. That evidence is the absurd. It is that divorce between the mind
that desires and the world that disappoints, my
nostalgia for unity, this fragmented universe
and the contradiction that binds them together.
Kierkegaard suppresses my nostalgia and Husserl
gathers together that universe. That is not
what I was expecting. It was a matter of living
and thinking with those dislocations, of knowing
whether one had to accept or refuse. There
can be no question of masking the evidence, of
suppressing the absurd by denying one of the
terms of its equation. It is essential to know
whether one can live with it or whether, on the
92
other hand, logic commands one to die of it.
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And he concludes, as we have seen above, that in order to
overcome the absurd we must live with it, in full knowledge of
the meaninglessness of our lives.

Sartre too condemns suicide

because paradoxically, although it is a free act, it becomes the
final act which takes away our freedom, man's mode of being doing
away with his mode of being. For Sartre, death can only "remove
93
all meaning from life".
If we must die, then our life has no meaning
because its problems receive no solution and
because the very meaning of the problems remains
94
undetermined.
Suicide is as meaningless as any other kind of death.

It would be in vain for us to resort to suicide
in order to escape this necessity. Suicide can
not be considered as an end of life for which
I should be the unique foundation. Since it is
an act of my life, indeed, it itself requires
a meaning which only the future can give to
it; but as it is the last act of my life, it
is denied this future. Thus it remains totally
undeterminedC..) Suicide is an absurdity which
95
causes my life to be submerged in the absurd.
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In the works of Pirandello we find one fictitious suicide (U
fu Mattia Pascal), three attempts or (near attempts) at suicide
and twenty-one examples of successful suicide. What function (or
functions) do these examples have in Pirandello's exposition of
his position concerning suicide?

There are only two clear examples of suicide as a reaction to
the absurd in all of Pirandello's works. In L'idea it is presented
to us as a vague idea which haunts, omnipresent in front of the
absurdity of life. In Candelora a woman faced with the relativity
of all reality cannot live with this awareness and kills herself.
Another short story, PubertA. may be interpreted as an example
of suicide in the face of the absurd, but it may just as well be
read as a reaction to the normal but in this case exaggerated
psychological difficulties of puberty.

In Spunta un giorno. we see the only example of the deliberate
rejection of suicide after it has been seriously considered as a
means of escape from an impossible or extremely difficult situation.
The two other examples of attempts (or near attempts) concern one
man who simply lacks the "courage" to commit the act of selfdestruction, L'idea. and another who simply falls asleep instead
of making the attempt, (La levata del sole).

Of the twenty-two examples of successful suicide, twelve are
committed because of the protagonist's inability to live with a
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difficult situation. In E due! a young man cannot live with

his past. In Nel segno, L'uoroo solo. Si gira ..., La veste lung a.
and Scialle nero the motive concerns unrequited love, betrayal
by the beloved or the impossibility of living without love. In
Zia Michelina the suicide is the result of the conflict between
society's values and the woman's own. In Niente and in La veglia
(this latter really an attempted suicide, but I have classed it
with the successful ones since the woman was saved only at the
last moment and not by her own acts.) the motives are less
clear but have to do with the difficulty of living with certain
situations. In Jn silenzio a young boy who has "adopted" his
illegitimate half-brother after the death of their mother and
made the love between them the focus of his life, kills himself
and the little brother as well when the mother's former lover
comes to claim the child. In Vestire gl'ignudi and JX guardaroba
dell'eloauenza suicide in conjunction with false stories are used
as means of saving the reputation of two people. In the latter
case, the suicide is committed by one person for the sake of two
other people's reputations, and in the former it is committed by
the person whose reputation is at stake.

While in some cases it is the awareness of the absurd which

results in suicide, in two short stories. Sole e ombra and L'imbeci
suicide is used by the author to lead us, if not the protagonist,
to a further awareness of the absurd. In the first case, a
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man commits suicide because he cannot bear the idea of being
caught for his stealing and going to prison. But a greater part
of the story concerns the contrast between his last glorious
day in the country and his designs, and between his death and
the continuing, uncaring beauty of nature. In the second story
suicide is used to illustrate the uselessness of death. No one,
no political motive, no other circumstances can make it "worth
something" to the individual.

Its very finality makes the life

which preceeded it futile,

In six instances suicide happens to appear in a short story
or novel, but it is used primarily to illustrate another theme,
In JX fu Mattia Pascal the suicide of a gambler is the technical
means by which Pirandello develops his plot and causes Mattia
to leave the casino and start for home, during which journey he
hears the news of his own presumed suicide and begins his new
life as Adriano Meis. In Mentre il cuore soffriva the suicide of
an old man paralysed by a stroke is described.

It is used to

illustrate the contrast between his body as looked at from the
outside by others and what was, at the same time, going on inside
him. In La levata del sole, a man who has gambling debts sees
no other solution but to kill himself. He stays up to see his
last sunrise but instead of killing himself he falls asleep. In
this story, as was shown in Section II of this chapter on the
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realisation of the absurd, Pirandello illustrates the absurdity
found in conjunction with even our most serious intentions.

In Ii viaggio. Da si, L'uccello impaqliato and Jl dovere del
medico, suicide is the perhaps exaggerated reaction of four people
in circumstances which take away their freedom and make their
life nothing more than a living death.
solution.

The suicides are not a

They are used by the author to provide a contrast

which ironically, highlights the value of life. In Da si, a man
decides to kill himself after discovering that he has fallen so
low that in fact his old self has already been dead for three
years. In II dovere del medico an accused murderer kills himself
rather than have his life - or even his freedom - taken away
from him. In Ii viaggio a young widow caught in the strictures
of traditional Sicilian society finally chooses life by rejecting
the living death of the customs of her little village. When she
must return to the village, she chooses death instead.

Rather

than being an example of true suicide, she is symbolically shown
to have chosen only between two forms of death.

In L'uccello

impaqliato a man who has "not lived" so he wouldn't die finally
realises his circumstances and ends the "living death" that was
his existence.

Thus, in none of these cases does Pirandello state clearly
his position regarding suicide.

He does not preach against it

as does Camus or Sartre, but neither does he propose it as a
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solution or an escape. In fact, far from admiration, the reader is
led to feel pity and a great compassion for all of these suicides.
Considering this evidence alone, it must be admitted that the
claim that Pirandello, like Camus, rejects and condemns suicide,
is simply under-determined by the textual evidence. However,
considered within the framework of all of the works of Pirandello
and especially in the light of the large number of works which
affirm the value of life as an antidote to the absurd (see
sub-section 6 below) it must be concluded that while Pirandello
did not consider the question of suicide as the basic one of all
philosophy as did Camus, neither did he leave out the question
altogether. And the answer to this question was, for Pirandello,
that while one must feel compassion for those who do choose this
form of action, for there are many who do; suicide is not an
acceptable means of dealing with the absurd.

4. Denial of Responsibility and/or of the Absurd

Sartre's notorious equation of man with freedom leads him
to conclude that he is totally and utterly responsible for his
choices, his actions. To attempt to behave as if one were not
responsible is to commit an act of what Sartre calls "bad faith",
mauvaise foi. It is an act by which a man tries to hide from or
mask the discomfort which this responsibility causes him. Even
madness is, for Sartre, a kind of "bad faith" because insanity
is a way of trying to create a false, illusory world in which
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a man can live without responsibility. Max Charlesworth in The
Existentialists and Jean-Paul Sartre, quotes an interview with
Sartre in which the French philosopher speaks of his influence on
and position concerning R.D. Laing and the anti-psychiatry school
of psychiatrists.

I think that Professor Laing was looking for a
theory which would put freedom first, so that
mental illness, or what is known as mental illness,
might appear as an aspect of freedom, and not as
a disease resulting from a malfunctioning of the
brain or from some physical complaint. I think
what he meant is that within society, such as I
conceived it, one could understand the nature of
an aberrant but persistent attitude which at
present is known as madness, an attitude that
prevents a real contact with others and which
is nevertheless a consequence of freedom. (...) a
new conception of mental illness seen as a mode
of life as valid as our own, but which, however,
is likely to lead to total inertia, for instance,
or to unbearable pain. He takes men as they are,
not as mad versus sane men, but as men; some
reaching a certain stage of distress, others
avoiding that stage. That is, I presume, what
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Laing seemed to want to take from my writings,
As a matter of fact, I am completely in favour
of anti-psychiatry, such as it is practised by
Laing and by others in Italy and France.96

For Sartre, Freud's theory of the unconscious act is a contradictio
in terms, and "bad faith" or "self-deception" is the true cause of

"mental illnesses" which are seen to be the result of "repression".
According to Sartre, repression at an unconscious level is not
possible because the mechanism of repression must in fact be
conscious of what it is repressing in order to do so. Even under
such extraordinary circumstances as torture, it is not licit to
say that one couldn't have done otherwise. One must admit that
rather than endure the pain, he chose to do as he did. Thus any
attempted escape from our responsibility for our choices as free
men is an example of "bad faith".

In Arte e coscienza d'oggi Pirandello describes the times and
one origin of this desire to escape. Modern science has taken
away the place in the universe which man thought to hold. The
world is no longer anthropocentric. Man can no longer believe
in the greatness of his position. As the "ancient faith" in God
disappears and man sees that there is no "meaning" or eternal
"plan" to be found in nature, he becomes aware of the absurd,
of I'umorismo of his situation and may seek to escape this
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realisation. One aspect of this "modern insanity" is a refuge in
a deterministic view of the world.

While on the one hand describing the condition of man as
part of an absurd world and emphasising his freedom; on the
other, Pirandello does not condemn universally the inauthenticity
with which some people approach this condition, this freedom, and
their resultant responsibility. The over-analysis of life, the
dissecting and marking of it with neat little labels rather than

living it is seen as inauthentic and unacceptable, but to a certain

extent "bad faith" (or as Pirandello might prefer "self-deception")
is unavoidable because not only do we often see ourselves as
very different from what we really are (see Chapter V on Self
& Others), but society itself often demands of its members a
97
certain reciprocal deception which makes life more tolerable.
This apparent divergence of opinion between Pirandello and Sartre
is not the result of any radically different view of man's freedom
responsibility. It is brought about only by a certain pessimism on
the part of the Sicilian as to individual man's actually accepting
his position in the absurd world. As has been shown in Chapter II

on freedom, Pirandello clearly believes not only in the desirabilit
of accepting this freedom and responsibility but in the very real
possibility of doing so. He does stress the difficulty of this,
however, and a great part of his work is devoted to illustrating
the conflict between authenticity and self-deception.

129
This same conflict between authenticity and self-deception
or bad faith shows up in Sartre. It is not only a question
of perpetual temptation toward bad faith as toward an easier
alternative but a conflict or a tension at an even deeper level.
Sartre states;

That which affects itself with bad faith must
be conscious (of) its bad faith since the being
of consciousness is consciousness of being. It
appears then that I must be in good faith, at
least to the extent that I am conscious of my
bad faith, (...) There is in fact an 'evanescence'
of bad faith, which, it is evident, vacillates
qg
continually between good faith and cynicism.
And again even more forcefully:

Thus the essential structure of sincerity does
not differ from that of bad faith since the
sincere man constitutes himself as what he is
in order not to be it. This explains the truth
recognized by all that one can fall into bad
faith through being sincere (...) Thus we find
at the base of sincerity a continual game of
mirror and reflection, a perpetual passage from
the being which is what it is, to the being which
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is not what it is and inversely from the being
which is not what it is to the being which is
what it is. And what is the goal of bad faith?
To cause me to be what I am in the mode of 'not
being what one is', or not to be what I am in
the mode of 'being what one is'. We find here
the same game of mirrors. In fact, in order for
me to have an intention of sincerity, I must at
the outset simultaneously be and not be what I
am.

Thus we see in both writers the illustration of the conflict
between authenticity and self-deception or bad faith, with a
slightly greater tendency on the part of the Sicilian toward a
certain pragmatic pessimism in regard to the outcome as well as
an appreciation on the part of both writers of the ontological
difficulties involved,

Pirandello, like Sartre, sees that the "unconscious" can be
no more than an excuse. He acknowledges its power, but sees
that its existence does not take away responsibility. In the
short story Nel gorgo and in the play taken from it Non si sa
come we see a man who, having committed adultery with his wife's
best friend in an "irrational" moment, and finding himself as well
as his partner, perfectly capable of pushing the memory of this
betrayal so deeply into their unconscious as to feel guiltless,
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goes "mad" as he realises that his wife might have done the same
101
thing.

The unconscious is likened to an abyss (.il gorgo) into

which the entire episode falls and which closes over immediately,
leaving no trace of the event. It is clear, however, that the
responsibility remains, as it does in the short story Nel sogno
from which comes the following passage:

(...) she had been another's in the unconsciousness
of her dream. The betrayal didn't exist in fact,
for the other; but it was and remained here, here
for her, in her body that had taken pleasure,
a reality.102

Nevertheless, the usefulness of the unconscious as an excuse is
also illustrated,
103
Where was the guilt? What could he do to her.
In IX treno ha fischiato. the usefulness of insanity as a
refuge from reality appears again. A man living an "impossible"
life, supporting a huge number of ill relatives, working literally
day and night becomes aware of his own freedom and sees his life
as his own choice. He is overcome with a sense of exhilaration
at this discovery, and other people think he is crazy. Of course,
he isn't, but being well aware of the situation he sees that it
would be much easier if he were,
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Yes, he was still a little elated, but very
naturally so because of what had happened to
him. He laughed at the doctors and the nurses
and at all his colleagues who thought him crazy.
- if only! - he said. - if only!

Of course, the most famous example of Pirandello's treatment

of insanity is the play Enrico IV in which a man, injured in a fall
awakes believing himself to be Henry IV. His friends and servants,
etc. second his delusions. After a time, he realises who he really
is, but aware also of the treachery of his "friends",—who had
engineered the fall—he pretends to continue to believe in his

fictitious identity, waiting for the moment when he will be able to
exact his revenge. He finally murders the man who had betrayed
him and retreats behind his "insanity" to evade responsibility
for his action. This play raises the question of what insanity
is, but it must be noted that Pirandello deals throughout his
works with two different concepts of insanity. One refers to the
type which we have been discussing through which a person tries
to evade his responsibility. The other concept, as we saw very
briefly in IL. treno ha fischiato is the labelling as "insane" by
society of any person who does not conform to its standards,
accept its particular values or share its deceptions. This is
the theme of the play JX berretto a sonagli.
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It's so easy to pretend to be crazy, believe
me! I'll teach you how. You just have to begin
shouting the truth in everyone's face. No one
believes it, and everyone will take you to be
insane.

Thus insanity can be a type of "bad faith" or "self-deception",
an attempt to evade one's freedom.

For Camus, "bad faith" is any flight from the absurd. In
discussing the various reactions to the absurd, in his essay
The Myth of Sisyphus Camus distinguishes between the absurd
hero, Sisyphus, who lives with and faces the meainglessness of
his existence and the futility of his endeavours, and others who,
through various means try to escape an awareness of the absurd.

In Pirandello, too, we find self-deception as a remedy for the
distress caused by the awareness of the absurd. In Si gira ...
the actress Nesteroff tries to escape the meaninglessness of her

existence. The protagonist of the novel, Serafino Gubbio, reflects:

'But what good will it do you' - I would like
to shout at her - 'what good will it do you if
Aldo Nuti does not come to bring it back before
you, your malady, when you have it still inside
you, stifled by an effort but not conquered?
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You do not wish to see your own soul? Is that
possible? If follows you, it follows you always,
it pursues you like a mad thing!

(..-) Is it

better to be killed than to fall back into that
torment, to feel a soul within you, a soul that
suffers and does not know why?'

Serafino is aware of the senselessness of everything. He wonders
if this can be an awareness peculiar to him or if others also
are aware.

I study people in their most ordinary occupations,
to see if I can succeed in discovering in others
what I feel that I lack in everything I do: the
certainty that they understand what they are
doing.107

He sees that others, too, are conscious of the absurd, but try
to reject it.

This is enough for me: to know, gentlemen, that
there is nothing clear or certain to you either,
not even a little, that is determined for you
from time to time by the absolutely familiar
conditions in which you are living.

There is

something more in everything. You do not wish

or do not know how to see it. But the moment
this something more gleams in the eyes of an
idle person like myself, who has set himself to
observe you, why, you become puzzled, disturbed

It is as if people, at times, would like to step outside of their
own beings so as to relieve their suffering, aware that it is
their own being which is the cause of their pain.

Enemies, to her, (Nesteroff) all the men become
to whom she attaches herself, in order that
they may help her to arrest the secret thing
in her that escapes her: she herself, yes, but
a thing that lives and suffers, so to speak
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outside herself.

In fact, it is precisely the desire to be aware of one's own being,
to give it a value, a meaning, in contrast with the impossibility
of achieving this which gives rise to the absurd. If one could
get outside of his own being and live without this awareness, the
anguish which this confrontation produces would cease. In Canta
l'epistola. a man who has already rejected religion as a solution
to the eternal problem is very well aware of the absurd. If man
could cease searching for a meaning, the absurd would no longer
exist.

To be no longer conscious of being, like a stone,
like a plant; not to remember any longer even
one's own name; to live just to live, without
knowing that one lives, like animals, like plants;
with no more affections, nor desires, nor memories,
nor thoughts; without anything any longer which
would give a sense, a value to one's own life.

The desire not to die but to live, as Sartre describes it, in the
manner of a thing, that is, without the terrible consciousness of
the absurd, is overwhelming. In the short story La trappola it
is illustrated again:

I was in the dark. You know I like to see the
day die through the panes of a window and let
myself be taken and enveloped little by little
by the shadows, and think: - 'I'm not here any
more!' - think: - 'If there were someone in this
room, he would get up and light a lamp. I don't
light the lamp because I'm not here anymore. I
am like the chairs of this room, like the table,
the curtains, the arm chair, the sofa, which
don't need a lamp and don't know and don't see
that I am here. I want to be like them, and not
111
see me and forget that I am here.

137
Sometimes people seek refuge from the absurd in frenetic and
continuous activity, hoping thereby to lose consciousness of it,
From his ridicule of such behaviour we may conclude that this is,
for Pirandello, an inauthentic mode of action. Claudio Vicentini
states;

Action, as absolute functionality without any aim,
becomes mechanical action (...) In this prospective, devouring activism represents the typical
attitude of the man who 'has renounced' and
tries to suffocate the existence of superior
truths, (...) It isn't, however, the overcoming of
the crisis, it is only the loss of awareness
of it, and entails the progressive alienation
of man who in exasperated activism suppresses
112
authentic feelings.
Vicentini in his work on Pirandello's aesthetics also notes that
the theme of the insignificance of human action which loses all

value and all real aims is a recurrent motif in Pirandello's works.
He quotes, in this context, Pirandello's short story Notizie del
mondo (Novelle I p 708) "What is important is not to fly faster
or slower, higher or lower, but to know why one flies." Without
this reason, action is folly. Again Vicentini quotes Pirandello (I
vecchi e X qiovani. in Romanzi. cit„ p. 817):
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I don't know, at certain times, who is crazier,
I who don't understand anything or those who
seriously believe that they do and speak and
move as if they really had some goal in front
of them.113

In

Si gira ..., Serafino, keeping his own being in parentheses,

as it were, retreats from life and observes very keenly the others
around him. He sees everyone rushing around, trying to hide their
distress in continuous amusements and activities,

I don't deny it, the outward appearance is light
and vivid. We move, we fly. And the breeze
stirred by our flight produces an alert, joyous,
keen agitation, and sweeps away every thought.
On! On, that we may not have time nor power
to heed the burden of sorrow, the degradation
of shame which remain within us, in our hearts,
Outside, there is a continuous glare, an incessant
giddiness: everything flickers and disappears.
114
'What was that?' Nothing, it has passed!
Such flight is fruitless. Even those amusements and those
activities cannot take from us the realisation of our condition.
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Yes.

More wearying and complicated than our

work do we find the amusements that are offered
us; since from our rest we derive nothing but
115
an increase of weariness.
The short story of Pirandello's which best illustrates the
theme of activity as a flight from the absurd is Leviamoci questo
pensiero. The protagonist is convinced that beyond all the little
tasks, the minute, everyday activities and obligations of life,
there must be some scope, some grand design by which he was
meant to accomplish something important. Living means doing this
"important something" so he must rid himself of the worry of
doing this or that in order to get on with the business of living.

(...) it palpitated in him like an indefinable
anxiousness, the anxiousness of an unknown wait,
a vague presentiment, that in life there was
something to be done, which was never one of those
many of which he ran round trying to rid himself
immediately of the worry. But unfortunately,
always, when he had rid himself of the worry,
he remained as if suspended and panting in a
frenetic emptiness. That anxiousness remained
inside of him: but the wait, alas, was always
. 116
vain.
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He couldn't 3eem to realise that life consists precisely of those
little tasks, those minute, everyday activities and obligations of
which he tried to rid himself of the worry. On his death bed he
is still convinced that there must be something important that
he was to do.

He regained consciousness a few moments before
dying; he re-opened his glazed eyes, looked
sullenly at the doctor and the nurses around
his bed: then reclining his head on the pillow
he repeated with his last breath: - There was
117
something I was supposed to do ...
Another, and most common, form of "bad faith" illustrated by

Pirandello is the avoidance of responsibility for one's own life by
attitudes which place the responsibility instead on circumstances,
other people, or fate.

In Si gira ... Serafino defines this type of "bad faith".

We all of us readily admit our own unhappiness;
no one admits his own wickedness; and the former
we insist upon regarding as due to no reason
or fault of our own; whereas we labour to find
a hundred excuses and justifications for every
trifling act of wickedness that we have committed,
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whether against other people or against our own
118
conscience.
In order to avoid responsibility for his own actions, a man may do
almost anything, as Serafino continues to reflect in the following
passage:

Among all the phenomena of human nature one
of the commonest, and at the same time one
of the strangest when we study it closely, is
this of the desperate frenzied struggle which
every man, however ruined by his own misdeeds,
conquered and crushed in his affliction, persists
in keeping up with his own conscience, in order
not to acknowledge those misdeeds and not to
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make them a matter for remorse.
The following are fully twenty examples from Pirandello's
novels, short stories and plays of the theme of blaming other
people, fate, God or circumstances for one's own difficulties, (1)
In Vexilla Regis a woman blames her mother's objection to her
marriage for her own abandonment of her lover and their child,
(2) In Zafferanetta a man blames his natural child for his retreat
from life and abandonment of his wife and the child of their
marriage. (3) In L'ombrello. a young widow blames the "difficult
nature" of one of her children for her own not remarrying. (4)
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In In corpore vili a priest uses the cook or anyone else around
as a scapegoat for his own gluttony and even uses the sacristan
to take the medicine for his own resultant illnesses. (5) In Tra
due ombre a man, upon seeing his former fiancee and realising
how changed he is, blames his stupid wife and ugly children for
the changes. (6) In Superior stabat lupus a woman refuses to
acknowledge her own complicity in a murder.

Did the suspicion of her father's cruel decision
flash across her mind, upon seeing him the next
morning all intent and attentive in the care
of the sick one, after all that had been said
between them the previous evening? Perhaps, but
she refused to assume consciousness of it.

In the novel (7) JX turno, a husband refuses any responsibility in
his wife's illness, of which he is actually the cause. The doctor

himself wishes to avoid responsibility for his choice of treatment.

And if the doctor said something to him: - I
don't know anything. - he answered invariably.
It's up to you. You're responsible. I'm here. I
don't complain about anything.

But in the end the doctor asked for a consultation, and having obtained from his colleagues

the assurance that he had done all that was
possible for the sick woman, he wanted to decline
all responsibility.

(8) In the play Come tu mi vuoi. a man refuses to acknowledge his
responsibility for his own choices,
Salter: I destroyed for you my life!

The unknown woman: For your own passion - not for me.

Salter: But who made me lose my head?

The unknown woman: I? You, yourself wanted to lose it
122
by coming near me.

(9) In Uno di pifl a man uses his own child as an excuse not to
admit that he can't leave his wife because he is afraid of her
and needs her.

(...) while it was he who put her forward that
way, his little girl, in order to shelter his
shame behind her, the shame of his inconfessable
shyness of his wife. He wanted to hide his shame
from himself and from his mother, and he put
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forward the little girl, saying that he didn't
123
leave his wife on account of her.
(10) In Vittoria delle formiche a rich man who has lost everything
through his over-indulgence in wine, women and gambling, is now
reduced to poverty. At the time he had refused all responsibility,
pretending not to be aware that ruin was imminent, although now
he lives in endless remorse over what he should have done and
didn't do. But still he hasn't learned his lesson. In order to
rid his shack of ants he tries to burn the ant hill nearby. His
hovel catches fire and he is burned trying to save it. He dies
calling it "an alliance between the ants and the wind",

(11) In Sedile sotto un vecchio cipresso a strangely emotional man,
always angry with one person or another has to call in a colleague
from his office as mediator every time he has a fight with his
wife. The colleague becomes like one of the family. He and the
wife have an affair, and the husband, thoughtless of consequences,
as usual, imprisons the wife in her own home, after having sent
her away and recalled her on account of the children. He shoots
the lover in the arm and is absolved. The lover goes away and
is reduced to begging in the streets. The husband, who has had
all kinds of prostitutes in the house as a vendetta on his wife,
by some sort of venereal infection has an enormous growth on
his neck on account of which he can't even lift his head. One
day, after many years, the husband and the lover meet and try
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to console one another. They are still trying to blame fate for
their present circumstances. (12) In Va bene, a man has blamed
"the blows of fate" for his entire life. Time after time he makes
the wrong decision and then, to avoid responsibility, blames fate
for all the dire consequences. (13) In La casa dell'anonia. the
theme of blaming fate is given a humorous twist. A man waiting
for an appointment in the livingroom of an acquaintance notices
a cat which is going after a nest of swallows under the window
ledge. The cat is bound to knock over a vase of geraniums that
is in the way. The observer can't take the agony of suspense. He
feels that it is useless for him to move the vase since the next
day it would be put back in its place. An accident is therefore
"inevitable". He rushes out of the house; if he is indeed hit by
the falling vase, whose fault is it? (14) In U. ventaglino a poor
woman begging in a cafe is finally given money. She spends it on

a little fan, saying "God will provide". (15) In La morta e _la vi
a man who has taken the responsibility of a choice under very
unusual circumstances continues to put the responsibility for the
consequences of his choice on God. (16) In Un'altra allodola. two
men who haven't seen each other for years meet. In discussing
their present circumstances, the one who is poor, whose wife has
run off to become a prostitute, blames all of his difficulties on

his being poor. (17) In L'uomo solo a man whose wife has left him,
obviously through his own fault, continues to blame fate for his
unhappy circumstances.

146
What could he do about it if around his childlike, tender and simple heart had grown that
ugly body of a pig? Born for hearth and home,
to love one woman in life, who would love him
- not a lot! not a lot! - just a little, what
recompense would he have known how to give her
for that little bit of love!124

(18) In JX turno. a young man with a little musical talent blames
the place of his birth for his not having developed his talent
and thus opened up the future for himself. Because he lives in a
small town and hasn't developed his talent, he does nothing and

lives off of his relatives. (19) In JX piacere dell'onesta Maurizio
speaks of:

The bad actions which one sees himself forced
, .. 125
to commit.
(20) In Vittoria delle formiche the man who has been reduced to
poverty muses:

It was destiny that he should wind up in the
126
country.

Thus we have seen twenty examples of the avoidance of responsibili
through a transfer of blame to another person, fate, God or
circumstances.
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Another way of avoiding responsibility is that of trying not
to act. As Sartre states, this, too, is a choice. Pirandello, too,
sees this sort of avoidance of responsibility as impossible. As
he states in E due!

(...) because men, in the presence of a fact,
couldn't remain impassive like things, even though
they, like he, might try with all their strength,
not only not to participate in it but even to
hold themselves as almost absent from it.

We see three examples in Pirandello, of people attempting to
avoid responsibility by trying to live through another person,
In La balia Pirandello describes a woman who expects that others
will give her life, without understanding that each person must
make his own.

She felt, and was perhaps really unhappy; but she
blamed others for this unhappiness, instead of
her own contrary nature, her bitter character,
her lack of any good graces. She was convinced
that had she come across a different man who
would have loved and understood her, she wouldn't
have felt all that emptiness inside and around
her. (...) Her husband (...) avoided as much as
possible speaking with her at length, certain
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that, whatever he might say or do he wouldn't
succeed in inspiring in her, in communicating to
her that affection for life, of which she felt
the furious desire, but of which at the same
time he judged her incapable. She expected life
from others, without understanding that each
person must make it for himself.128

A major theme of the novel Sup marito is precisely this refusal to
make one's own life. It concerns the husband of a famous writer
who tries to take refuge in and derive his own personal worth
from his wife's fame. The short story Ho tante cose da dirvi also
deals with a person who tries to take her identity from another.
A woman who as a young country girl married a famous musician, is
stupid and knows nothing of music or art, but she thinks that for
the past twenty-eight years she has shared her husband's life.
Now that he is dead, she cannot seem to understand why no one is
interested in seeing her. She has "borrowed" her husband's life
all these years and now, by rejecting a suitor from her village,
she refuses to live her own, again.

Another way of rejecting one's own responsibility is by
adopting certain illusions which may be easier to live with than
reality.

In Concorso per riferendario al consiqlio di state a

man is in a resort "trying" to study for an examination through
which he could obtain a civil service position in order to be able
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to marry. He uses every possible excuse to keep from studying,
except the real one: that he truly doesn't want the position and
doesn't really want to marry the girl. The truth is discovered
when his fiancee breaks off the engagement and rather than feel
unhappy or disappointed he is relieved,

In L'esclusa. the protagonist, a heroine of the anti-establishment
whose role in the novel is to contrast with the "bad faith"

of society is herself, upon occasion "guilty" of the same behaviour

When evening came, however, she realised that not
so much for others did she need to pretend as
for herself. Immediately, not to pay attention
to her own disquietude, not to remain alone with
herself, she took out from the drawer the school
assignments to be corrected, as she was in the
habit of doing every evening, she took in hand
the correction pencil and she began to read,
concentrating on the first composition all her
attention.129

In La maestrina Boccarme we see a country school teacher who has
retired from life to live with her illusions. In Mondo di carta a
man who has never lived, but only read about life, goes blind. At
first he hires someone to read to him, but this is unsatisfactory
since every inflection, every tone of voice other than his own
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seems wrong. Then he hires a girl merely read silently and thus
share his world. When she takes exception to a particular book,
saying that the place described isn't really the way it is in the
book, the man is distraught. It must be the same! It must be
the same! Otherwise, his entire conception of the world, based
on his books, is no longer secure,

The following are four examples of Pirandello's illustration
of the theme of man's coming to the realisation of his deliberate
avoidance of responsibility, (1) In II treno ha fischiato a man

who lives an impossibly difficult life, working literally night and
day to support a host of ill or aged relatives, is awakened to
all the possibilities of life outside of his own tormented and
difficult situation. A train whistle in the middle of the night is
the catalyst which brings about this awareness. The situation
will remain. He continues to work to support his relatives. In
fact, very little will change, but the awareness of all the other
possibilities and hence his responsibility for having in fact
chosen this particular life are enough to bring his happiness,
(2) In Marsina stretta. a man realises how he usually abandons
himself to whatever situation arises, rarely if ever having the

courage to rebel. (3) In II coppo a man who has blamed his failures
as an artist on anyone except himself and his own choices, finally
realises his own responsibility. In this very symbolic short
story, a type of fishing net represents self-deception and the
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river water which flows through it, life. He realises that it
is (was) his decision to jump into the net and after jumping, he
climbs out. He realises that he has chosen those "duties" which
inhibit other choices and chosen to pretend that he couldn't have
done otherwise. (4) In Paura d'esser felice. the theme of the
realisation of one's own responsibility is symbolically portrayed.
In this story is discussed the question of whether it is fate
or ourselves which are responsible for our own happiness. A
man whose every plan seems to be foiled at the last moment is
convinced that it isn't through his own actions that he comes
to grief but rather through some sort of demon or evil eye or
malevolent force. He becomes afraid to be happy and thus tempt
the evil eye. He always asks for the opposite of what he wants,
complains about what pleases him, etc. in order not to lose his
happiness. In the end he "catches" the demon responsible. He
realises that it is within himself.

Thus, along with those examples of "the denail of the absurd",
we have seen numerous examples of man becoming aware of his
condition, accepting his responsibility and living in "good faith"
with the absurd. However, it is clear that Pirandello wishes
to stress the difficulty of this. Sartre states in Being and
Nothingness that:

(...) consciousness conceals in its being a permanent risk o£ bad faith. The origin of this risk
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is the fact that the nature of consciousness
simultaneously is to be what it is not and not
to be what it is.130

In other words, if a man calls himself, for example, honest, in the
same manner that he calls a stone, a stone, he is in "bad faith"
inasmuch as he is not honest, he has merely committed certain
acts which may be termed "honest" and there always remains for
him the possibility that he will one day commit a dishonest one,
Thus, man, or as Sartre terms him, consciousness, is not what he
is. On the other hand, the man who has always acted the coward,
may term himself courageous in that for each one of his future
acts, there is as much possibility for him to act courageously
as for him to continue to act cowardly. Thus, he is what he is
not.

There is a nearly perfect parallel here between Pirandello
and Sartre.

While the affirmation of freedom is, in one sense,

the avoidance of "bad faith"; self-deception is, in another sense,
nearly unavoidable since as soon as one tries to affirm one
mode of being as opposed to another, as soon as he tries in a
certain sense, to define his "self" he is deceiving himself. The
continuous flux which is life, or consciousness cannot be limited
or defined. Hence Sartre's "permanent risk of bad faith". Hence,
also, Pirandello's ideas concerning life as a continuous flux and
form (definition of any part of that flux) as death.

Despite
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this, man cannot live in society without imposing upon himself a
form, a mask behind which lives his vastly multi-faceted self. As
Pirandello states in L'umorismo:

And nothing is true! True the sea, yes, true
the mountain; true the stone; true the blade
of grass; but man? Always masked. Without
wanting it, without knowing it, in that thing
131
which he in good faith believes himself to be.
And yet this mask, too, is a kind of self-deception,

Thus emerges from both Pirandello and Sartre a philosophy of
freedom in the face of the absurd, freedom, however, in constant

danger of being subverted by the desire to flee one's responsibili
or to deny the absurd. These desires to flee or to deny are
Sartre's classic examples of "bad faith". At the end of this
chapter we will examine the other reactions to the absurd to see
which are in Sartre's terms "authentic" or "inauthentic".

5. Fraternal Love

It has been stated in defense of Pirandello's philosophy
against the charge of utter despair and pessimism that, in fact,
the one value which this writer affirms, despite all his pessimism
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is that of love, mutual - if not understanding - then, tolerance,
agape. Indeed, Vera Passeri Pignoni in her previously cited
article on Pirandello and existentialist philosophy writes:

And this (suffering) is accompanied, as a medicine
and a relief, by love which has the function,
in the great iciness of existence, to bring
humanity back to its primordial ardour, to warm
for a moment that substance which form has
irrevocably fixed. How can one find here the
most agonised themes of Jaspers or of Marcel,
the need to resolve in love, in communion, in
compassion that weight of the absurd and of
the irrational which would otherwise crush man.

Thought doesn't include everything but it itself
is included. To its limitedness it is necessary
132
to respond with the consoling mystery of love.
Using as a prime example of this "doctrine" the play Cosi &. (se
vi pare) and speaking of Pirandello's characters which "do not
133
ask to be understood but to be loved".
Prof. Pignoni states:
(...) he gathered together the voices of many
philosophical theories, elaborating them with
originality, thus from the budding existentialism
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of his thought, he deduced a most human, most
original theory of love and of compassion. "

In an article on the moral philosophy of Pirandello, Lina
Passarella Sartorelli, defending the writer against charges of
complete moral relativity, finds that Pirandello's morality - as
she puts it - consists in his pity and compassion!

But against this drama (0 dX uno p_ dX nessuno)
stands Tutto per bene where Pirandello becomes
the tragedy of the most pointed morality, crying
along with scorned virtue.

And there stand

also Pensaci, Giacomino and II piacere dell'onesta
where man becomes the protector of another's
error.135

The conclusions of both Prof. Pignoni and Prof. Sartorelli, while
appealing are, in fact, unwarranted because 1) The compassion,
the fraternal love of which these two writers speak is indeed
present in Pirandello's works. However, it appears most frequently
as an emotional response in the reader or the audience to the
various situations and characters depicted. This consumate author,
this winner of the Nobel Prize for literature has undoubtedly
accomplished this deliberately but can this assumption be used as
"hard" evidence for the conclusion that his philosophy includes a
"doctrine" of fraternal love similar to Marcel or Camus? And more
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importantly, 2) the themes of pity and compassion, while they do
appear, seem to be counterbalanced or even outweighed by opposing
ones such as the inability to see others as they see themselves,
the impossibility of any deep communication between people, the
violence done to the self by the other's "look".

To cite the same examples as Passarella Sartorelli, it is at
least debatable whether Tutto per bene becomes the "tragedy of
the most pointed morality, crying along with scorned virtue" or
whether instead the author isn't in fact pointing again to ono
of his favourite themes, i.e. you make your own reality. That the
reality is, in this particular instance, a bit more compassionate
than in others is, I think, quite irrelevant. In Pensaci. Giacomino
and II piacere dell'onestA the fact that man becomes "the protector
of another's error" is simply the cause of further mishap. Hence
the compassionate nature of this protection is overshadowed by
its consequences,

There are indeed three short stories in which love, or
compassion is the major theme, and it may be on this evidence that
Professors Pignoni and Sartorelli base their conclusions. These
are; Natale sui Reno, in which we find a great nostalgia—possibly
autobiographical—for a time when the author was surrounded by
love. Prima notte and La fede. Already in the latter two, however,
we see evidence of the difficulty of attaining such love. In fact,
it is precisely this difficulty—one might even say impossibility-
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-which is illustrated in two very striking short stories: Sogno
dX Natale and Un goj, In Sogno di Natale a man dreams on
Christmas that he meets Jesus roaming the world looking for a
soul into which he, the incarnation of love, may be reborn. He
can find none since everyone is too busy looking after his own
affairs. The hypocrisy of the world which professes itself to
be guided by Christian principles of charity, which supposedly
lives by the agape of the Gospel is shown in Un goj. In fact,
this agape is at best difficult to encounter. A Jew who has
given up his whole identity, changed his name and married into
an ultra-Catholic family is persecuted for his religion by his
hypocritical and over-zealous father-in-law. He feels a "goj", a
stranger, in his own home. Actually, he is more "Christian", and
understands and bears things more "Christianly" than any of his
family. During the Great War, the father-in-law has prepared a
magnificent manger scene, making use of all sorts of black market
items. While everyone else is out at Midnight Mass, the "goj"
replaces all of the shepherds. Magi, peasants, and other figures

in the scene with tin soldiers of all nationalities, all with thei
guns facing Bethlehem.

Thus, while it may appear at times that Pirandello would find
in compassion, fraternal love, or agape a kind of temporary refuge

from the absurd, it is clear that Pirandello sees such a refuge as
impossible—or nearly so—because man is depicted as a basically
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self-centred being who, because of the inescapable relativity of
his perception of reality, can never truly communicate with others
let alone attain to such love,

6. Nature and the Affirmation of Life

Pirandello's attitude toward nature is somewhat complex and
quite unique. He has been called a mystical-pantheist and his
pantheism has been discussed in sub-section 2 of this Section, but

to call his attitude toward nature "mystical" is merely an evasion,
a means of avoiding a rigorous examination of this attitude. It
is neither mystical nor mysterious. Indeed, it is "pantheistic"
only if one insists on terming the "highest value", God. In this
sub-section I will argue that Pirandello's attitude towards nature
leads him first of all to a historical outlook concerning man's
awareness of his place in the universe, thence to the various
attitudes which an individual may take towards nature and his
place in it, and finally to the view of life, or nature, as a
continuous flux of which we are a part and which is killed by
the various "forms" which we try to impose upon it.

Mankind could never be "glorified". His behaviour is often
more bestial than that of the beasts. This is well-illustrated in
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the play Sagra del Siqnore della nave in which a young pedagogue
tries to defend:

'human dignity' despite the spectacle that it
makes of itself right in front of his eyes. In
the end his faith wavers terrified, and he falls
prostrate in front of this obscene and frighten137
ing spectacle of bestiality triumphant.
It is not just humanity in general being judged, but individuals
as well.
Sig. Lavaccara; That one there, I assure you, he is
a lawyer, yes, but much more of a
pig than my pig which we are about
. , 138
to eat.

In the past, however, despite man's faults he was regarded
as the centre of the universe, the centre of the history of
the Redemption, God's likeness and His child. The beginning of
the disintegration of this illusion came with Copernicus. From
L'umorismo:

One of the greatest humorists, without knowing
it, was Copernicus, who took apart not really
the workings of the universe, but the proud
139
image which he had made for ourselves of it.
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The coup de grSce was given by the telescope which, by making the
heavens and the stars so grand, in turn made us see the world
and all of our own grandness and glory as infinitely small. Thus
man, his old faith lost, turned to science to provide 'him with a
way to deal with the absurd. It must be noted here, of course,
that Pirandello was writing at the time of public awareness of the

rise of science, a time in which science of one sort or another was
thought to be the panacea. It must be noted also, that Pirandello
was not saying that people turned from faith to science as a
necessarily conscious choice. He is speaking, rather, as a social
psychologist, analysing the "popular mind", much the way Sartre
does when he connects atheism with the absence of moral values.
Of course, science fails to live up to man's expectations of it.
Vicentini, discussing Pirandello's essay Arte e. coscienza d'oggi.
writes:

Thus, rationalism, after having destroyed faith in
God, the concept of truth and the anthropocentric
conception of nature, can no longer satisfactorily
answer the man who asks what is the aim of
life, how to govern the instincts, and how to
found a morality. From this arises a critical
140
situation.
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In Lg stormo e l'angelo centunor Pirandello illustrates the
theme of faith or science used as a refuge from the absurd. Faith
is for the common people what science is for the educated.

In the two short stories Donna Mimma and Le sorprese della

scienza. Pirandello ridicules man's faith in science. In the former
an old mid-wife is forced to go to school to get a licence for
her "profession". All the "science" she learns takes away her
instincts and the benefit of all her years of experience. She is
useless. Her rival, a young fully-trained woman, instead, takes up

all of the old woman's folklore and traditional behaviour and so i

very successful. In Le sorprese della scienza Pirandello paints th
picture of Milocca, a town with no electricity, no running water,
nothing that smacks of progress. The inhabitants of this town,
far from being "backward", think of themselves as ultra-modern.

They are simply waiting for the ultimate technological advancement
which will make electricity, running water, etc. obsolete.

Machines or other modern inventions which are the result of
science are also derided since all they can do is make life, a
dull and meaningless business, easier and more monotonous. In Si
gira ... there are many examples of Pirandello's dislike for "the
machine". The following are six:

(1) This was bound to happen and it has happened
at last!

Man who first of all, as a poet, deified his
own feelings and worshipped them, now having
flung aside every feeling, as an encumbrance not
only useless but positively harmful, and having
become clever and industrious, has set to work
to fashion out of iron and steel his new deities,
141
and has become a servant and a slave to them.
(2) (...) the motor-car, the machinery intoxicates
them and excites this uncontrollable vivacity in
them. They have it at their disposal; free of
charge; the Kosmograph pays. In the carriage
there is myself. They have seen me disappear in
an instant, dropping ludicrously behind, down the
receding vista of the avenue; they have laughed
at me; by this time they have already arrived.
But here am I creeping forward again, my dear
ladies. Ever so slowly, yes; but what have you
seen? A carriage drop behind, as though pulled
by a string, and the whole avenue past you in a
long, confused, violent, dizzy streak. I, on the
other hand, am still here; I can console myself
for my slow progress by admiring one by one,
at my leisure, these great green plane trees by
the roadside, not uprooted by the hurricane of
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your passage, but firmly planted in the ground,
which turn towards me at every breath of wind
in the gold of the sunlight (...)

(3) A violin, in the hands of a man, accompany
a roll of perforated paper running through the
belly of this other machine! The soul, which
moves and guides the hands of the man, which
now passes into the touch of the bow, now
trembles in the fingers that press the strings,
obliged to follow the register of this automatic
instrument.

(4) All the life that the machines have devoured
with the voracity of animals gnawed by a tapeworm,
is turned out here, in the large underground
rooms, their darkness barely broken by dim
red lamps, which strike a sinister blood-red
gleam from the enormous dishes prepared for the
developing bath.

The life swallowed by the machines is there, in
those tapeworms, I mean in the films, now coiled
on their reels.
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We have to fix this life, which has ceased to
be life, so that another machine may restore to
it the movement here suspended in a series of
instantaneous sections. We are as it were in a
womb, in which is developing and taking shape a
144
monstrous mechanical birth.
(5) (...) that (opportunity) of meeting the man who
has remained for me ever since the symbol of
the wretched fate to which continuous progress
condemns the human race.

(6) I have no doubt, however, that in'time. Sir,
they will succeed in eliminating me. The machine
- this machine too, like all the other machines
- will go by itself. But what mankind will do
then, after all the machines have been taught
to go by themselves, that, my dear sir, still
remains to be seen.

Of course, man can do many things with the aid of science and its
machines, but the one important task of man - to find a meaning
for his existence - neither science nor inventions can accomplish,
We read in Canta l'epistola:
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Oh ambitions of man!

What cries of victory

because man has begun to fly like a bird! But
look here how a little bird flies: it is with the
purest and lightest ease which is accompanied
spontaneously by a trill of joy. Think now of
the mortal anguish of man who wants to be a
little bird! Here a flutter and a trill, there
a noisy and stinking motor and death ahead.
The motor breaks, the engine stops; good-bye
little bird! - Man - Tommasino Unzio would say,
stretched out there on the grass - leave flying
alone. Why do you want to fly? And when you
k r, ol47

have flown?
While some look for an answer to the eternal question in faith
or science, some take refuge from their terror of the absurd
in their acceptance of scientific theories and the consequent
"smallness" of man. If man is so small, then his pains must be
small too. In the short story Fallottoline! we find such a man.
He is an astronomer who lives a miserable life with his wife
and daughter, but he doesn't let any of this worry him because
the earth is nothing but a little ball. He takes refuge in his
telescope. Pirandello describes the complaints of his family over
how far away they lived from everything.

Distance?

But on earth for him there was no

distance. He would make a ring joining his thumb
and finger of one hand and would say to his
wife, laughing derisively: But if the Earth is
so big ...m

All pain and discomfort he would try to remove with reflections
on the smallness of man,

- You feel cold because you don't reason! Not
only by words did he demonstrate contempt in
which he held the world and all the things of life,
He suffered from toothaches, and sometimes his
cheek, in the violence of his pain would swell up
under his huge beard like the hip of a fatherabbot: well then, immediately he would push back
into space the planetary system: the sun would
disappear, the earth would disappear, everything
became nothing, and with his eyes closed, unmoving
in the consideration of this nothing, little by
little his torment would subside. - A decayed
tooth which hurts in some astronomer's mouth ...
it's enough to laugh.

The contemplation of nature and man's place within it is, for some,
an ideal means of escape. This is illustrated in Si gira ...:

Escape, Signor Fabrizio, escape; fly from
drama! It is a fine thing, and it is the fashion,
too, I tell you. Let yourself e-va-po-rate in
(shall we say?) lyrical expansion, above the
brutal necessities of life, so ill-timed and out
of place and illogical; up, a step above every
reality that threatens to plant itself, in its
petty crudity, before your eyes. Imitate, in
short, the songbirds in cages, Signor Fabrizio,
which do indeed, as they hop from perch to
perch, cast their droppings here and there, but
afterwards spread their wings and fly: there,
you see, prose and poetry; it is the fashion.
Whenever things go amiss, whenever two people,
let us say, come to blows or draw their knives,
up, look above you, study the weather, watch
the swallows dart by, or the bats if you like,
count the passing clouds; note in what phase
the moon is, and if the stars are of gold or
., 150
silver.
Not everyone can find comfort in this manner.

As we gaze at them (the stars), our own feeble
pettiness is engulfed, vanishes in the emptiness
of space, and every reason for our torment must

the
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seem to us meagre and vain. But we must have in
ourselves, in the moment of passion, the capacity
to think of the stars. This may be found in
a man like myself, who for some time past has
looked at everything, himself included, from a
151
distance.
In the short story Rimed io la geografia. we find another version
of this type of escape from anguish. A man has found the way
to forget his troubles by thinking how insignificant they are in
relation to all the troubles in the world. By thinking of the
reality of other places he somehow takes away the reality of this
place or this situation. The paradox is, of course, that man is
never so small as when he considers himself as grand, (science
will immediately dispute his claim and show him to be a tiny speck
in an immense universe), and conversely, he is never so grand as
when he considers himself to be small. That is to say, realising
his own place in the universe and being able to live with the
knowledge that the only spark of greatness, the only bit, as it
were, of infinity which is within him is his life, which is only a
tiniest part of the eternal flux of nature but which for him will
be limited by his death - accepting this knowledge means that
a man is living, as Camus would phrase it, in defiance of the
absurd.

I know; there is also the melancholy of those
philosophers who do admit the smallness of the
earth but not, for that, the smallness of our
soul if it can conceive of the infinite greatness
of the universe. Yes. Who said it? Blaise
Pascal. Nevertheless, one would need to think
that this greatness of man, then, if ever, exists
only provided that he understand, in front of
that infinite greatness of the universe, his own
infinite smallness, and that for this reason,
man is only great when he feels very small, and
never so small as when he feels himself to be
great.152

Another means of escape from the absurd is a desire to be
one with nature, not as a man, a consciousness, but as a thing,
a "being-in-itself" as Sartre would call it. Camus also is aware
of this type of an attempt at escape. In The Myth of Sisyphus.
we read:

If I were a tree among trees, a cat among animals,
this life would have a meaning or rather this
problem would not arise, for I should belong to
this world. I should be this world to which I
153
am now opposed by my whole consciousness (...)
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Two examples of this type of "escape" have already been given in
sub-section 4 of this chapter, since it is essentially an attempt
at hiding from or masking man's situation rather than accepting
it.

Another attitude toward nature which is a form of bad faith,
an attempt to refuse the responsibility of one's position in an
absurd world, is taken by people who try to give a "meaning"
to nature and hence to their own existence as part of nature,
Pirandello describes this attitude in several places. In La patente
ue find:

D'Andrea: (...) I speak to him (the little cardinal)
imitating, thus, with a whistle, his song, and he
answers me. I don't know what I tell him; but
if he answers me it means that he gathers some
sense from the sounds that I make to him. Just
like us, my friends, when we believe that nature
speaks to us with the poetry of its flowers, or
with the stars in the sky, while nature, perhaps,
154
doesn't even know that we exist.
In the short story JX oatto. un cardellino e le stelle we find:

A stone. Another stone. Man passes and sees
them next to each other. But what does this
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stone know of the stone nearby? And the water
of the canal which it flows through? Man sees
the water and the canal; he hears the water
flowing there and goes as far as to imagine
that water confides, in passing, who knows what
155
secrets to the canal.
II gatto. un cardellino e le stelle is the story of an old couple
who are keeping as a remembrance of their orphaned granddaughter
who died at age fifteen, a little cardinal. They attribute all
sorts of human thoughts to it. The little bird is eaten by a cat
and the stars continue to shine. Nature is perfectly indifferent.
The short story JX corvo di Mizzaro is another illustration of
man's attempt to ascribe a meaning to nature and natural events.
In Suo marito. again, we find as a minor theme, the idea of nature
having a meaning and having been created for man,

Ah, man who takes the whole earth and thinks
that everything has been made for him.

Thus Pirandello first describes the historical progression
of man's awareness of his place in nature from an anthropocentric
conception to a "rationalistic" one. Then we see four attitudes
which Pirandello derides as impossible or based on falsehood: 1) a
refuge in science as the provider of the "meaning" of nature and
hence of human life, 2) the seeking of solace in the contemplation
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of the "greatness" of nature and the "smallness" of man, 3) the
desire to be "one" with nature in the manner of a thing as
opposed to a consciousness and 4) the ascription of a "meaning"
to nature. These are all derided by Pirandello and are illustrated
as examples of various types of useless self-deception.

What, then, is Pirandello's own attitudes toward nature?
Among all of the possible reactions to the absurd (insistance
upon the existence of an absolute, rejection of responsibility,
the affirmation of "common moral values" or of the existence of
God, suicide, fraternal love), what value, if any, does Pirandello
choose? In all of his works, the only value which is unequivocally
affirmed and never contradicted is life itself. It is here that
Pirandello's and Camus' ideas coincide perfectly. In La. trappola
we find what may be Pirandello's clearest exposition of his ideas
concerning nature, life, death and forms.

(...) life is a continual flux, incandescent and
. ,. , . .157
indistinct.
We are all beings caught in a trap, detached
from the flux which never stops, and fixed for
death. The movement of that flux in us lasts
for a brief space of time, in our separated
detached and fixed form; but then, little by
little it slows down; the fire cools; the form
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dries out; until the movement stops entirely in
158
rigid form.
Thus we are a part of nature. Our life is only a part of a
life force which continues, but our life in and of itself has
no meaning. The continuous flux of this life-force will continue
unaltered after our death. Beyond the realisation of this, any
reflection, any thought, any attempt to organise or contain our
being in some "form" is only a hastening of death, since the

movement of life's flux is the antithesis of the immobility of form.

Oh to lose oneself, there, to stretch out and
abandon oneself, thus, on the grass, to the
silence of the skies; to fill one's soul with
all that vane blue-ness, making all thought, all
159
memory fail.
Thought can be the enemy of life, as we read in La nuova colonia:

But don't think of anything! Try to do! Listen
to me, to have never thought. - There is the
ground to the tilled? till; to sow? sow; to
throw out and bring in the nets? throw out
and bring in! Do, do. To do just to do, without
even seeing what you are doing, why you are
. , ., 160
doing it.
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There is no use asking the eternal "why". There is no answer,
There is only life. In All'uscita we read:

(...) so much life which, in the meanwhile, entered
into me through my open senses, of which I wasn't
aware. And then I would complain. About what?
About that miserable little thought, about an
unsatisfied desire, an adverse event already
passed. And in the meanwhile all the good of
my life escaped me.

Life in man is his only good. We read in Sopra e sotto:

(...) man has here, here in his breast, in himself
the greatness of the stars, this infinity, this
eternity of the heavens, the spirit of the
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immortal universe.
Because of Pirandello's derision of blind faith in science
and his identification of man with nature since the flux of the
life-force flows through all nature and man as well, we find in
Pirandello's works very often an exaltation of the country over
the city. He often likes to contrast the unnatural constructions
of man (machines, inventions, city life) with nature or life in
harmony with nature, as he does in Ciaula scopre la luna. in which
a boy who has been a miner all his life finally discovers the
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moon or in Alberi cittadini in which he describes the trees which
try to grow in cities. In La favola del figlio cambiato we find
the same contrast.

I shall go to bathe my hands in that fountain!
I want life to make itself new in me like spring
grass]
Away with the bitter fog, and that smoke
that smoke pierced by lamps,
architecture of iron,
ovens, coal, city
bustling with blind
and miserly worries.

In the play La nuova colonia. we find a group of people who
are trying to escape from the city and begin life anew. In the
play Lazzaro we see the contrast between the "real" life of the
country and the "cursed" life of the city. And in X giganti
della montagna we find:

And only when you no longer have a house, does
the whole world become yours. You go and you
go, then you abandon yourself on the grass to
the silence of the heavens; and you are all and
you are nothing ... and you are nothing and you

In SX gXra ... Serafino muses and wonders if it wouldn't be
better to destroy everything and start again.

I look at the women in the street, note how
they are dressed, how they walk, the hats they
wear on their heads; at the men, and the airs
they have or give themselves; I listen to their
talk, their plans; and at times it seems to me
so impossible to believe in the reality of all
that I see and hear, that being incapable, on
the other hand, of believing that they are all
doing it as a joke, I ask myself whether really
all this clamorous and dizzy machinery of life,
which from day to day seems to become more
complicated and to move with greater speed, has
not reduced the human race to such a condition
of insanity that presently we must break out
in fury and overthrow and destroy everything,
It would perhaps, all things considered, be so
much to the good. In one respect only, though:
to make a clean sweep and start afresh.

Mixed with pity, as is his custom, we find Pirandello's greatest
derision reserved for those who refuse to live: the country primary
school teacher in La maestrina Boccarme who lives only her world
of illusions, the cataleptic wife of the puppet maker in La. paura
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del sonno. the abandoned wife in Pena di vivere cosa, In La
distruzione deH'uomo we see the hideous crime of the murder of
a pregnant woman and we are led to question whether the title
refers to the destruction of the child in the womb or of the

murderer himself. An excellent example of Pirandello's condemnation
of mere existence as opposed to life is found in the short story
L'uccello impagliato. Coming from an entire family which has died

young of T.B., two brothers decide "not to live so they won't die".
One finally decides to marry and the other remains, just like the
old stuffed bird in his house. The married brother lives happily,
eats and drinks normally. The other brother tries to follow
his example once, but worries about it so much that he becomes
ill. Three years after his marriage, the one brother dies. The
other lives more sombrely than ever. Having reached age sixty,
he realises that he is "made of straw", lifeless. He pulls out the
stuffing of the old bird and commits suicide. In the development
of this theme, it is clear that Pirandello is affirming the value
of life lived to the fullest. As Camus writes:

(...) if I admit that my freedom has no meaning
except in relation to its limited fate, then I
must say that what counts is not the best living
but the most living. It is not up to me to
wonder if this is vulgar or revolting, elegant
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or deplorable. Once and for all, value judgments
are discarded here. (...)

Pirandello's affirmation of life is found throughout his work
- in the triumph of the continuation of life after the death of
a loved one, in an especial reverence for the family (although
not always the socially accepted one), in a mistrust of imposed
chastity as opposed to a love for all life especially young,
new life, in an awareness of the irreversibility of life and the
impossibility of capturing any part of life in "form" or trying
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to perpetuate any experience beyond its moment of life.

In the

3tories Vis it are gl'infer mi and Filo d'aria Pirandello affirms l
in its violent contrast with death. In the play L'uomo dal fiore
in bocca and its twin short story La morte addosso. as well as
in the short story La toccatina and JX marito di, mia moglie we
see the reactions of a man who knows he is dying. There can be
no greater affirmation of life.

Of what use is this affirmation of life? Can man find in
it an answer to his eternal "why", a refuge from the absurd?
No. Pirandello affirms the existence of a life force but not any
meaning to it. It simply is, and we are part of it, like Sartre's
"being". It is a positive value in that it is the contrary of
"nothingness". Our awareness of this life force only enhances
our consciousness of the absurd as we contrast our ideals or
aspirations with an eternal but blind and meaningless flux which
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is our life within us. This flux is the only reality, eternally
mutable, all else is only illusion. (See chapter on the nature of
reality.)

Let us examine, then, the final possible reaction to the
absurd, the last possible value to be chosen: silence.

7. Silence

In Arte e coscienza d'oggi Pirandello notes that the natural
consequence of irresolution in thought is irresolution of action.

Wo ideal today arrives at concretising itself in
front of us into a really intense desire or into
a strong need. As soon as one believes in the
vanity of life, one believes in the uselessness
of the struggle. We neither reach the ideal nor
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does the need disappear.

A desire for silence, for passivity is felt. Vicentini, in L'estetic
di Pirandello, sees this as a positive solution,

(...) it is not a repression of every interest,
but only of the egoistic interest, it isn't a
closing but an opening, it isn't a distance but
a presence m

the world.
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Realising the vanity of all ideals, the relativity of all reality
(see chapter on reality) one can find any decision, any attitude,
any action intolerable because it is unjustifiable. The theme of
Quando s& capito XI giuoco is precisely this necessary stoicism
brought on by an understanding of the world's meaninglessness.

(...) nor could he be shaken from that kind of
perpetual philosophic lethargy which stood in
his large greenish eyes and panted through his
large nose among the hairs of his dishevelled
moustache and those which grew in clumps from
his nostrils.

Because Memmo Viola would say that he had understood the game. And when one has understood
4-k
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the game ...
Is such "disinterest", such passivity possible? Serafino Gubbio
in SX gira ... finds himself in perpetual danger of being caught
in that reality from which he tries to divorce himself completely.

(...) I endeavour to feel them in myself as they
feel themselves, to wish for them as they wish
for themselves: a reality, therefore, that is
entirely disinterested. But I see at the same
time that, without meaning it, I am letting myself

be caught by that reality which, being what it
is, ought to remain outside me; matter, to which
I give a form, not for my sake, but for its own;
172
something to contemplate.
Serafino's job as a camera operator is one of complete passivity,
Knowing that all the action is but illusion meant for the cinema
he must remain before it and simply turn the handle of his machine
so that it may record it.

(...) Now she was beginning to be aware that
for these other people and also for herself (in
a vague way) I was not, properly speaking, a
person. She began to feel that my person was
not necessary; but that my presence there had
the necessity of a thing, which she as yet did
not understand; and that I remained silent for
that reason. They might speak, yes, all four of
them - because they were people, each of them
represented a person, his or her own; but I, no:
I was a thing: why, perhaps the thing that was
173
resting on my knees, wrapped in black cloth.
It is Serafino's job to be a silent, impassive spectator. Speaking
to a tiger which is to be used in a film, he says:
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And I, who love and admire you, when they kill
you, shall be impassively turning the handle of
this pretty machine here, do you see? They have
invented it. It has to act; it has to eat. It
eats everything, whatever stupidity they may
set before it. It will eat you too; it eats
everything, I tell you! And I am its servant,174

Entering his studio he stops being a person and assumes his
impassive role as the servant of the machine,
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I ceased to be Gubbio and became a hand.
I at once assume, with it in my hand, my mask
of impassivity. Or rather I cease to exist. Jt
walks, now, upon my legs. From head to foot, I
belong to it: I form part of its equipment.

Little by little, the impassivity of Serafino Gubbio's job spills
over into his life and we are aware that Pirandello is no longer
speaking of one individual with a unique profession but of the
condition of men in general,

I am neither hungry nor thirsty! I can do
without everything.
I have wasted upon you a little of what is of
no use to me;

you know it; a little of that heart which is of
no use to me;
because to me only my hand is of use (...)

Confronted by life itself, he tries to use his work-a-day passivity
as an escape.

I felt myself, all of a sudden, alienated by this
disgust from everyone and everything, including
myself, liberated and so to speak emptied of
all interest in anything or anyone, restored
to my function as the impassive manipulator of
a photographic machine, recaptured only by my
original feeling, namely that all this clamorous
and dizzy mechanism of life can produce nothing
now but stupidities.

But as yet the withdrawal is not complete. There is always the
danger that Serafino will not be able to remain passive.

Never before have I turned the handle of my
machine with such delicacy.

This great black

spider on its tripod has had her twice, now for
its dinner. But the first time, out in the Bosco
Sacro, my hand, in turning the handle to give
her to the machine to eat, did not yet feel.

Whereas, on this occasion ... Ah, I am ruined; if

Suddenly there occurred a thing which (...) rebuked
me for having chosen to remain indifferent. My
mask of indifference I was obliged to throw aside
in a moment, at the threat of a danger which did
really seem to all of us imminent and terrible.
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Despite my resolution to place and keep all these
people in front of my machine as food for its
hunger while I stood impassively turning the
handle, I saw myself too obliged to continue to
take an interest in them, to occupy myself with
their affairs.181

We begin to see the reason for Serafino's attempts at perfect
passivity. It is not so much a "professional" need as it is a
need to escape from his "superfluity".

I have only to enter here, in this darkness,
foul with the breath of the machines, with the
exhalations of chemical substances, for all my
superfluity to evaporate.

Hands, I see nothing but hands, in these dark
rooms; hands busily hovering over the dishes;

hands to which the murky light of the red lamps
gives a spectral appearance. 1 reflect that
these hands belong to men who are men no longer;
who are condemned here to be hands only: these
hands, instruments. Have they a heart? Of what
use is it? It is of no use here. Only as an
instrument, it too, of a machine, to serve, to
move these hands. And so with the head: only
to think of what these hands may need. And
gradually I am filled with all the horror of the
necessity that impels me to become a hand myself
also, and nothing more.

It is a refuge from his superfluity and yet this very superfluity,
"wretched" though it is, is also, in some way, a relief.

When, finally, I am restored to myself, that is
to say when for me the torture of being only
a hand is ended, and I can regain possession
of the rest of my body, and marvel that I have
still a head on my shoulders, and abandon myself
once more to that wretched superfluity which
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exists in me nevertheless (...)
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Serafino does not wish to admit it, but his friend Simone Pau
tries to convince him that the superfluity which he is trying to
escape through impassivity, is life itself.

It is true that I shall not know what to do
with these riches; but I shall not reveal my
embarrassment to anyone; least of all to Simone
Pau, who comes every day to shake me, to abuse me,
in the hope of forcing me out of thi3 inanimate
silence, which makes him furious. He would like
to see me weep, would like me at least with
my eyes to show distress or anger; to make
him understand by signs that I agree with him,
that I too believe that life is there, in the
superfluity of his, I do not move an eyelid; I
sit gazing at him, rigid, motionless, until he
flies from the house in a rage.

I have found salvation, I alone, in my silence, with
my silence, which has made me thus - according to
the standard of the times - perfect. My friend
Simone Pau will not understand this, more and
more determined to drown himself in superfluity
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Serafino sees his passive silence a way to brotherhood in the
suffering of mankind,

If you knew how I feel, at certain moments, my
inanimate silence!
And I revel in the mystery that is exhaled by this
silence for such as are capable of remarking it,
I should like never to speak at all; to receive
everyone and everything in this silence of mine,
every tear, every smile; not to provide, myself,
an echo to the smile; I could not; not to wipe
away, myself, the tear; I should not know how;
but so that all might find in me, not only for
their griefs, but also and even more for their
joys, a tender pity that would make us brothers
186
if only for a moment.
But it is very difficult to give or to receive pity and one can
really only look through one's own eyes. It is impossible to be
perfectly disinterested. Worst of all, complete passivity keeps
one from living, as we have seen in the chapter on freedom.

But I? Was I of the same world? His journey and
mine ... his night and mine ... No, I had no time,
no world, no anything. The train was his; he
was travelling in it. How on earth did I come

to be travelling in it also? What was I doing
in the world in which he lived? How, in what
respect was this night mine, when I had no means
of living it, nothing to do with it? (...) No,
no world, no time, nothing: I stood apart from
everything, absent from myself and from life; and
no longer knew where I was nor why I was there,
Images I carried in me, not my own, of things and
people; images, aspects, faces, memories of people
and things which had never existed in reality,
outside me, in the world which that gentleman
saw round him and could touch. (...) I, no, I was
not there; albeit, not being there, I should have
found it hard to say where I really was and
what I was, being thus without time or space.

I have derived one great benefit from it, as
you can see, I have learned to draw back with
an instinctive shudder from reality, as others
see and handle it, without however managing to
arrest a reality of my own, since my distracted,
wandering sentiments never succeed in giving
any value or meaning to this uncertain, loveless
life of mine. I look now at everything, myself
included, as from a distance; (...)
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In the short story II lume dell'altra casa PiranriplTn illustrates
the impossibility of living apart from others, impassively, in
silence, through others. A man with no life of his own tries to
live vicariously by watching a family which he can see across the
alley way through the window. The wife of that family and he run
off together, but she cannot bear to be separated from her family
and they are incapable of having a life of their own, so they
return, only to watch the little group - husband and children as they take their evening meal. They are as if suspended in
time. They do not live and they cannot live passively through
others.

Serafino, in Si gira ..., accepts the result of his impassivity,

lifter witnessing a particularly gruesome scene at which he assists
passively turning the handle of his camera, he wraps himself
completely in his silence and remains mute forever.

I have lost my voice; I am dumb now for ever.
Elsewhere in these notes I have written: 'I suffer
from this silence of mine, into which everyone
comes, as into a place of certain hospitality.
X should like now my silence to close around
me altogether.' Well, it has closed round me.
I could not be better qualified to act as the
189
servant of a machine.
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The reader is aware that Serafino's silence is his own deliberate
choice.

No, thank you. Thanks to everybody. I have had
enough. I prefer to remain like this. The times
are what they are; life is what it is; and in
the sense that I give to my profession, I intend
to go on as I am - alone, mute and impassive being the operator.

Is the stage set?
190
Are you ready? Shoot ...'
It saves him from the awareness of his superfluity but the
result is that while he can exist, he can never live,
E. Summary

In this chapter we have compared the "absurd" as found in
Pirandello, Sartre and Camus (Section B), then we have examined
the moment of realisation of the absurd as described by these
three authors, (Section C). In Section D we have seen several
possible reactions to the absurd: acceptance of "common" morality
or of God, suicide, rejection of the absurd and its concomitant

responsibility, search for fraternal love, the affirmation of nature
or life and refuge in silence.
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While the rejection of the absurd and its concomitant
responsibility is Sartre's classic example of "bad faith", it has
been shown that other reactions to the absurd, i.e. acceptance of
"common" morality or of God, suicide or a refuge in silence—are
also forms of inauthenticity. A search for fraternal love is for
Pirandello as it is for Camus a solace, a temporary refuge from
the absurd but as long as it does not become a denial of the
absurd neither writer seems to see it as a form of bad faith.
It has been shown that Pirandello, like Camus, chooses as his one
positive value life lived in the knowledge of its own absurdity,
It must be noted, of course, that Pirandello seems to understand
each one of the possible reactions to the absurd and exhibits
a certain compassion towards people as they choose among them,
a compassion perhaps greater than that of Camus or Sartre. It
seems clear, however, that Pirandello's conclusions are perfectly
existentialist ic.
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CHAPTER IV - THE NATURE OF REALITY
A. Introduction

Pirandello's philosophy concerning the nature of reality is
overwhelmingly Kantian and most probably based, in fact, upon
the Italian's study of German philosophy while at the University
of Bonn. He, like Kant, holds that objective reality (things in
themselves) exist, but that they are essentially unknowable. The
objects of our knowledge are things as they appear. All of
the sense data (relating, of course, to these appearances) are
organised by the individual into what he sees as a reality. The
concept which he himself creates through his own organisation
of these appearances is termed a "form". It is through the
creation of these "forms" that we know "reality". Paradoxically,
however, according to Pirandello, as we organise or create reality
by fitting it, as it were, into forms, we begin to distort this
reality by consciously or unconsciously ignoring those sense data
which, like loose ends, do not fit neatly into the form(s) which
we have already created and by being loathe to change the mold
into which we have organised reality once we have so organised
it. This distortion of reality, which of course will be extremely
subjective and will vary from individual to individual, Pirandello
expresses in the well-known phrase: form kills life.
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The awareness of the unknowability of things in themselves
and the consciousness of the subjectivity of the reality which
we organise and thus create for ourselves is, for Pirandello, a
primary path to the awareness of the absurd,

At times Pirandello seems to contradict himself. On the
one hand, he speaks of hiding from the "truth" or shouting the
"truth" in people's faces. On the other, he seems to deny that
truth exists. The inconsistency arises, however, from a confusion
between ontology and epistemology, and from a fairly careless
use of the word "truth". For Pirandello, there is an objective
reality with which our subjective construction of reality may at
times coincide—as, for example, in certain reasonably unimportant
(to us) bits of factual information. But this objective reality
seems to Pirandello very unimportant because it is rather the
subjective reality which motivates people's feelings and actions.

This subjective reality is so important to Pirandello that he would
not even pose the question as to whether "A knows that p" entails
that "p is true". One could well assume that if it were posed
to him, he would answer that it does entail that "p is true for
A". At the same time it could be false for B. Really true. Really
false. —a maddening response for one attempting to do analytical
philosophy, but as many analytical philosophers would be the first
to point out, perfectly in character for an existentialist. What
Pirandello is saying must be looked at at several levels: 1) he
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seems to assume a naive correspondence theory of truth; 2) the
subjective experience of this correspondence and the opposite
experience of a non-correspondence with this objective reality do
not differ from each other, hence my belief that "p" will motivate
me, will cause me to think, to feel, to act in the same way whether
or not "p" is true; 3) if, then, subjective reality has this power,
then one might as well say that truth doesn't exist in that my
construction of reality is as powerful, as capable of motivating
as anyone else's. That is—yes, truth does exist, but that fact
is simply less important to the running of the world than the
paradoxical facts that we each have our own subjective reality,
these various realities are at times extremely different one from
the other—even contradictory, and yet they may be based on the
same set of "facts". These realities co-exist, each one of us
finding in "the facts" reason to believe that our reality is the
"true" one.

At a different level, one does in fact find some inconsistencies

in Pirandello on the subject of truth, knowledge and communication.
If it is through the creation of "forms" that we know "reality",
which otherwise is a continual unstructured flux of sense data,
and if these "forms" distort reality, how can we know even those
small unimportant bits of true information which Pirandello takes
for granted that we do know? How can it be that society labels as
"insane" those people who speak about "truths" which are usually
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hidden because of society's standards, values or deceptions? Why
are these "truths" more "true" than others?

It appears to this writer that what Pirandello is doing is
similar to the idealist who opens the door, (even though it really
doesn't exist!) That is, he is conforming at times to the naive
demands of everyday existence. There is such a thing as truth
and we do at times seem able to apprehend it. We do at least
sometimes succeed in communicating with one another, if only at
a superficial level. Therefore, Pirandello takes these things for
granted.

Ludovico Steidl of the University of Florence proposes a
different solution. He suggest that by highlighting both the
necessity of shattering the mask to get beneath it to the "truth"

and the impossibility of doing this, what Pirandello is really doing
is placing the emphasis on the method itself, on the attitude
toward the absurd which it presupposes, rather than on the
2
feasibility of actually arriving at the truth. This too is a
possible interpretation,

Having recognised that we will encounter some inconsistencies,
let us now turn to a more detailed look at Pirandello's ideas
concerning the nature of reality and the ways in which he has
illustrated these ideas in his plays, short stories and novels.

1%
B. The Subjectivity pr 'Relativity' of Reality

The primary contention of Pirandello concerning the nature
of reality is that it is "relative", and here again it must be
noted that "relative" is the Pirandellian term for what would more
properly be called "subjective". Consciousness cannot passively
reflect an objective reality but organises its ever-changing flux
of sense data into ideas, concepts, forms. In the essay Teatro
e letteratura. equating "life" with our consciousness of reality,
Pirandello writes:

Life is a continuous and indistinct flux which
has no other form outside of the one which time
by time we ourselves give it, infinitely varied
and ever changing. Each one really creates for
himself his own life.

We are not in the realm of pure idealism here, however, because:

The world is not limited to the idea that we can
have of it. Outside of us the world exists for
itself and with us; and in our representation,
therefore, we must resolve to realise it, as much
as it is possible, forming a consciousness of it
in which it lives, in us as in itself; seeing it as
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it sees itself, experiencing it as it experiences
itself.

Nevertheless, despite this affirmation, the objective world in
itself has very little importance for Pirandello.

The goal of

seeing the world "as it sees itself" is an unattainable aim.
We can only know the reality which we see, which we experience,
which we live. The emphasis in all of Pirandello, is all on the
relativity, the subjectivity of this reality. As Serafino reflects
in SX gira ...:

(I) heard him say aloud in the silence of the
night:
'Excuse me, but what do I know about the mountain,
the tree, the sea? The mountain is a mountain
because I say: 'That is a mountain,' What are we?
We are whatever, at a given moment, occupies
our attention, I am the mountain, I am the tree,
I am the sea. I am also the star, which knows
not its own existence!'

I remained speechless. But not for long. I too
have, inextricably rooted in the very depths of
my being, the same malady as my friend.

The objective world exists, but we cannot know it as such.
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The activity of nature, in fact, is nothing but
the spirit which penetrates it, organising it. It,
therefore, does not prolong nature, it prolongs
itself: nature in itself and for itself remains
that which is extraneous to him and irreducible
for him.

And again in the short story Guardando una stampa we find:

Things, as they are, no one can know.

Thus the blind poet in this short story believes that he is at
no disadvantage, since everyone is, in that sense, blind.

By trying to contain reality in concepts, forms, we organise
it rather in the manner of the familiar Kantian active synthesis
and in that sense create it. This extends to the forms which
we impose upon ourselves to create a reality, a personality,
an individual out of what otherwise would be no more than a
consciousness aware and participating in a continuous flux of
raw sense data. As the Philosopher explains in the unusual play
All'uscita in which the shades of people recently dead gather at
the entrance to the cemetery:

(...) you, perhaps, poor man, imagined while you
were alive that you could see those forms of
yours, and touch them like real things; while
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they were only illusions necessary to your being,
as to mine, in order to exist in some way,
understand? They needed (and they still do) to
create for themselves an appearance.

Thus it is we who give reality to things, to other people and
to ourselves, in our fear of losing this reality we try all the
harder to fit consciousness into forms. We read in La trappola:

You hold precious above all things and you never
tire of praising the constancy of feelings and
the coherence of character. And why? But always
for the same reason! Because you are cowards,
because you are afraid of yourselves, that is,
of losing - by changing - the reality which
you have given yourselves, and of recognising
thereby that it was nothing but an illusion of
yours, that, therefore, no reality exists if not
9
that which we give ourselves.
The paradox, however, is that by fitting experience, life, consciousness into forms, we kill it. In the same story, we find:

But what, I ask, does it mean to give oneself
a reality, if not to fix oneself in a sentiment,
to congeal, to become rigid, to encrust within
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ourselves the perpetual vital moment, to make
of ourselves so many

little, miserable pools

awaiting putrefaction, while life is a continuous
flux, incandescent and indistinct.

(...) Life is

the wind, life is the sea, life is fire; not the
earth which is encrusted and assumes a form.
Every form is death.

The man in the short story quoted, La trappola, like several
others in Pirandello, such as the husband who has "understood
the game" in Quando s'fe capito il giuoco or Serafino Gubbio in Si
gira ... tries to encompass life in forms.

This tends to bring

one, as it were, outside of life, to cause the person to stand
apart, unable to participate and hence, in a different way, to
die. So, as the title of the story (La trappola) implies, we are
all caught in a trap, at the moment of our birth, merely through
the accident of being born in one time or place as opposed to
another or into one set of circumstances rather than another.

We wholeheartedly believe in our own conception of reality.
From Si gira ...:

I find myself assailed, at times, with such violence
by the external aspects of things that the clear,
outstanding sharpness of my perceptions almost
terrifies me.

It becomes so much a part of

myself, what I see with so sharp a perception,
that I am powerless to conceive how in the world
a given object - thing or person - can be other
than what I would have it to be.11

This is so important that at least in one sense it may be said
that there is no other reality.

If only there were outside of us, for you and
for me, a Madame reality of mine and a Madame of
yours, I mean for themselves, equal and immutable.
There is not. There is in me and for me a
reality of mine; the one which I give to myself;
a reality in you and for you: the one which you
give yourselves; ones which will never be the
same neither for you nor for me,

So, my friend, we must console ourselves with
this: mine is no truer than yours, and yours
12
like mine lasts but for a moment.
It is impossible for us to see any kind of reality from outside
of ourselves. As soon as we try, we find "nothingness". In La
distruzione deU'uomo we read:

The difficulty comes when we want to see the
aim of those inclinations and capacities and
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intentions, of those sentiments and instincts,
from the outside, for precisely because they are
sought from the outside, they are not found, as
nothing is found any longer.

To the extent that form kills life, which cannot be grasped
or held, there is no such thing as an "outward" reality. It is
useless to point to "facts". They are as subjective as the rest.
In the play Vest ire gl'ignudi we read:

The facts! The facts! Dear sir, the facts
are as one assumes them; and so, in the spirit
(consciousness) there are no longer facts: but
life which appears, this way or in some way.
Facts are the past when the spirit gives in (...)
14
and life abandons them.
To become aware of the relativity of reality is possible. To
accept it and live with it, without, therefore, ceasing to live
but only exist, is difficult, if not impossible. Serafino Gubbio
remarks:

There it is. Knowing quite well that places have
no other life, no other reality than that which
we bestow on them, I saw myself obliged to admit
with dismay, with infinite regret: 'How I have
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changed!'

The reality now is this.

Something

different,

I rang the bell. A different sound. But now
I no longer knew whether this was due to some
change in myself or to there being a different
15
bell. How depressing.
One excellent illustration of the way each man creates his own
reality is to be found in Pirandello's play Come tu mi vuoi, in
which no one is sure of the identity of one of the characters,
Each person finds "proof" for his own hypothesis in the "facts"
and "evidence" around. In the end Pirandello makes it clear that
there is no such thing as "facts" of the case, or "evidence"
because everything hinges on one's own interpretation.

Nor is reality constant through time even for one individual.
Moscarda comments in Uno. nessuno e centomila:

Why does it seem to you to be really a question
of taste or of opinion or of habit; and you don't
in the slightest doubt the reality of those
dear things with which now you see and touch
it. Go away from that house of yours; come back
in three or four years to see it with another
spirit than that of today; you will see what

will have happened to that dear dear reality
of yours. 'Oh, look, is this the room? Is this
the garden?' (...) Now you say that everyone
knows this, that moods change and everyone can
make a mistake. Of course it's an old story in
fact. But I don't pretend to tell you anything
new. I'm only asking: 'why then, by God, do you
act as if you didn't know? Why do you continue
to believe that yours is the only reality, that
of today, and you wonder, you become annoyed,
you show that your friend is mistaken, he who
no matter what he does will never be able to
have in himself, poor thing, the same spirit as
-,46
yours?
According to Pirandello we find the relativity (subjectivity) of
reality very difficult to accept, but occasionally circumstances
may force the realisation upon us. The result is a feeling of
anxiety, an unstable state in which it is difficult to remain. We
read in Un ritratto:

(...) I am convinced that there is no other reality
outside of the illusions which our feelings create
for us. If a sentiment changes suddenly, the
illusion collapses and with it that reality in

205
which we live and then we see ourselves lost in
the void.17

And in X nostri ricordi;

That life had never existed except in me. And
here, in the presence of things - not changed,
but different because I was different - that
life seemed unreal to me, as if it were a dream:
an illusion of mine, one of my fictions of the
past.18

The theme of the short story JX capretto nero is precisely that
time (and hence reality) passes differently for different people.
This notion is of course related to the concept of life-flux versus
form-death, in the sense that life, flux, experience, consciousness
cannot be halted even for the moment it takes to label it with a
concept, fit it to a form. The story is a humorous one concerning
a wealthy English woman who is travelling in Sicily. She sees
an adorable little black kid and wishes to buy it and bring it
back home with her. Since she is on a long trip she cannot
take it along and asks that it be sent in eight months time.
Of course, by then it is a big, dirty goat and no longer an
adorable kid. After the furor caused by the arrival of this
beast, it is suggested that what should have been sent was an
adorable little black kid, albeit a different one, since that form
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is what the woman wanted and not the objective reality of the
goat which her chosen kid had become. The arrival of the goat
was, most likely, for the Englishwoman, the moment of collapse of
her idealised fictions concerning reality.

As Claudio Vicentini

paraphrases Pirandello:

Life appears as 'a continuous flux which we try
to stop, to fix in stable and determined forms
inside and outside of us'. The 'forms' into which
we try to stop the flux 'are the concepts, the
ideals to which we wish to remain coherent'. But
inside of us the 'flow continues', and 'in certain
tempestuous moments, beseiged by the flow, all
our fictitious forms collapse miserably.

In fact, at one time or another, almost everyone comes to the
realisation of the relativity of reality, but this awareness like all the other components of the flow which is life - must
remain dynamic, never static. It is an awareness which comes and
goes. At the risk of remaining paralysed, silent, motionless in
front of the appalling spectacle of our own ignorance of reality,
we must believe in our illusions all the while knowing them to
be just that.

In Suo marito we read of the moments when the

illusions would fall and then be taken up again.
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Was a particular thing really that way? No,
perhaps it wasn't even that way! Perhaps, who
knows how others saw it ... if they even saw it!
And that dreamlike aura would put things back
in order.20

In Non si sa come, a man realises how capable he is of burying
reality beneath his own deception of self and of others, becomes
conscious of the relativity of reality, of the possibility that he,
like his betrayed wife, may be living an illusion. This awareness
pushes him to the brink of madness. Ordinary life is not possible
without illusions, hence the inevitability of what Pirandello calls
"self-deception" and what Sartre calls "bad faith". In the same
play we read;
21
Life depends on believing, not knowing.
In Bella vita we find:

Denora: When we don't want to know something
- it takes no time at all - we pretend not to
know it. - And if the pretence is more for us
than for others, believe it, it is just, just as
22
if we didn't know.
As has been mentioned in Chapter II on Freedom and in the section
of Chapter III on the denial of responsibility, Pirandello does not
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wish to take away our freedom or our responsibility, but he does
believe very strongly in the inevitability of a certain amount

of self-deception. In the play Come tu mi vuoi. the statement is
23
made that all of us never do anything but lie. Objective reality
exists. We cannot know it as it is in itself, but only form a

conception of it according to our own subjective consciousness o

it, which conceptions cannot encompass reality since not only ar

they subjective, they are only static forms that are of themselv
incapable of arresting the flow of experience.

The obvious implication of the contention that reality is

relative is that for different people, reality is different. The
paradoxes that this involves are the subject of perhaps the

most famous of Pirandello's plays: Cos! £ (se vi pare), Laudisi,

attempts on several occasions to explain these views to the othe
characters:

Laudisi: (...) I see you so anxiously seeking to know who other people
are and how things are, almost
as if other people or things
were one way or another.
Signora Sirelli: But then according to you one
will never be able to know the
truth?
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Signora Cini:

If we're not to believe even
what we see and touch!

Laudisi:

But yes, believe it, signora!
However, I tell you: respect
that

which

others

see and

touch, even if it be the contrary to what you see and

This

statement

is relatively

uncontentious, but

(Pirandello?) goes further.

Laudisi: (...) Permit me, signora, to answer
your husband.

How, my dear

friend, do you want your wife
to be content with the things
you tell her, if you - naturally
- tell them to her as they are
for you?
Signora Sirelli:

As they absolutely can't be!

Laudisi
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Laudisi:

Ah, no, Signora, please permit
me to say that here you are
wrong! For your husband, rest
assured, things are as he tells
you.
But the way they are in reality.
The way they are in reality!

Signora Sirelli:

Not

at

all!

You're always

mistaken.
Sirelli:

You are mistaken, I beg you to
believe!

Laudisi:

But no, my friends!

Neither

of you is wrong.

We cannot know things as they "really" are, and even less, people
Each person sees a different reality.

Laudisi:

(...) You, too, are sure to touch
me as you see me?

You can't

doubt yourself. - But for pity
sake, don't tell your husband,
or my sister, or my nephew, or
this lady here Signora Cini:

(suggesting) - Cini -

211
Laudisi;

(Cini) - how you see me, because
otherwise all four of them will
tell you that you are mistaken,
while in fact you aren't mistaken at all!

Because I am

really the way you see me. But that doesn't take away my dear lady, from the fact
that I am also really as your
husband, my sister, my nephew
and the lady here see me.

Nor does time pass equally for all. One person may live an entire
lifetime in the space of a year while for another it seems as
though time has hardly passed. This is the theme of the short
story mentioned above, JX capretto nero.

In Mondo di carta, a man who has done nothing but read all
his life and who has formed all of his ideas about the world
through books, is now blind. He hires a person to read to him
from his extensive library.

In order to "continue living", he

needs someone to share his reality. This is impossible, since even
in this case where all of his reality is codified, stable in books,
just the tone of voice of the reader changes it.
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(...) he understood that, more or less, it would
have been the same with any other reader. Any
voice that wasn't his would have made his world
27
seem another.
As we have seen in the chapter on freedom, many people take
refuge from the absurd, from the relativity of reality in history,
In Uno, nessuno e centomila we read;

Ah, the pleasure of history, gentlemen! Nothing
more restful than history. Everything in life
changes continually, right before our eyes; nothing certain, and this ceaseless anxiety to know
how things will turn out, to see how the facts
will sort themselves out holds you in such restlessness and such agitation! Everything determined, everything established at first sight, in
history: no matter how sad the events (...) at
least there they are, ordered, fixed in thirty,
forty little pages of a book: those and that's
it; since they will never change, at least until
some wicked critical spirit has evil pleasure in
overthrowing that ideal construction, where all
the elements held each other so well connected,
and you rested admiring how each effect followed.
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Actually, there can be no real refuge in history since it is an
idealisation and cannot capture the ever-changing flow of life,
There are no such things as facts; that is to say, the world is
not made up of facts which we can discover. Rather, facts are
like the slices of a cake which have no existence antecedent to
the cuts which we choose to make, thereby creating them. Indeed,
the very language of cutting suggests the aptness of this simile.
All of this is really antecedent fact. And yet not, perhaps. In
Risposta we read:

It is and it isn't. Because everything depends
?9
on where and how you cut the facts.
The importance of a fact is only that which we give it. This is
the theme of the short story Non £ una cosa seria.

For Perazzetti, there were in principle no serious
things. Everything depends on the importance
that you give to things. Something ridiculous
if you give it importance, can become something
most serious and vice versa, the most serious
thing ridiculous. Is there anything more serious
than death? And yet, for so many who don't
30
give it importance. (...)
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This is also the theme of the play by the same name. Memmo, the
main character, puts it into these words:

(...) Serious things, moreover, please be convinced,
Mr, Barranco, are only those to which we give
importance! Is there something more than death?
Someone doesn't give it importance - it's nothing!
On the contrary: your nose! Ridiculous thing,
But for you serious unhappiness! Why? Because
31
you give it importance,
The realisation of the relativity of reality must be accepted,
but one must live with it without either taking one's own "reality"
too seriously or, on the other hand, making a sort of refuge
from this manifestation of the absurd by refusing to believe in
the importance of any reality. Sartre calls this type of refuge,
the "bad faith of quietism". Pirandello, in for example, Rimedio
la geografia ridicules it as an impossible refuge and uses it to
again create a contrast which will highlight the absurd. In this
story, a man proposes as an infallible remedy for human distress,
a forced awareness of other people's reality. By remembering the
geography that one has learned at school, all of those facts
concerning other people, their customs, their lives - so the remedy
goes - we can put the distress of our own reality into perspective
and, seeing how small it is, not suffer. Of course, this only
serves to bring to light once again, the paradox of the absurd.
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If we are to live, we must choose, react, experience.

In order

to do this, we must believe in a particular reality to which we
can react, which we can experience and according to which we can
choose - all the while realising that it is a very subjective
reality created by ourselves and shared by no one.

Over and over again Pirandello illustrates the unimportance
of objective reality at least in the lives of men, in that it
is unknowable. As Laudisi proclaims in the above-mentioned play,
Cos! h (se vi pare);

I? But I deny nothing! I carefully abstain from
that! You, not I, need facts, documents to affirm
or to deny!

I wouldn't know what to do with

them, because for me reality doesn't consist of
those but of the minds of those two people, into
which I cannot hope to enter, if not by that
little bit which they tell me of it,

(...) You

can't tell, (who is right) No one can. And not
because those facts which you are looking for,
are annulled ... lost or destroyed - by some
kind of accident - a fire, an earthquake - no;
but because they themselves have annulled them
in their own mind, understand?

Creating, she

for him or he for her, a spectre which has the
same consistency as reality, in which they live
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at length in perfect accord, reconciled. And
this reality of theirs cannot be destroyed by
any document, since they breathe it, they see
it, they feel it, they touch it! - At the most,
the document could enable you to get rid of a
stupid curiosity. It's missing, and here you are
damned to the marvellous torture of having in
front of you, near you, here the spectre and
here reality, and not being able to distinguish
32
one from the other.
The document is missing, but just so that the audience or the
reader shouldn't believe that in order to discover the "true"
nature of reality it is merely a question of finding the objective
facts, Pirandello constructs the play so that, in fact, there is
one person who unquestionably knows the truth. Who is "right"
depends totally upon the identity of this person. The people,
unable to accept their "ignorance of the facts", contrive to find
this out, The final scene of the play belongs to this unknown
woman, who at last will resolve the mystery. But she says:
33
I am whomever you believe me to be.
And Laudisi comments:
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And that, ladies and gentlemen, is how truth
speaks. Are you satisfied?

There are three other plays in which the relativity of all
reality is the major theme. They are: Come tu mi vuoi. Tut to per
bene and All'uscita. In the first, the question of the identity
of a particular woman depends entirely (as it does in Cos! £}. on
each individual's interpretation of "the facts". In the second,
Martino Lori is Palma's father, if and only if, she and others
recognise him as such, irrespective of her actual biological origin.
In All'uscita. shades of people recently dead congregate at the
entrance to the cemetery. The relativity of reality is the subject
of their conversation and they are led by the Philosopher to the
recognition of this.

The following are fourteen of Pirandello's short stories, which
have as a major theme the relativity of reality. In La prova two
young priests are "tested" before being sent off as missionaries.
At least, this is the way they see it.

For someone else, the

incident would have nothing to do with "God" or "tests".

La

signora Frola e iX signor Ponza. suo genero is the short story
version of Cos! £ _{se vi pare).

In L'arnica delle mogli is Pia a

friend to all the young wives or are all her actions directed
towards the admiration of her by them and their young husbands?
JX chiodo is the reconstruction of a murder. What were the "true"
motives? X piedi sull'erba is the story of an old man involving
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the contrast between what his actions appear like to others and
how they seem to himself. Cinci is another story concerning a
violent crime. We know that Cinci will never be accused even
though he is the murderer. For his mother, as well as the rest
of the world, he will remain the little innocent, just as for him,
his mother is a good hard-working woman, struggling to raise him
on her own - even though the reader is aware that, in fact, she
earns her living from a dubious profession. PX guardia is an
extremely humorous story in which all the evidence points to a
particular situation, which we discover in the end not to be the
case. What about the evidence? Dono della Vergine Maria, on the
other hand, is a tragic tale in which the difference between the
outward appearances of a man's action and his own beliefs and
intentions causes the man's death, L'eresia Catara is the story
of an old professor who, believing that he is about to settle an
ancient question before an avid audience, gives an entire lecture
to a hall filled only with chairs on which are draped students'
raincoats. Le medaglie is one of several stories dealing with
people claiming to be "Garibaldini" heros. In it is described
the death of a man who, although he had never marched with
Garibaldi, had lived his life pretending that he had. In Pena
di vivere cos! Pirandello describes the situation of a deserted
wife whose husband returns, along with three daughters by a de
facto marriage. Everyone believes the husband to be entirely
to blame while the woman is the ideal wife. Is this really the
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case? In Accrua e Ji the theme of relativity is carried beyond
the realm of personal relationships into the domain of science,
In a small village there is a good doctor and a quack. Which is
which? The one who is believed is the one who is able to heal,
even though he does it with plain water. In Lo_ spirito maligno.
the "evil spirit" is, in fact, this subjectivity according to which
a man's indifferent or even good actions are often interpreted
as evil. In Guardando una stampa we find a blind beggar who
preaches that everyone is blind because no one can see things
as they really are.

If all reality is relative, subjective, is any one "construction"
of reality as good as another? According to Gino Cucchetti in

his article in the Proceedings of the (1961) International Congress
of Pirandellian Studies:

Pirandello would seem to accept openly that which
was the ancient proposition of the sophists and
of the sceptics: that it is possible for truth
not to exist in itself and for it to only have a
subjective value; to exist then only inasmuch as
we believe in this existence. In this way there
would be neither reality nor truth outside of
ourselves, to be and to seem would be the same
thing, two propositions contradictory to each
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other could be equally true as long as they are
recognised as such by the creative act of faith
r 35
of man.
As we have seen above in the excerpt from Pirandello's essay
Illustrator! at tori e. traduttori (Saggi p 221) for the author,
reality does, in fact, exist outside of our conception of it,
but the affirmation of this objective reality plays a very small
part in the works of Pirandello other than saving him from being

dismissed as "another idealist". Yes, objective reality does exist,
but this fact has no importance. All of the emphasis is placed,
instead, on what he calls the relativity, or what should more
properly be called the subjectivity, of reality. The proverbial
falling tree in the forest does make a noise, even though no one
is there to hear it, but the unheard noise has no importance. Far
more important, for Pirandello, would be the illusory noise which
someone or some group of people believed that they heard. All but
the "humorist" the absurd man, need to believe that their reality
corresponds with objective reality. Awareness of the closeness
of reality to illusion is too much for most ordinary people to
bear. As the narrator says in La signora Frola e ii signor Ponza.
suo genero:

But I say, holding the entire population this
way, in a nightmare, does this seem a small
thing to you? Taking away every support to
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common sense, so they can't distinguish any
longer between phantasm and reality. An agony,
a perpetual alarm. (...) Naturally, in everyone
is born the pernicious suspicion that reality
then is worth as much as phantasm, and that
every reality could well be a phantasm and vice
versa. This seems a small thing to you? If I
were in the Prefect's shoes, for the well-being
of the minds of the inhabitants of Valdana, I
would immediately evict Signor Frola and Signor
Ponza, her son-in-law.

One of the clearest expositions of Pirandello's thoughts on the
relativity (subjectivity) of reality is found in the short story
nn EPl dX vino, which deals with an old man who, forbidden to drink
alcohol, still goes often to the bar. Questioned, he answers that
his reason for doing this is to remind himself of the relativity
(subjectivity) of reality. His sadness can't be so real if a tiny
drop of wine would make it disappear. He states:

(...) I console myself, proving to myself that this,
my great sadness, yes, now it is real, but all I
would have to do is to drink a little wine for it
not to be. You could object that then my gaiety
wouldn't be real either, since it would depend
on the little bit of wine which I would have

222
drunk. I don't say no. But let's go back to the
beginning; what is true, dear sir? What doesn't
depend on what we put inside of ourselves in
order to create for ourselves now this and now
that truth?37

Of even more significance for Pirandello than our subjective
construction of "facts", occurrences or events is our construction
of the reality of ourselves as well as of other people. This
construction will be dealt with in the next chapter on the self
and others. It is interesting to note, as a conclusion to this
chapter on the nature of reality, that for Pirandello, there is
a unique parallel between reality in life and reality in art. As
he says in his essay on humour:

(...) one could say that not only for the artist,
but there exists for no one a representation,
either created by art or even that which we
make for ourselves of ourselves, of others and
of life, which can be believed to be a reality.
They are, at the bottom, the same illusion, that
of art and that which commonly comes to all of
38
us from our senses.
It must not be concluded, however, that Pirandello thinks man
must therefore step back and believe nothing. It is clear that
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the paradox would disappear if we were not to believe in the
reality which we have, each of us, created. We would all finish
like Serafino Gubbio in Si gira ...! —mute in a world of silence,
existing but not alive,

Sartre's position regarding the nature of reality is not
identical with, but certainly similar to Pirandello's. Sartre too
admits the existence of objective reality, which he calls the
"brute existent" or the "brute being of the in-itself". However,
it is through the freedom of the "for-itself" (man) that this
brute being reveals itself. Hence, in any given instance it will
not be possible to separate or even to determine what comes from
the brute given and what comes from man's freedom. Sartre cites
the example of a crag by the side of the road:

Here I am at the foot of this crag which appears
to me as 'not scalable'.

This means that the

rock appears to me in the light of a projected
scaling—a secondary project which finds its
meaning in terms of an initial project which is
my being-in-the-world. Thus the rock is carved
out on the ground of the world by the effect
of the initial choice of my freedom. But on the
other hand, what my freedom cannot determine
is whether the 'rock to be scaled' will or will
not lend itself to scaling. This is part of the
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brute being of the rock. Nevertheless the rock
can show its resistance to scaling only if the
rock is integrated by freedom in a 'situation'
of which the general theme is scaling. For the
simple traveler who passes over this road and
whose free project is a pure aesthetic ordering
of the landscape, the crag is not revealed either
as scalable or as non-scalable; it is manifested
only as beautiful or ugly.

After further examples Sartre states:

Thus we begin to catch a glimpse of the paradox
of freedom: there is freedom only in a situation,
and there is a situation only through freedom.

Sartre has very carefully reminded us in the same work, in
the chapter on transcedence that he has already rejected both
41
the "realist" and the "idealist" solutions.

Pirandello is more

dramatic, if less precise, fascinated as he is by the paradox
of man's "power" to "structure" his own reality—in fact by the
necessity of his doing so.

In Sartre there is no parallel to Pirandello's idea concerning
form killing life. As well, the Frenchman is more precise in his
explanation of the relationship between the "for-itself" and the
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"in-itself" and how in one sense man creates his own situation and
in another it must be said that he does not create it, but rather
discovers it. Nevertheless, Pirandello's ideas concerning the
nature of reality seem to be consonant with Sartre's particularly
since his works manifest very clearly the relationship between
the nature of reality, existentialist freedom and the absurd.
C. Summary

We have seen in this chapter Pirandello's view of reality as

"relative", or more properly "subjective", based on each individual'
organisation of sense date into "forms", thereby facilitating their
subsumption under concepts - though whether he operated with
a considered distinction between "form" and "concept" is by no
means clear. We have seen both the positive and the negative
function of these forms. Through examples and illustrations from
Pirandello's plays, short stories, and novels we have seen how
the writer draws the conclusions that it is possible to become
aware of what he calls the "relativity" of all reality and that
this awareness is a path to the consciousness of the absurd. We
have seen how these ideas are similar to Sartre's. Let us now
proceed to an examination of how Pirandello's ideas concerning
the "relativity" of reality affect his views on the nature of the
"self" and its relation to the "other".
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CHAPTER V - THE SELF AND OTHERS
A. Introduction

As we have seen in Chapter IV, all reality, for Pirandello
is subjective. While he does not deny the objective existence of
things, he stresses the unimportance of this objective reality.
Because of this, it is not the world of "things" which interests
Pirandello, but the world of people. While it is true that a man is
tall or he is not; he has red hair or he does not; he is born into
a particular set of historical, social and physical conditions some
of which he can change but some of which he cannot; these objective
"facts" take on importance for Pirandello - as for Sartre - only in
relation to a person's consciousness of and attitude toward them.
Given each person's individual awareness of and interpretation
of his own reality and reality of others, who am I? Who is the
"other" person? What relationship is possible between us? These
are the questions of most interest to Pirandello. In accord with
his views on the "relativity" of reality, he rejects any but the
most ephermal "human nature". We "construct" ourselves as well
as others. How is this accomplished? Section B of this chapter
will deal with the self: D the individual's search for identity,
2) the construction of the self and 3) the problem of "masks"
or "roles". Section C will deal with the relation of the self
to others: 1) the other's construction of us, 2) the mirror and
the other's look. Section D will treat of the "other": 1) forms,
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2) the paradox of the reality (or irreality) of death. Section E
will deal with the possibility of communication between individual
"selves".

As we have seen in previous chapters, life may be understood
as a continuous flux, as pure experience,

Man does not have an absolute idea or notion
of life but rather a varied changeable feeling,
according to the times, the instances, chance,
Now logic, abstracting ideas from feelings, tends
rather to fix that which is mobile, changeable,
fluid; it tends to give an absolute value to
that which is relative (sic!)

Each person has an infinity of possibilities which are then limited
by his own self-concept ion or the conception which others have
of him. Thus emerges another aspect of the absurd: the conflict
between the fluid, purely experiential nature of life and man's
consciousness which tries to conceptualise it.

While it is in

the realm of experience, sense data, that man has an infinity of
possibilities of being, any attempt at living within this realm
gives rise to a host of difficulties, primary among which is
the problem of what Sartre calls "quietism".

Aside from the

conception which others have of us, we are constructed also by
the conception that we have of ourselves as well as the facts
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of our birth and our historical and social condition. Also, our
acts become a prison for us, in which our identity is shaped.
In JX qiuoco delle parti. Silia is unhappy because she suffers
from, but is unaware of, this aspect of the absurd. Her husband
Leone, who has "understood the game" tries valliantly to fight

against the limitation on his possibilities of being, to resist the
"construction" of his "self". But falling into "quietism", passive
acceptance of everything, which of course is a choice in itself,
he realises that he cannot escape being "constructed", if only
by the facts of his birth and his "role" in society. Seeing the
inevitability of his situation he becomes Camus' absurd hero.

Rest assured, this indifference will be enough
for me to have courage, not just in front of a
man who is nothing; but in front of everyone and
always. I live in such a climate, dear, that I
can be heedless of anything; of death as of life.
Imagine then, of the ludicrousness of men and
of their wretched judgments. Don't be afraid. I
2
have understood the game.
Even our bodies "construct" us. Aside from fixing us in time
and space and leading us from the moment of our birth inevitably
toward the extinction of our personal being, they are the limiting
form by which others recognise us, the image others have of us.
In Trovarsi Donata states:

Eh, if you then look at my body ...
And what do you want me to look at?

... here yes, you see? That really is a
stranger to me then. (...) I am so little in
my body.
And where are you?

When you think, where are you? You don't see
yourself when you speak ... I am in life ... in
the things which I feel ... which move about
inside me ... in all I see outside - houses,
street, sky .,. the whole world ... So much
so that sometimes, seeing myself recalled by
certain looks at my body, to find myself a
woman ... - Oh God, I don't say it displeases but at certain times it seems to me an almost
odious necessity, against which I could come
to rebel.

(...) I no longer see the reason

why I should recognise my body as the thing
most mine, in which I should really consist
for others.
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Sartre too was fascinated by the problem of the relationship
between the "self" and the "body". He states that there are
three ontological dimensions to one's body:

I exist my body: this is its first dimension of
being. My body is utilized and known by the
other; this is its second dimension. But in so
far as I am for others, the Other is revealed
to me as the subject for whom I am an object.
Even there the question, as we have seen, is of
my fundamental relation with the Other. I exist
therefore for myself as known by the Other-in
particular in my very facticity. I exist for
myself as a body known by the Other. This is
4
the third ontological dimension of my body.
He, too, spoke of the feeling of discomfort within one's body
because of the relationship between it and the Other.

The explanation (of the wish to be invisible) here
is that we in fact attribute to the body-forthe-Other as much reality as to the body-for-us.
Better yet, the body-for-t he-Other is the bodyfor-us, but inapprehensible and alienated. It
appears to us then that the Other accomplishes
for us a function of which we are incapable and
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which nevertheless is incumbent on us: to see
ourselves as we are.

In Pirandello's Uno. nessuno e centomila. Moscarda reflects:

Living, I didn't represent to myself any image
of me.

Why then should I see myself in that

body there as in a necessary image of me? It
stood there in front of me, almost non-existent,
like a dream apparition, that image. And I could
very well not recognise myself that way. If I
had never seen myself in a mirror, for example?
(...) What did my thoughts have to do with that
hair, of that colour, which could have been no
longer there or white or black or blond; (...) I
could very well even feel a profound antipathy
for that body there; and I did.

In art, the "construction" of a character is totally free.
In life one's construction of oneself is conditioned by others'
perception of us, by our historical and social condition and by
our past acts.

Yet one must create oneself in order to find

one's own identity. In Trovarsi we read:
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And this is true ... and nothing is true. ...
The only truth is that one must create oneself,
create! And only then does one find oneself.

Still the paradox remains. We must create ourselves, our own
identity, but if we try too hard, we find ourselves caught in the
death of a "form" and as we watch ourselves we stop living. From
Trovarsi:

You want to 'find' yourself. But you have to find
yourself in life, time by time without searching;
because by force of searching, if in the end
you manage to find yourself, do you know what
happens to you? You find nothing anymore and
you can't live any longer: nice and dead, with
8
your eyes open.
Here one is reminded of Sartre's views on the curious inevitability
of "bad faith". We can never "be" anything in the same manner
that a stone is a stone. The nature of being-for-it self is not to
be what it is. On the other hand, when we construct ourself we
define what we are and what we are not, but it is the nature of
the human reality to be what it is not. By "finding ourselves",
we find only a part of ourselves which we surpass in the very
act of being conscious of it.
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Given that despite his efforts to live life rather than think
about it, man is conscious of his "self" at the same moment that
he lives it, how does man construct himself?
B. The Self

L The individual's search for identity - awareness of
the problem

Pirandello's major work concerning the self and others is
Uno, nessuno e centomila. which chronicles the search for personal

identity of one man, Vitangelo Moscarda, from his first consciousnes
of the problem to his provisional solution. Like Roquentin's
understanding of being which springs from the contemplation of
the chestnut tree root, Moscarda first becomes aware of the
whole problem of personal identity through a most insignificant
incident. One morning, as he stands in front of the mirror, his
wife asks him what he is looking at and remarks, "Oh, I thought
you were looking to see which side your nose leans towards,"
Never having noticed that his nose wasn't absolutely straight, at
first he denies it. Then looking closely, he realises that indeed,
his nose does lean slightly to the right. In fact, his wife can
list for him a whole series of hitherto unnoticed little defects
of which he wasn't aware: eyebrows like circumflex accents, "
one ear which stands out more than the other, one leg ever so

A

,
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slightly more curved than the other about the knee. Moscarda
gives no importance to these tiny defects but:

(...) a very great and extraordinary importance
to the fact that I had lived for so many years
without ever changing nose, always with that
one, and with those eyebrows and those ears,
those hands and those legs; and I had to wait
to take a wife in order to realise that they
10
were defective.
He thus realises that - is it possible? - he doesn't even know
his own body well; the things which are most intimately his.

From this began my suffering. That illness which
was to reduce me shortly in conditions of spirit
and body so miserable and desperate that I
certainly would have died of it or gone crazy,
11
if I hadn't found (...) a remedy.
And so Moscarda becomes aware of the problem: I am not for others
what I am for myself. Furthermore, one cannot brush aside the
"self-for-another" as some sort of misapprehension. It has a
reality of its own and it is to this reality that the other person
reacts.
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Moscarda's wife has a nickname for him.

She always calls

him Genge. The way his wife sees him, the way she perceives her
"Genge" is so far removed from Moscarda's own self-concept ion,
that it is as if she were in love with and married to another
man. He begins to feel rage and jealousy of this "other" man.

I loved her, despite the torture of being perfectly
conscious of not belonging to myself in my own
body as the object of her love. And yet, the
sweetness which came to this body from her love,
it was I who tasted it. (...) even if sometimes I
was almost tempted to strangle her seeing her
(...) tremble a stupid name: Gengg,

Not only does the other person's conception of a person take on
a reality all its own, but one's own self-conception is seen to
be as ephemeral as the "self-for-another".

(...) think on it well: a moment ago, before this
happened to you, you were another; not only,
but you were even a hundred others, a hundred
thousand others. And believe me there is nothing
to be surprised at.

See, rather, if it seems

that you could be so sure that from today to
tomorrow you will be that which you assume to
be today. My dear, the truth is this: they are
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all fixations. Today you determine yourself one
13
way and tomorrow another,
Moscarda finds himself at a moment of crisis. This multiplication
of his "self" leaves him not with a hundred thousand identities,
but with none, since in the eyes of others, "I as I, was nothing."
He feels an icy solitude as he cannot penetrate another's reality
and cannot communicate his own to another. He looks strangely
at those around him and thinks:

(...) we should all look like this all the time,
each with his eyes full of horror at his own
15
inescapable solitude.
He purposely acts very differently from his usual manner in order
to break the conception others have of him. He struggles to find
out who he is.

But I, one, who? who? If 1 no longer had eyes to
see me myself as one even for me? The eyes, the
eyes of everyone else - 1 continued to see them
on me, but equally without being able to know
how they would see me now in this my newborn
will, if I myself didn't know yet in what I would
consist for myself. No longer Genge.
Another.
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I had really wanted this.
But what else did I have inside if not this
torment which revealed me as one and a hundred
16
thousand.
Thus no more "truth" can be ascribed to one's own conception of
himself than can be ascribed to another's conception of one. The
former changes in time and the latter, not only in time but from
"other" person to "other" person. Thus if I am not, as previously
assumed, one, I am a hundred thousand - different in each moment
in time and a different person to each "other" person who sees
me. If I am a hundred thousand, no one more real or even more
Stable than the other, then I am no one. Here Pirandello bases
himself on the psychology of Alfred Binet and Gabriel Seailles,
and he states in Scienza e critica estetica:

Our spirit, then, consists of fragments, or
better, of distinct elements, more or less in
relationship with each other, which can disperse
and reorder themselves in a new ensemble, so that
from it results a new personality (...) With the
elements of our ego we can therefore compose,
construct in ourselves other individualities,
other beings with their own consciousness with
17
their own intelligence, alive and acting.

Based on this theory of the personality, we find in the
story L'Avemaria di Bobbio;

That which we know of ourselves is however only
a part, and perhaps a very small part, of that
which we are unbeknownst to us. Bobbio indeed
said that that which we call consciousness is
comparable to the little water which is seen in
the neck of a bottomless well. And he meant
perhaps to say by this that (...) there are
perceptions and actions which remain unknown
to us (...) but which at the sudden call of a
sensation, be it taste, colour or sound, can still
show signs of life, showing still alive within us
another unsuspected being.

And in the novel Suo marito we find:

(...) perhaps because she had never been able to
hold herself, compose herself, fix herself in a
solid and stable concept of self, she had always
been aware with lively disquiet of the extraordinary disordered mobility of her interior
being, C..)19
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Vitangelo Moscarda, made aware of his own numerous "selves"
reasons that this being the human condition,;

Julius Caesar, one, didn't exist. Yes, there
existed a Julius Caesar such as he, in so many
parts of his life, represented to himself; and
this had without doubt, an incomparably greater
value than the others; not however, with regard
to reality, I beg you to believe, because no
less real than this imperial Julius Caesar was
the tender, fastidious, shaven and beltless and
most unfaithful one of his wife Calpurnia; or
that lewd one of Nicomede, King of Bitinia. The
trouble is this, always, gentlemen: that they all
had to be called Julius Caesar, and in a sole
body of masculine sex there had to cohabitate

The same multiplication of personalities, of selves is noted in
Trovarsi:

One, no; so many women! And for herself, perhaps,
21
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In fact, it is precisely the doubling of selves which is the major
theme of La signora Morli. una £ due. Neither "self" has more
reality than the other.

2, The construction of the self

Nevertheless, one cannot be in the abstract. Being must be
encased in form. Like forms are people'3 acts. Moscarda comment:

When an act is accomplished, it is that; it no
longer changes. When one, however, has acted,
even without later feeling himself and finding
himself in the completed acts, that which is
done, remains: like a prison for him. (...) the
act is, rather always and only of one of the
many that we are or that we could be, (...)
because no reality has been given to us and
none exists, but we have to make it for ourselves,
if we want to be; and it will never be one for
all, one forever, but continuously and infinitely
changeable. The faculty of deluding ourselves
that today's reality is the only true one, if on
the other hand, it sustains us, on the other,
it precipitates us into an emptiness without
end, because the reality of today is destined
22
to show itself to be illusion tomorrow.
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Here, Pirandello's ideas are in perfect accord with Sartre's, We
are our acts. One cannot posit more than that which is given, and
what is given is our acts not our intentions or our unrealised
possibilities. The world sees us in our acts and limits us to and
imprisons us in them. The man who has stolen is branded a thief,
the man who has been courageous, a hero. But a man does not
exhaust the possibilities of his being in such a name. The thief
has forever open to him the possibility of honesty, the hero of
cowardliness. So there is no unity of self to be found in our
acts either. Moscarda summarises the problem:

I didn't know myself at all, I had for myself
no reality of my own, I was in a state as of
continual fusion, almost fluid, malleable; others
knew me, each in his own way, according to the
reality which they had given me; that is, they
each saw in me a Moscarda that wasn't I, I not
being really anyone for myself; as many Moscardas
as they were, and all more real than I who had
23
for myself, I repeat, no reality.
Here, the obvious question is raised - is there not some
"inner self", which we protect by keeping it hidden from others,
or perhaps an "inner being" unknown or even unknowable to other

people or even to ourselves, but an objective reality, nevertheless?
There is a certain amount of evidence for this interpretation in
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such passages as the one in Suo marito describing the "inner
being" of the artist's father as a "bitter enemy inside of himself"
which he forever tries to hide from the world. In her article La
filosofia morale nel teatro pirandelliano Lina Passarella Sartorelli
opts for this interpretation and says:

Inevitably we construct ourselves (...) at bottom,
inside of these constructions of ours, put as
it were out front, behind the jealousies and
the impositions there remain then well hidden
our most secret thoughts, our most intimate
sentiments, all that we are for ourselves, outside
24
of the relations that we want to establish.
Sartorelli goes on to say:

For Pirandello it isn't all unconscious: too many
times it is something which we deliberately hide
from the world, afraid that the world will spoil
it and then too we suffocate it desirous of
25
destroying that which is too tormenting (...)
Thus she concludes that the construction of the self is:
(...) a construction of another apparent rself
different from the 'self which remains hidden,
26
in fact, in contrast with the 'self (...)
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It cannot be denied that Pirandello does deal with this sort of
deception and even with cases where it becomes self-deception,
as we have seen in the section dealing with "bad faith".
However, conscious deception of others and even self-deception only
constitute one aspect of the problem, and they do not imply the
existence of an objective and static "self" beneath and deception,
but only a perception of construction of the self which is in the
first instance hidden from others and in the second inconsistent
with or in conflict with another conception of ourselves which we
have. In Humian terms:

(The self is) nothing but a bundle or collection of
different perceptions, which succeed each other
with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a
27
perpetual flux and movement.
The "self" cannot be discovered but only lived because it is an
infinite set of possibilities or, as Sartre would term it, complete
freedom:

In a sense there is no such thing as the
self, if by that is meant some permanent and
already constituted identity that lies behind
our actions. My ego or self exists only through
my actions and I have to be continually re-making
28
and re-affirming myself.
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Thus we can see that Pirandello's ideas on the reality of
the self parallel those on reality in general. One is forced,
on pain of being labelled "insane" by society, to give a certain
unity to our behaviour, to "construct" the self the same way as
one "constructs" reality, all the while aware that the resultant
entity, the ego or the self, remains only one construction in
confrontation with the construction of ourselves by others. One
device to accomplish this construction is the use of "masks" or
"roles".

3. The mask (La, maschera)

Pirandello, the "humorist" (or the "absurd man", as we have
seen earlier) is fond of unmasking people, of always distinguishing
between the role which a person chooses to play or which society
forces upon him, and the person himself whose total being cannot
be encompassed by a role, or a mask. This theme is so common
in Pirandello that his plays have been collected and published
under the title Maschere nude (Naked Masks),

In L'umorismo Pirandello states;

The more difficult is the struggle for life, and
the more one's own weakness in this struggle
is felt, the more then is the reciprocal need
for deceipt. The simulation of strength, of
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honesty, of niceness, of discretion, in sum, of
very virtue the principle of veracity, is a form
of adaptation, a capable instrument of battle,
The humorist immediately gathers these various
simulations for the struggle of life; he amuses
himself by unmasking them.

Indeed, many examples are seen throughout Pirandello's work of
people who, unable to deal with the amorphousness of their own
"self" put on a mask to give a unity to their personality; and
of society, unable to understand or deal with a person on the
level of the infinity of his possibilities, imposes upon him a
role which he must play, under pain of being labelled insane, in
order to more easily deal with the "role" rather than with the
person. Over and over again, caught in the strictures of Sicilian
society - characters ignore their own feelings or desires and act
according to the role which society has placed upon them, or in
fact, deliberately create a role, a mask for themselves according
to which the world will be able to judge them. Examples include
Vest ire gl'ignudi. La guardaroba dell'eloauenza. and La patente.
The imposition of roles or masks is the major theme of JX berretto
a sonagli. A jealous wife has created a scandal concerning her
husband and the wife of another man. In fact, there has been
no justification for the scandal, but given that now, the entire
town believes that adultery has been committed, the "wronged"
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husband must take his revenge, fully aware that his only playing
the role. The only way to avoid a double murder - and this is
the solution which is finally accepted - is for the jealous wife
to be branded insane and go away temporarily to a rest home. If
she will play the role of the crazy person, the man can avoid the
"responsibilities" of the role of "wronged husband" in Sicilian
society.

In Pensaci Giacomino an old professor, acting out of the
goodness of his heart and for everyone's benefit is thwarted in
his projects by the roles that people must play. He is aware of
the concept of role and realises that any harm which will come to
him will not be to his "person" but to himself as a "role". This
is not sufficient because although he is aware of the distinction,
society will not admit it,

Even Leone in JX qiuoco delle parti finally comes to the
conclusion that it is the role which must be played.

(...) I'm sorry for you! But you have to play
your part like I mine. That's the game. Even
she has finally understood that! Each one his
own, till the end; (...) I see myself and I see you
play, and I am amused.
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He must challenge his wife's insulters to a duel. All is arranged.
But it is the lover who must fight the duel, for his part goes
only so far. The lover is forced to play his role as well,

Quando si & qualcuno concerns a famous writer who, however,
in the play, has no name. The play illustrates the theme of the
construction of the self according to the mask which society places
upon one. The famous cannot live but are walled up, suffocated,
turned into lifeless statues by the conception which the world
has of them, the mask which is forced upon them.

In JX piacere dell'onesta the characters suffer because they
force the "form" of honesty to take life for them in the person
of "the honest man", whose role, whose only function, is to play
the part of honesty personified in order to save the reputation
of a young woman and her married lover. The conditions imposed
are merely those conditions commonly found in society by which
a person is "respected" for the role he plays, for the masks
he puts on. The "honest man" wishes to be respected for his
role of honest husband of a well-bred young lady, but given the
hypocritical circumstances of on-going adultery and deceipt, this
is of course impossible even though it is precisely to be respected
that the "honest man" has been called in. The entire problem
of the distinction between the role or the mask, and the person
is highlighted. It is seen that no solution to the problem of
personal identity can really be found through the use of masks.
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Perhaps it is in the relationship between ourselves and
others that our identity can be found.
C. The Relation of the *5eJff te 'Others'

L The 'other's' construction of us

As was stated at the beginning of this chaper, it is because
of Pirandello's view on the relativity of all reality, (at least
at the epistemological level) that the question of individual
identity, the "self" takes on such importance. If we look at such
short stories as L'altro figlio. JX figlio cambiato, Un ritratto or
Benedizione we see reality's "relativity" as applied to people and
their personal identity. In Section B of this chapter we have
already seen the difficulties raised in regard to the individual's
perception of himself, his own self-con struct ion and his use of
masks or roles. Both Sartre and Pirandello hold that the "self"
cannot be identified or "constructed" without reference to the
"other". To a certain extent, we need others in order to see
ourselves. In fact, Pirandello sees as an interesting result of
this, that we never cry for another's having died. Since that
person lives for us in our own creation of him, he is still there
before us alive. Rather, we cry because we can no longer, through
31
his creation of us, give life, reality to us,

The play La vita che

ti diedi and the short story X Pensionati della memoria illustrate
this theme.
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We need others in order to be able to construct ourselves,
to "confirm", as it were, our own construction of reality. Our
conscience is "the other" within us. Similar passages on this
topic are found in the novels Uno. nessuno e centomila. II fu
Mattia Pascal and L'esclusa: in the play Come prima meglio di
prima: and in the short story Mondo di carta.

Since each "self" has an infinity of possibilities, it is
"others' " confirmation of one reality rather than another, which
not only creates or constructs that very reality but also helps
us to a certain extent, form our own self construction. Numerous
illustrations of this are to be found in Pirandello's works'. In
Tut to per bene (both the short story and the play) a man's
identity as "the father" depends not on biological fact but on
his being recognised as such by his wife's daughter. La signora
Morli, una e_ due has as its major theme a woman's identity based
on the "others" around her. The same theme is illustrated by
Come tu mi vuoi. in which a character is simply designated as "the
unknown one" because the entire play is devoted to establishing
her identity. Is she the long missing wife who disappeared in the
chaos of the war, or is she an impostor? It is found to depend
precisely on what the "others" believe. She herself states:

To be? To be is nothing! To be is to create
oneself.
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In context, this is understood to mean, to construct oneself for
others. Asked if she would then admit that she might not be Cia,
she replies;

I admit that and more! I admit that Cia could
even be this one (She indicates the Insane Woman)
- if you wanted to believe it.

The "other's" creation of us is so strong that we may begin to
live the reality which others have given us. In Tut to per bene
we read;

Martino Lori remained astonished at the conception of him which his wife went along little by
little forming for herself, at the interpretation which she gave of his acts, of his words.
Sometimes he almost began to doubt whether in
fact he wasn't as his wife thought, as she
had always thought and whether he didn't have,
without realising, all those defects, all those
vices with which she reproached him.

In La carriola a man actually feels himself to be re-entering into
a different existence each time he goes home. Vicentini writes:

If the world finds its own reality in the
representation, the personal perspective, the

interpretation confers reality, under the object
'alive'. In this conception an individual acquires
reality in the perspective of the person who
knows him and loses it when that person is no
more. (...)

Since the perspective confers reality, erroneous
opinions of people constitute an actual deformation to which they are forced to submit. Not
only, in the most obvious sense, that they condition our actions forcing us to act in a way
which we don't want to, but actually because
they modify our own individuality.

Moscarda, facing this problem of his need for others in order to
construct himself and aware of their "deformations" of his being
states:

(...) there really wasn't a view for me, to be able
to say in some way how I saw myself, without
the view of others, for my own body and for
every other thing how could I imagine how they
should see it; and so my eyes, for themselves,
outside of the view of others, could no longer
know really what they saw.

(...)

252
Where the view of others doesn't help us to
constitute in any way in us the reality of that
which we see, our eyes no longer know what they
see; our consciousness is bewildered, because
this which we believe to be the most intimately
ours, consciousness, means the others in us: and
39
we cannot feel ourselves alone.
In Vestire gl'ignudi Grotti expresses precisely this need for
others as mirrors for ourselves;

(...) Because you didn't believe it! I felt that
you didn't believe that I could have been so
good solely to make you happy. See, see ... And
by not believing this, you ruined everything!
Because I had more than ever a need that you
should believe it, in order to hold me, in order
40
to overcome each temptation.
L'uscita del vedovo is the story of a man who becomes the image
that his wife had of him. All her life, the woman complains of
all the faults of men in general and especially of widowers. The
husband is forever falsely accused or wrongly held in suspicion.
Upon her death, the widower begins to be haunted by her image
of him and despite all of his protestations while she was alive,
he now begins to live up (down?) to her conception of him.
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Our need, according to Pirandello, for others' conceptions of
us is so great that without the "other" we no longer have an
identity. In Da s£ ... we read:

Who was he anymore? No one. Not only because
he had lost all he had; not only because he was
reduced to that miserable degrading condition
of errand boy, (...) No, no. He was no longer,
really anyone, because there was nothing any
more in him, aside from the appearance, (and even
that so changed, unrecognisable) of that Matteo
Sinagra that he had been up to three years ago.
In this errand boy, just now gone out of the
house, neither did he feel himself nor did others
recognise him. And so? Who was he? Another,
who didn't live yet (...) Matteo Sinagra, the real
Matteo Sinagra was dead, absolutely dead, three
41
years ago.
Even if we are unaware of its existence, the "other's" creation
of us begins to take on a life of its own and the result is the
" sdoppiamento" (doubling) of personalities which Pirandello seems
to have taken from the psychology of Alfred Binet and for which
he is so well-known. Having an infinite number of possibilities of
being, but capable at any one moment in time of apprehending a
finite group of these, a group of actions or attributes which will
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be compatible among themselves, we organise and construct our
self-conception out of these. Simultaneously, using sometimes the
same set of attributes but organised and arranged differently,
perhaps seeing an overlapping set of characteristics or possibly
even one which in no way coincides with our own chosen set, others
construct their own conception of us, a construction which acts
and reacts, moves and speaks - in short - becomes a live person

which, given the subjectivity even of each individual's perception,

does not even fully coincide with "us" under a physical description
As soon as we realise that the process is the same by which we
construct ourselves and by which others construct us, and that
the resultant "creations" are equally valid (invalid) but mutually
incommunicable, we become aware that we have discovered another
aspect of the absurd. Pirandello is fascinated with this and
makes it the subject of many of his books.

In the short stories: I nostri ricordi. Musica vecchia. Con altri

occhi. Risnosta and Gioventil to cite five examples, the protagonist
of each story is confronted with an "alternate reality", either
of himself or of another which he must realise has the same
"validity" or "correspondence to truth" as his own construction
has.

In the play Come prima, meglip di prima, a woman who had
deserted her family years before, is reconciled with her husband
and returns. Her husband had raised their daughter in the belief
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that her "sainted" mother was dead. The woman is caught in the
unusual situation of being compared unfavourably with "herself".
The "sainted mother" has such force of reality for the daughter
that "she" has taken on a life of her own, one with which it is
impossible for the woman to interfere,

Silvio: But how could I imagine that this
would happen!

Excuse me, but it's

strange! You speak of her as if you
were jealous of her ...
Fulvia;

Oh. Yes, in the heart of my daughter.

Silvio: But think, at bottom it is you
yourself!
Fulvia:

That's not true!
Myself?
I'm dead!

That's not true!

I touched it!
really dead!

I felt it!
I stand in

front of her and I am dead! It is
not I, here alive; it is another, her
mother ... there ... is dead! (...)

(...)
Fulvia: Really for me? You want to remain
silent in order not to offend her
mother, that's why!
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Silvio:

But if that's you!

Fulvia:
It's
not true! I for her am - that
one - and I can't be her mother!
I've come to the point of believing
it myself!

She seems to me, she

really seems to me the daughter of
that other one.

It's frightful (...)

- The shadow become reality!

In the play Vestire gl'ignudi a young girl tries to "clothe
herself" in others' illusions so that she may die with the shame
of the nakedness of brute facts covered. But she discovers that
in life as in art, the image, the other person's construction is
always of "another". She cannot clothe her own construction using
others' illusions, in fact they would have to be her own and they
are not. Here the paradox is brought out again, that although
to some extent we need the other's look, the other's construction
of ourselves as a mirror for our own construction, there remains
a tension between the other's construction of ourselves and our
own, which cannot really be resolved.

The works which deal specifically with this problem in detail
are, as has been mentioned, the novel Uno. nessuno e centomila
and the short story Stefano Giogli. uno e due from which the
novel was developed.

In Stefano Giogli a man realises that his
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wife has a completely different conception of him than he does
himself and is, in fact, married not to him - whom she doesn't
know - but to this "other man".

(...) Stefano Giogli had to become aware of the
fact that his Lucietta, in the three months
of their engagement, during which the fire by
which he was devoured had reduced him to a soft
dough at the disposition of those little restless
and tireless hands, of all those elements of his
spirit in fusion, of all of those fragments of his
consciousness scattered in the tumult of frenetic
passion, she had forged, kneaded, composed for
her own use, according to her taste and her will,
a Stefano Giogli which was hers alone, absolutely
hers, who wasn't him at all, not only in spirit,
but by God, not even almost in body.

And, strange torment, Stefano Giogli becomes ferociously jealous
- of himself because*.

(...) this fool was loved by his wife, to this
fool she gave all of her kisses - on his own
lips. When Lucietta looked at him, she didn't
see him, but that other one; when Lucietta spoke
to him, she wasn't speaking to him, but to that
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other one; when Lucietta embraced him, she wasn't
embracing him, but that hateful metaphor of him

-44
that she had created for herself.
It is in UnoT nessuno e_ centomila. however, that Pirandello
develops these themes of self-identity to the fullest. The wife's
name is no longer "Lucietta", but "Dida", and it is no longer
Stefano Giogli, but Vitangelo Moscarda, but the story is simply
a further development of Stefano Giogli. It follows the gradual
awareness on the part of the protagonist of all of the problems of
self-identity which we have been discussing. At first, realising
that his wife has a different perception of him than he himself
does, he ascribes it to her inability to understand, for example,
some of his more complex ideas,

I thought, in sum, that my ideas and my sentiments
couldn't be understood unless they were reduced
and diminished, in her little brain and heart; and
45
that my tastes couldn't adapt to her simplicity.
This, however, wasn't the case. It wasn't she who distorted and
made ridiculous all of his thoughts and feelings. Dida, too, found
them foolish.

And so who disguised and reduced them so? The
reality of Genge, gentlemen! Genge, such as
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she had fromed him for herself, could have such
feelings as those, such tastes as those, A
little fool, but dear. Oh yes, so dear to her!
She loved him like that: dear little fool. And
she really loved him.

It begins to appear to Vitangelo that he is no one at all, that
the reality which he had ascribed to himself belongs to "Genge".

She had constructed him! And he wasn't any
puppet. If anything, the puppet was 1 ... because
that Genge of hers existed, while I for her didn't
exist at all, I had never existed. My reality
was for her in that Gengfe of hers which she
had made, who had thoughts and feelings and
tastes that weren't mine and that I couldn't
have altered in the slightest, without running
the risk of becoming immediately another whom
she would no longer have recognised, a stranger
whom she would no longer have been able either
47
to understand or to love.
He became jealous not of himself, he insists, but of Genge.

Understand? She was certain, perfectly certain
that her Genge liked her hair better combed

in that other way, and she combed her hair in
that other way that neither she nor I liked.
But Genge liked it; and she made the sacrifice
(...) And I - now that everythig in the end had
become clear to me - began to become terribly
jealous - not of myself, I beg you to believe: you
feel like laughing! - not of myself, gentlemen,
but of one who was not I, of an imbecile who had
stuck himself between myself and my wife; not
like a vain shadow, no - I beg you to believe
- because he, on the contrary, made me a vain
shadow, me, me, appropriating my body to make
himself loved by her.

After becoming aware of the reality of his wife's construction
of him and feeling as though he is no one, he then realises that
it is not only his wife who has a different conception of him
which in no way coincides with his own. He is not "no one". He
is a hundred thousand - as many as there are "other" people
to have constructions of him. In a room with other people, he
realises that he is not one, but five.

(...) believing that you speak to one Moscarda
only, who is really one, yes, the one who is
standing in front of you in such and such a
way, as you see him, as you touch him; while you

speak of five Moscardas because the other four,
also have one in front of them, one for each,
who is that one only, thus and so, as each one
sees him and touches him. Five; and six, if poor
Moscarda sees himself and touches himself, one
also for himself; one and no one, alas, as he
sees himself and touches himself, if the other
49
five see him and touch him differently.
He is five people, and each one with a life of its own.

Five imbeciles. One in each. Five imbeciles who
stand in front of you, as you see them from
outside, in me who am one and five like the
house, all with this name Moscarda, nothing for
himself, who, yes, all five will turn if you call
"Moscarda!" but each one with that appearance
that you give him; five appearances: if I laugh,
five smiles, and so on. And will not each act
which I accomplish be for you the act of one of
these five? And can this act be the same if
the five are different? Each one of you will
interpret it, will give it a sense and a value
according to the reality which you have given
me.
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He is five (six) people - but he can only know the sixth, that is
himself as he creates or constructs himself. There is no way for
Moscarda to come to know himself as others see him. The other
five will forever remain strangers to him.

Each person can know only his own "creation", his own
"construction" of reality, although he is, at times, made painfully aware that others have their own "creations", their own
"constructions". Describing Stefano Giogli, Pirandello writes*.

" - Who knows then how that one, or that thing,
which now to me seems one way, really is?' Did
he perhaps know some reality outside of himself?
He himself didn't exist for himself except like
and in as much as, time by time, he imagined
himself. Well, his wife had created for herself
a reality of him which didn't correspond at all,
neither interiorly nor exteriorly, to that which
he had created himself: a true reality; not a
shadow, a spectre!

And then, would Lucietta have loved the true
Stefano Giogli, a Stefano Giogli different from
051

hers?
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From other sources we see that Pirandello's answer to this question
is that not only would she not have loved him but she wouldn't
even recognise any other Stefano Giogli than her own. In Uno,
nessuno e centomila. Moscarda argues:

I don't presume that you are the way X imagine
you. I have already stated that you aren't
even the one which you imagine yourself, but
so many at the same time, according to all
your possibilities of being, and happenstance,
relationships and circumstances. And so what
wrong do I do you? You do me a wrong believing
that I don't or can't have any other reality
outside of the one that you give me; which reality
is yours only, believe: an idea of yours, that
which you have made yourself of me, a possibility
of being as you feel it, as it seems to you: since
of that which I could be for myself, not only
52
can you know nothing, but not even I myself.
(N.B. In this last phrase Moscarda is not referring to the general
state of affairs. In context it is obvious that he cannot know
what he can be for himself due to his own confusion about his
identity because of his recent realisations.)
!n Si gira ... we read:
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(...) he could not be one and the same person to
her and to myself,
(...) We have all of us a false conception of an
individual whole
(...) And we ourselves can never know that reality
which is accorded to us by other people; who we
are to this person and to that.

Paradoxically, although we cannot know directly or completely
another's construction of our reality, we are to some extent
indirectly aware of it and through this indirect awareness of
it this other reality impinges upon us. This in turn forces us
to submit to what he calls "deformation" of our own reality and,
indeed, changes that reality not into a duplicate of the other's
construction but modifies our original construction to resemble
more closely our construction of the other's construction of us.
In Una voce the parallel is drawn between a blind man who can
only imagine what his wife looks like through his impressions of
her voice, and the condition of any person who can only imagine
what another is really like through his impressions of that other
person's physical characteristics, actions, etc. Just as the blind
man would be incapable upon regaining his sight, of recognising
his wife, whom he had never seen, so different would she be from
the construction which he had made of her; so would any man be
incapable of recognising another reality apart from his own. In
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this short story, the wife is wise enough to be aware of this
incapability, of the impossibility of changing the reality which
another has constructed for us. Knowing that her husband's sight
is about to be restored by an operation, she leaves him, never
to return.

Vitangelo Moscarda is not as wise, at least not at first.
Becoming aware of the existence of his "other" realities, he tries
vainly to change them, to make them conform more closely to his
own reality for himself. First he tries to destroy his wife's
"Gengfe". Of course, he fails.

And it was so real, this one, that when I at
last, exasperated, wanted to destroy it, imposing
instead of its reality, my own, not my wife but
the wife of that one, found herself immediately
horrified as if in the arms of a stranger, an
unknown person; and declared that she couldn't
love me any more, that she couldn't live with me
54
not even a moment and ran away.
He can't bear the reality which others have given him and is
tempted to do anything to change it.

I would even, my God, suddenly stick out my
tongue, move my nose making a sudden face, in

266
order to alter all of a sudden, as a joke and
without malice, that image of me which he believed
to be real.

He discovers the tenacity of others' construction of us.

Superficially, we usually call them false suppositions, erroneous judgments, gratuitous attributions. But all that can be imagined of us
is really possible, even though it isn't true for
us. That it isn't true for us, others laugh.
It is true for them. So true that it can even
happen that if you don't hold tight onto the
reality which for your own sake you have given
yourself, others can induce you to recognise
that more real than your own reality is that
which they give you.

So "real" is the other's construction of us that it cannot change.
Finally Moscarda realises that the other's construction of himself
might "go crazy" but it cannot be destroyed.

Although we need the other's look in order to help form our
own image of ourselves, the other's look is hateful to us because
living our own lives the other's image of us is only indirectly

accessible to us. It has a life apart from us, and by definition
we cannot really see it as it is experienced by the "other".

The conclusion of Come prima, meglio di prima is that Fulvia
ceases trying to fight her daughter's image of her. She leaves
her family taking with her her newborn baby for whom she will
be able to create a different image of her.

Vitangelo Moscarda states:

I needed a mirror. On the other hand, just the
thought that my wife was home was enough to
hold me present to myself and it was just this

2.

The mirror and the 'other's' look

We see ourselves as in a mirror. The mirror is for Pirandello
a very special instrument by which we can become aware of the
absurd. This is explained by Moscarda to his wife in Uno. nessuno
e centomila:

'All dead,' I told her,

(...)
'But dead, how, if I'm here, alive?'
'Oh, you, yes, because now you don't see yourself.
But when you stand in front of the mirror, at
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the moment that you see yourself, you are no
longer alive.'
'And why?'
'Because you have to stop life in yourself for a
moment, in order to see yourself. Like in front
of a camera. You strike a pose. And striking
a pose is like becoming a statue for a moment.
Life moves continuously and can't ever really
59
see itself.'

In fact, Moscarda, among others of Pirandello's heroes, is fascinate

by his mirror image and his inability to see himself live as others
see him. The moment one accidentally catches sight of himself
in a mirror, fleetingly, as one moves, he is horrified, (see for
example Rimedio la geografia cit. page 226) It is like seeing a
stranger. And then as soon as we stop to get a better look,
the live image is fixed and dies. Seeing ourselves in others is
like seeing ourselves in a sort of mirror, one in which we cannot
recognise ourselves, (see for example L'uomo in frak cit. p77)

The parallel goes further. The "other's look" fixes one,
catches one in a pose, as it were, just like a mirror, and creates
thereby a form into which the "other" then tries to fit and
therefore limit all of one's possibilities of being. Knowing that
our being overflows such a form and cannot but be killed by it,
all the while needing the other's confirmation of our being, we
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feel the "other's look" upon us and have an instinctive horror
of it.

In the short story Romolo. Pirandello discusses man's need
for others as a cause for his unhappiness because of the abovementioned horror of the "other's look".

(...) but civilisation means precisely the recognition of this fact: that man, among so many
other instincts which bring him to make war,
has also that which is called the gregarious
instinct, by which he must live with his fellows.
- And so then you see from this, - you deduce,
- if man can ever be happy.

What, however, is the nature of this look which so disturbs us?
Pirandello, like Sartre, believes that the problem lies in the fact
that - as Vicentini explains, - our "egocentrism":

makes us interpret and therefore perceive the
reality of others exclusively in function of our
needs, violating their intentionality,

(...)
The root of the difficulty is the same individuality of the person who, asserting himself
as intentionality, with individual needs, deforms

the reality of other individuals perceiving their
reality in his own egocentric perspective.

This conflict is inevitable since:

One cannot, defending one's own, not violate the
intentionality of others.62

This violation is, of course, bound up with the limited way in
which others perceive us (or we perceive others) contrasted with
the infinity of possibilities of being that each person has and
the way in which the individual himself interprets, organises and
feels these possibilities.

Examples of the effects of the "other's look" abound in
Pirandello. The short story which has as its major theme precisely
these effects is La maschera dimenticata. It concerns the amazing
oratorical performance of a man at a town meeting where he is
unknown and the extraordinary changes which take place as soon
as he feels upon himself the eyes of someone from his own town
who knows him.

Even midst the enthusiastic fervor of the welcome,
he felt himself wounded right from the outset
by those little eyes. He tried to escape them,
plunging himself into the middle of the confusion
of the party. But from here, from there, from
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nearby, from far away, from wherever he least
expected it, he felt himself stung by the almost
spasmodic fixedness of those little persecuting
eyes; and when stung; frozen, perturbed, all
confounded by an obscure feeling which furiously
assaulted him and occupied his brain like a
vertiginous darkness.

Persecuted by the look of the one who knew him as he usually
appeared,

(...) he saw himself go back into himself with all
his misfortunes and his misery (...)

Completely changed, a different person from the night before, he
mystifies those townspeople who had so admired him the previous
evening.

Was he an impostor?

No, he had merely forgotten

his habitual mask (maschera) and had begun living a different
possibility of being. Strangers saw him and identified him with
the "new mask", unable to imagine him in the old, unless they
believed that one was "real" and the other "pretense".

In Pensaci Giacomino (both the short story and the play), the
point is made that certain things may be done only in secret but
not in front of the "other's look".

- Leave me be! don't make me say it! How can
you not understand that certain things can only
be done in hiding, and are no longer possible
in the light, with you who know, with everyone
laughing.

In Da sfe it is the "other's look" which makes Matteo Sinagra
realise that he has lost his identity, that his old self is
completely dead.

In Nel gorgo we see another effect of the other's look: the
stirring of a bad conscience.

(...) inside of us, the little machine of civilisation, and we let all of the dregs of all of our
actions, of all of our thoughts, of all of our
feelings, quietly deposit themselves, hidden, at
the bottom of our conscience. But let someone
whose little machine is broken begin to look at
you the way I looked at you, no longer as a joke,
but seriously, and without your expecting it, it
removes from the bottom of the conscience all
of the deposit of those dregs which you have
inside, and see if you can tell me that you
wouldn't be frightened.
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Other examples of the effects of the "other's look" are to be
found in the short stories". Frammento di cronaca di Marco Leccio.
Romolo. La. paura. L'onda. La rosa and La ricca.
Thus, we all feel a horror of the "other's look". Vitangelo states:

(...) to feel on me people's eyes seemed to me
to undergo a horrible oppression thinking that
all of those eyes gave me an image which was
certainly not the one which I knew myself to
be but another which I could neither know nor
prevent; (...)

Not only of the look of other people in general, Moscarda had a
special loathing for his wife's "look".

And meanwhile I had a horror of her eyes which
looked at me, laughing and secure; a horror
of those cool hands of hers which touched me,
certain that I was as her eyes saw me; a horror
of all of her body which weighed on my knees,
trusting in the abandonment of herself to me,
without the faintest suspicion that she wasn't
giving that body of hers really to me, and that
I, holding her in my arms, didn't hold with that
body of hers one who belonged to me totally and
not a stranger (...) two strangers, held tight
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thus - horror - strangers, not only one for the
other, but each one to himself, in that body
which the other embraced.

In La balia signor Manfroni has a similar horror of his wife's
"look".

Mr. Manfroni could have a hundred thousand
reasons, but he also had on his cheek bone a
most ridiculous wart, onto which his wife would
icily point her glance, more than ever spiteful,
when she saw herself being forced to submit
to those reasons.

And Mr.

Manfroni, seeing

his wart looked at each time, experienced such
an attack of nerves that in order not to do
anything rash, he would immediately cut short
the discussion.

A first reaction is to try to escape the other's look.

Vitangelo, in fact, as soon as his wife leaves him, begins
to feel an exhilarating sense of freedom.

In the short story

Guardando una stampa we read;

(...) blind men can have luck with 'good' women.
Look, I would bet that Marco, handsome man,
must have had his adventures.

Because woman,
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understand? It's all a matter of her being able
to do it without being seen.

But one cannot escape feeling the other's look. In L'esclusa we
find;

No one, it's true, had bothered her; but she felt
71
herself wounded by so many looks.
In E due! we see;

But don't you see, don't you see how you look
at me even you? - I? - exclaimed his mother.
- How do I look at you? - Like all the others
72
look at me.
In La carriola we read:

When I have someone around, I never look at her;
but I feel her looking at me, she looks at me,
she looks at me without taking her eyes off me
for a moment.

Not only do we inevitably feel the other's look upon us when they
are present even if they are not, in fact, looking at us, but
we are haunted by this look even when we are alone, This is
illustrated in the play JX giuoco delle parti. Silia is haunted by
her husband's "look", even though they no longer live together.
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She can always feel it upon her. Even the furniture begins to
personify this "look" and she cannot bear being in the same room
with the chair her husband used to sit in. The reason for this,
of course, is that our conscience, as we have already seen, is
nothing but the "other" in us. It is the other's look upon us,
or rather, our interpretation of the other's look, which becomes
our conscience, which helps us to form our own construction of
ourselves.

Thus we have seen in these previous two sections how our
"self" is formed, what the function of the "other" is in the
formation of this "self", and what relationship obtains between
the "self" and the "other".

Let us now turn to the opposite

question and deal with our conception of others,
D. The Other

3. Forms

Just as others "know" us through their construction of us
and their fitting of us into categories, roles, or forms, so too
do we "know" others through the same process.
be noted that Pirandello is not an idealist.

Again it must
He affirms the

existence of an objective reality which, in order to avoid falling
into solipsism, we must try to have our representation of the
world resemble. Beyond the abstract knowledge of the existence of
an objective reality of things and of people, we cannot progress.
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On the experiential level, this objective reality can never touch
us, and since it is with this experiential level which Pirandello,
like the other Existentialists, deals, the objective reality has no
importance other than the purely philosophical one of rejecting
solipsism.

It is only through "forms" that we can know reality. That
is, it is only through the categorisation of sense data that
the world can begin to have some meaning for us. But it is the
"forms" which we know and not the objective reality.

Do you believe that you know yourself if you
don't construct yourself in some way? And that
I could know you if I don't construct you in my
own way? We can only know that to which we
succeed in giving form. But what knowledge can
it be? Is this form perhaps the thing itself?
You, for you as for me; but not in the same
way for me as for you: so much so that I don't
recognise myself in the form which you give me,
74
nor do you in the one X give to you; (...)
The first "form" which we are given and into which we must
forever fit is our name. It brands us. It becomes not our name but

the name of the form into which the other tries to fit us, the role
which the other sees us play. According to Pirandello, the very
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special function of a proper name is not fulfilled. Rather, he sees
names taking on the meaning of whatever "form" people ascribe to
that person, the way the name Shy lock has become synonymous with
"usurer" or Solomon with "wise-man". This is not, according to

Pirandello, a general association but rather a very individual one.
That is to say, once known a person is labelled with one or more
"forms" which represent the way another individual has organised
the sum of that person's appearances, his "reality". In time, the
person's name becomes merely a convenient way of referring to
these forms, a sort of a mental shorthand which, like all other
concepts or "forms" distorts reality precisely because of their
inherent limitedness. As we read in Uno. nessuno e centomila:

A name is nothing but this, a funeral epigraph.
It suits dead people. People who have finished.
I am alive and I'm not finished. Life doesn't
'finish'. And life admits of no names.

Life isn't fixed in a form. Life is a continuous flow of sensations

experience which the moment they are conceptualised freeze, solidif
and thus die. Vitangelo Moscarda wished that he could have
thousands of names, each one for the thousands of his thoughts,
feelings or actions, rather than having each of his individual
acts branded with his name and his body as if that individual
act involved his entire being and not merely a fraction of it,
only one of his possibilities of being. Of course, he is so used
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to his name that he is able to live with it, but he does recognise
it as a sort of a seal, a brand, a stamp.

We are branded by each of our words. Others hear and
construct a form for us according to their interpretation of
these words. In Come tu mi vuoi we read:

I couldn't be serious! I couldn't be serious! It
is frightful, sir, how one of these things, even
stupidity, that is said to provoke laughter, in
passing, - see? - it is fixed into a concept
- forever - I am that, and I can't be anything
else - branded - a clown.

Not only our words, but of course, also our actions brand

us, force us into a mold, a form, a concept. In Si gira ... we find:

We may easily fail to recognise ourselves in what
we do, but what we do, my dear fellor, remains
done: an action which circumscribes you, my dear
fellow, gives you a form of sorts, and imprisons
78
you in it. You seek to rebel? You cannot.
Donata, the actress in the play Trovarsi explains that as long
as one can remain suspended:
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... able to turn with the mind ... here, there ...
to any recall in us of a sensation, an impression
... to so many images that a momentaneous desire
might awaken ... or re-evoke a memory ... with
this breathing within us ... yes, of indistinct
memories ... not of acts, perhaps not even of
appearances ... but, precisely, of desires almost
vanished before they arise ... things of which
one thinks without wanting to, almost hidden
from ourselves ... dreams ... the suffering of
not being ... like flowers which weren't able to
bloom ... - that's it, yes, as long as one remains
thus, sure one has nothing; but one has at least
this fullness of freedom (...) Now, to commit and
act, it is never the whole spirit which commits
it ... the whole of life which is in us ... but
that which we are only in that moment ... - and
yet, there, that act of a moment - committed 79
imprisons us, stops us here (...)
The short story La patente is a parody of this situation,
A man about whom it is whispered that he is a "iettatore" (one
capable of putting the "evil eye" on people) based on one of his
actions and a series of coincidences, sees that he cannot escape
this branding. So, he seeks legal recognition of his title of
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"lettatore" so that at least he will be able to use it to extort
money from the superstitious inhabitants of his town.

In JX dovere del medico we see the torment of a man who
has been branded by one of his acts. Caught in a frivolous
act of adultery he kills the husband in self-defence and then,
in remorse, shoots himself. The doctors save his life, and he who has already taken upon himself the harshest punishment but
has been saved from it by others - feels that he is reborn. He
has paid, nearly with his life, for his act, an act which began
foolishly and which he had no intention of committing. But it is
only he himself who feels that he has been sufficiently punished.
Society requires that he be tried and sent to prison as soon as
he recovers. He protests:

- I washed myself, with my blood! (. ••) I am
another, now* I am reborn! How can I remain
suspended at a single moment of that other life
of mine that no longer exists for me? Suspended,
hooked to that moment, as if it represented my
whole existence, as if I had never lived for
80
anything else.
The short story JX Professor Terremoto has as its major
theme precisely this fixing of a person into a form by the other,
based on an act of that person. In this work a professor is
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disgraced because he had been branded a hero due to his acts of
heroism during the Messina earthquake and afterwards could not
live up to the label. The professor explains:

- And yet please believe that for me dear sir, - he continued
shortly after with a sigh - this woman who died was not as
unfortunate as all of those who, after one of these heroics,
remained alive.

'Because you have to admit that an act of heroism
is the business of a moment' (...)
81
'Life is not made of these moments.
The similarity here is obvious between this example and Sartre's
example found in L'existentialisme est un humanisme in which the

French existentialist speaks of the "bad faith" involved in calling
anyone a hero or a coward (in the way that one calls a stone, a
stone,) since there is always a possibility for the hero to cease
being a hero or the coward to cease being cowardly.

Just as Sartre speaks of the nature of "being-for-itself"
not to be what it is and to be what it is not, Pirandello, despite
his speaking of any "form" as a kind of death, a concept which
cannot capture or encompass life, recognises (as we have already
seen in the section of this chapter dealing with masks) that in a
certain sense, the form takes on reality, at least for the person
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who has constructed it and sometimes even for the person onto
whom it has been placed, and that person becomes what the form
dictates. If one believes in the form, the mask, the role, then
the other person is as you see him.

In La favola del figlio cambiato we find:

Change this one of paper and glass into one of
gold and gems of value
the coat into a mantle
and the king for fun becomes in earnest,
to whom you bow down.
There is need of nothing else, only
83
that you believe it.
Taking the identification between the person and the form one
step further, we find in Pirandello many examples of people's
behaviour being influenced by the form or role which society
(or they themselves) have placed upon them. In Ieri e. oggi the
sadness of a mother at the departure of loved ones going to war
is contrasted with that of a prostitute. In the one case the
tears are blessed, as it were, by society. In the other they are
held to be cheap and the people involved must act accordingly.
In the short stories Certi obblighi. La verita. and L'uomo solo
the protagonist of each has known for years that his wife is
unfaithful to him. Because society does not know and hence the
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role of the cuckold has not been assigned to him he chooses to
ignore the situation. As soon as society knows and the role is
assigned, each man must then play his part. He is forced to
"become aware" of his wife's infidelities and act accordingly. In
the novel L'esclusa we see the example of a man who believes in a
"fate" (rather than society) which assigns to each person a role
or form. His own, he believes, is that of the betrayed husband.

This way of thinking of his had become so fixed
that if by chance someone, urged by need, came to
ask help of him, he, even feeling himself sometimes
inclined to give in, already moved, he would stop
himself, sigh loudly, then he would open his lips
in his usual sardonic smile and advise the poor
devil to address himself to someone else: to
so and so, for example, the good philanthropist
of the town: - Go to him, my friend: he was
born expressly to help people. I wasn't, you
see. To me this office does not belong. I
would be offending that worthy gentleman who
has fulfilled it for so many years and can't do
84
without it.

Of course, his belief is self-fulfilling and in one of Pirandello's
usual ironic twists, as soon as he is in fact betrayed by his

formerly unjustly accused and faithful wife, he becomes convinced o
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her innocence, thus by belief in his assigned role, he is condemned
to play it out. Of course, quite apart from the ironic turn of
the plot (which one may or may not ascribe to the biographical
consider at iona concerning the author's insanely jealous wife) we
can see another example of "bad faith" or self-deception in which
a person denies his own freedom and blames everything on fate,
another example of a man wishing to be - in this case a cuckold
- "in the same way", (as Sartre would have it), "that a stone is
a stone".

A form "catches" life in an instant, rigidifies it, freezes it,
and represents it just the way a camera stops the action and
records a particular moment in time. For this reason Pirandello
is particularly interested in the camera. He uses this analogy
throughout his novel SX gira ... the protagonist of which is
Serafino Gubbio, cameraman at a (silent) movie studio.

In exile, not only from the stage, but also in a
sense from themselves. Because their action, the
live action of their live bodies, there, on the
screen of the cinematograph, no longer exists:
it is their image alone, caught in a moment,
in a gesture, an expression, that flickers and
disappears. They are confusedly aware, with
a maddening, indefinable sense of emptiness,
that their bodies are so to speak subtracted.
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suppressed, deprived of their reality, of breath,
of voice, of the sound that they make in moving
about, to become only a dumb image which quivers
for a moment on the screen and disappears, in
silence, in an instant, like a unsubstantial
phantom, the play of illusion upon a dingy sheet
of cloth.

They feel that they too are slaves to this
strident machine, which suggests on its knockkneed tripod a huge spider watching for its
prey, a spider that sucks in and absorbs their
live reality to render it up an evanescent,
momentary appearance, the play of a mechanical
illusion in the eyes of the public. And the man
who strips them of their reality and offers it
as food to the machine; who reduces their bodies
85
to phantoms, who is he? It is 1, Gubbio.
The camera, like the form, imprisons life, kills it. Serafino Gubbio
feels the hatred of actors for his machine, parallel to the hatred
of the man aware of the absurd for the form.

It is not so much for me, Gubbio, this antipathy,
as for my machine. It recoils upon me, because
I am the man who turns the handle.
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They do not realise it clearly, but I, with the
handle in my hand, am to them in reality a sort
of executioner.

The reason, of course, as has been mentioned, is that the
person becomes identified with the form and limited to it. The

play Quando si k crualcuno deals precisely with this problem. In it,
a famous author feels himself imprisoned in the image that others
have of him. Having just written, under an assumed name, a new
book, one which repudiates his old "self" and is young, alive with
ideas and very popular, he realises that he can never acknowledge
the book because rather than see in him another facet, another
possibility of his being, people would sooner hold on to the image
of his old self that they already have and dismiss the new self
87
as a mask, a fiction which he has placed upon himself as a joke.
He has no life outside of the form under which he is seen by
others.

Because I now must not think anything else imagine anything else - feel anything else. What! - I thought that and I thought (according
to them) and that's enough! - They don't accept
any more images of me. - I expressed what I felt
- and there - stopped there there - I can't be
different - alas if I should try - they no longer
recognise me - I must no longer move myself from
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the precise concept; determined in every minimal
part, that they have made for themselves of me:
there, that, immobile, forever.

Thus we form a concept of the other. We determine him by
any individual word or any particular action.

We construct a

form into which he must fit, a role which he must play.

What

happens if the other person becomes aware of that form, that role
and rather than accept it and second it, he tries to change it
for us? According to Pirandello, rather than change it we often
believe that the person has become insane, since he no longer is
consistent, no longer lives up to society's or our expectations
of his behaviour. We read in Uno. nessuno e centomila:

In fact, wasn't I perhaps going up to Sig,
Vitangelo Moscarda in order to play a dirty
trick on him? Eh, gentlemen, yes, a dirty trick
that is, to make him commit an act completely
contrary to him and incoherent: an act which
suddenly destroying the logic of his reality
would annihilate him in the eyes of Marco di Dio
as in so many others?

Without understanding,

wretched as he was! that the consequences of
such an act couldn't be those which I imagined;
to present myself, that is to ask everyone after:
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'see now, gentlemen, it isn't true at all that I
am the usurer that you want to see in me?'

But these others, instead: that everyone should
exclaim amazed:
'Oh! You know?

the usurer Moscarda has gone

mad!89

In fact, that is what everyone believes when Moscarda no longer
acts as they expect.

'Mad! Mad! Mad!'
It was the same cry of the whole crowd there
in front of the door:
'Mad! Mad! Mad!'
Because I had wanted to demonstrate, that I
could, even for others, not be what they believed
me to be.

Moscarda becomes aware of the impossibility of changing the concept
which others have of him.

He realises that they all think him

mad and he speaks to the husband of a woman who is in an insane
asylum:

And I touched the ground with my forehead.
'You, not I, understand?
understand?

in front of my wife,
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You should stay like this! And I, and he, and
everyone, in front of the so-called insane, like
this!'

(...)
"New words!' I cried. 'Do you want to hear them?
Go, go there, where you keep them locked up: go,
go and listen to them speak! You keep them
91
locked up, because it suits you that way!'
Why is it that we should listen to the so-called insane? We find
the answer in, among other places, the play Come tu mi vuoi;

The unknown one; Oh yes, I know! Only the insane
have the privilege of shouting - clearly - in
92
front of everyone - certain things.
What are these "certain things"? As we read in JX berretto a
sonagli - the truth. There is no surer way to be thought crazy
than to shout the truth in people's faces.

In Ouand'ero matto the protagonist learns that his reasoning
can only go so far. One can reason about other people's feelings,
needs, etc. but you can only live your own life and take care of
yourself. All the reasoning in the world - unless you're a saint
perhaps - can never equate your experience of others and their
own of themselves. If one isn't wise to this,;
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there is no middle road: either one is a saint
93
or he is insane.
The exact same statement is found in the play Lazzaro

So, we accord to the "other" a form which under most
circumstances we do not change. As soon as one becomes
encapsulated in a form he no longer lives. In order to know

oneself (or an "other") we (or he) must be defined by a form. Thus
we find in the play Non si sa come:
95
To know oneself is to die.
The form is intollerable because it stops the "flux" of life.
In Quando si fe, qualcuno we read;

Second journalist: Oh yes, others ... Respect ...
admiration
Natasha: All things that kill. And even
in front of an object of someone
killed that way, even in front
of you, if they recognise you
as his son, so many stop to
look at you. When a life stops
... or is stopped by others ...
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First
journalist: of fame. That's
The
consequences
why one stays'
Natasha:
And no longer lives.

The writer in this play feels as though he were becoming a statue,
one who can no longer move. He has become famous. He is Someone,
but for this he must die because:

Someone, alive no one can see.

We find another parallel between a man who has been given
(or taken on) a form, and a statue in Si gira ...:

But his dignity, so long and so strenuously
defended, has now settled upon him, like the
mould of a statue, immovable. Cavalina feels
himself empty inside, but outwardly incrusted
all over. He has become the walking mould of
this statue. He cannot any longer scrape it
off himself. Forever, henceforward, inexorably,
98
he is the most dignified man in the world.
Ironically, while the form distorts or kills life, it itself
remains vitally alive even if the person on whom it was placed
really dies physically, so long as the person who has constructed
the form continues to live and to believe it. This brings us to
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our next consideration which is the paradox of the reality (or
irreality) of death.

4. The reality (or irreality) of death

As we have seen, we make our reality in a sort of mirror-like
exchange with the "other's look". We see ourselves in others' eyes
and this reflection influences our own self-concept. Thus it is
that it is the other's look which gives us existence. Here "life"
is understood, not as the indistinct flow which each person feels
within himself, but "life-in-the-world", existence. It of course

follows from Pirandello's ideas concerning the relativity of realit
that while a person's sentient life does not depend on others,
his existence as a particular individual does because he needs
the other's look in order to create himself. In Come prima meglio
di prima Pirandello's ideas concerning this mirror-like exchange
are illustrated. The long-straying wife and mother has returned,
thinking that she can take up her old life. Since she has been
reconciled with her husband, she can do this at least to a certain
extent with him; but her daughter believes her to be dead. She
realises that because of this she and her daughter can no longer
reciprocally give each other life.

(...) my dear, if you can't make me live again for
your daughter, can she now, instead, live again
99
for me.
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It is here that the paradox of the irreality of death arises.

If it is the other's look which gives life (understood in the sens
of existence-in-t he-world), then it follows that as long as that
"look" continues, that person is "alive", existent-in-the-world,
whether or not he is physically alive or dead. We find this
general theme illustrated in the story lines of three short
stories; Colloaui coi nersonaggi. Vista and La camera in attesa.
Even more specifically, we read in La camera in attesa:

The truth is that you don't recognise in your
son or daughter, returned after a year, that
same reality which you gave to them before they
left, (...) Your son, the one that you knew before
he left, is dead, believe it, he's dead. Only there
being a body (and even that so changed!) makes
you say no. But you observe it well that he
was another, the one who left a year ago, and
who didn't come back anymore. (...)

You know it well, now, that reality doesn't depend
on there being or there not being a body. There
can be a body and it be dead for the reality
which you gave it. That which makes life, then,
is the reality which you give to it.
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As long as I who give reality to a person, live, that person

continues to have a life-in-the-world. In I pensionati della memori
we find:

(...) that which was my reality, solely mine, which
can neither change nor perish, as long as I
live, and which can even live forever, if I have
the strength to immortalise it in a page, or at
least, for a hundred million years, according to
the calculations just made in America concerning
the duration of human life on Earth.

101

In the play La vita che ti diedi. Pirandello paints the picture
of a mother whose son has just died, but who is well-aware of
this paradox of death's reality or irreality. She states;

I don't need to believe in shadows. I know that
r T- 102
he is alive for me. I m not crazy.
Nevertheless, she really knows that her son is dead and she
cannot make him live for herself when she is aware of that fact.
Her only comfort is in knowing that as long as there is a woman
who knew and loved her son and who doesn't yet know that he is
dead, he remains alive.

For Pirandello, what constitutes "death" (that is, the ceasing

of our " exist en ce-in-t he-world") is the death of the reality tha
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we have given to a particular person, however that is brought
about. When a child goes off to a boarding school, for example,
that child never returns. When the child that was that child
goes home, that child (the one of times past) dies for the parent,

because the reality which the parent used to give him is recognised
as an illusion. In La camera in attesa we read;

- Didn't your son or daughter die when they
left for school in the far off big city?

(...)
- Calm yourself, yes, go on, I know it well. But
how is it, at the end of the year, when your
son or your daughter comes back a year older
from the city, you remain astonished and amazed
before them; and you, yes you, with hands open as
if to parry a doubt which alarms you, exclaim:
- Oh God, but is it really you? Oh God, how she
103
has become another!
When a person goes away and changes, they, that is, the reality
which we gave them dies. We do not cry because for us that

reality is still alive, The mother in La vita che ti diedi realises
that it was when her son went away that he "died", not at the
moment of his physical death.

- Well, life can act so cruelly toward a mother: it
tears from her a son and changes him. - Another;
and I didn't know it. Dead and I continued to
make him live in me.

The dead, like the living, depend on the other's look for
their reality. In X pensionati della memoria Pirandello explains;

Their reality is vanished; but which? the one
they gave themselves. And what could I know of
that reality of theirs? What do you know of it?
I know that I myself give to them. Illusion, mine
and theirs. But if they, poor dead ones, have
been totally disabused of theirs, my illusion is
still alive and it is so strong that I, I repeat,
after having accompanied them to the cemetery,
I see them come back to me, all of them, just as
they were, outside of the coffin, next to me.
- But why, - you say, - don't they return to
their own houses, instead of coming to yours?
Oh beautiful! because they hardly have any
reality for themselves, to be able to go where
they please. Reality is never for the self. And
they have it, now, for me, and with me then, per
105
force, they have to come away.
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If the "dead" continue to live in the reality that we continue
to give them, why then do we weep at the death of a friend?
They still have the reality which they always had, namely, the
one which we have constructed.

We weep because the giving of

reality is reciprocal. We weep because the dead can no longer
give reality to us.

In effect, since the reality of the dead

person lives on in us, it is we, not they, who die! In La vita
che ti diedi we read:

And I here? - This is what death is, my daughter,
- Things to be done whether we want to or not
- and things to be said ... - Now, a time-table
to consult - then, the carriage for the station
- travel ... We are the poor busy dead.

And in the same play:

Anna: (...) My God, one should also understand that
the real reason we cry also in front of death
is a different one from what one believes,
Giorgio:

One cries for the one whom we'll miss.
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Anna:

Right! Our life in the one who dies: that which

we don't know! (...) Yes, yes: for ourselves we
cry; because he who dies can no longer give
any life to us, with those dead eyes which
no longer see us, with those cold and hard
hands of his which can't touch us anymore,
(...) - And you instead mean that he isn't
alive for me any longer. But of course he is
alive for me, alive with all of the life which
I have always given him; mine, mine; not his

In Colloquii coi personaggi we find the same example.

Mama! I cry because you. Mama, you can no longer
,., 108
give me a reality.
In X pensionati della memoria we find the same explanation of
our tears when a loved one dies, namely, the destruction of the
reciprocity of our illusions. We need the other's look as a support
for our own illusions. Here it must be noted that Pirandello is
not making any philosophical statement regarding physical death.
Although Pirandello demonstrates a certain interest in spiritism
or "theosophy", as was in vogue in his day, and speculates on the
possibility that there may remain some sort of consciousness after
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death, it is obvious that these possibilities are not particularly
important to him. These beliefs or speculations remain isolated
from the rest of his work and at no time does he accept that
a belief in an afterlife should influence one's choice of values
in this life. The subject remains for Pirandello an interesting
speculation but an unimportant one. What Pirandello is doing is
using that subject of death and the paradox of its reality (or
irreality) to illustrate once again his beliefs in the relativity
of all reality.

I suppose that a dead person has as much reality for us as
a live one and that this reality collapses at the moment when
we know that we will no longer feel the other's look upon us, is
to say something about the possibility of communication between
people. Let us now explore this possibility,
E. Communication

Lina Passarella Sartorelli in her article La filosofia morale
pel teatro priandelliano states;

And then in Pirandello there is also another
contrast: men, all preoccupied with themselves,
with this intimate part of them, with this
expression, don't have the energy to give to
know their neighbour, and that is why they
109
don't understand each other.
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While it is certainly true and can easily be seen in Pirandello
that people are preoccupied with themselves and rarely if ever
try to know or understand others, Pirandello's statements and
examples illustrate a much deeper reason for this lack of mutual
understanding. The reason is because real communication between
people is impossible due to the subjectivity of each person's
world-view. Not only do we hide our most intimate selves from
others and retreat behind a role or a mask, but even when we
wish to communicate our own construction of reality to others; we

find this impossible. In JX piacere dell'on est a Baldovino explain

I come in here, and I immediately become that
which I must be, that which I can be - I construct
myself - that is, I present myself to you in
a form suitable to the relation that I must
contract with you. And you do the same to
yourself when you receive me. But, deep down,
inside of these constructions of ours placed
thus face to face with each other, behind the
jealousies and the shutters remain hidden our
most secret thoughts, our most intimate feelings,
all that we are for ourselves, outside of the
110
relations which we want to establish.
From this we might be led to believe that if only we didn't
deliberately hide ourselves we could understnad one another. But
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in Uno nessuno e centomila we read how Vitangelo discovers the
subjectivity of reality and the impossibility of communication. He
states:

The trouble is that you, my friend, will never
know, nor will I ever be able to communicate to
you how that which you tell me is translated
within me. You haven't spoken Greek.

We have

used, you and I the same language, the same
words,

But what fault have we, you and I, if

words, for themselves, are empty?
friend.

Empty, my

And you fill them with your meaning,

in saying them to me; and I in receiving them,
inevitably, fill them with my meaning. We believe
that we understood each other; we haven't at
all. Oh, this too is an old story, we all know it.
And I don't pretend to be telling you anything
new. Only I go back to asking you:
'But why then. Holy God, do you continue to
act as if you didn't know?

To speak to me of

yourself, if you know that in order to be for
me what you are for yourself, and I for you
what I am for myself, it would be necessary that
I, inside of myself, give you that same reality
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that you give yourself, and vice versa; and this
111
isn't possible.
It is also impossible, for the same reason, Vitangelo discovers,
to see myself as the other sees me, but only as X see him seeing
me.

In X qiqanti della montagna Cotrone explains:
(...) each one of us speaks, and after having
spoken, we almost always recognise that it has
been in vain, and we go back inside ourselves
disillusioned, like a dog in the night to his
112
bed, after having barked at a shadow.
Vitangelo speaks of the impossibility of his communicating with
the person whom he thought knew him best:

I was astonished.
It was obvious that the sense which I gave to
my words was a meaning for me; that which they
then assumed for her, as Genge's words, was
113
completely different.
It is a lonely world which Pirandello describes, however,
the possibility of a certain solace being derived from common
experience, a sort of communication without words, is left open.
This is the theme of the short story Notte.
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It is clear nevertheless that our reality remains precisely
that, our own personal construction of reality, unapproachable for
others, incapable of being communicated or expressed by us. This
is the discovery of Vitangelo Moscarda and this is the discovery

of Serafino Gubbio (in S_i gira ...) which leads to their silence.
(This leaves aside for the moment, other considerations of this
silence which have already been discussed,) Their "selves" are
incommunicable to others but so is the very discovery of this
incommunicability.
F. Summary

In this chapter concerning the self and others we have
discussed Pirandello's views on life as pure experience, one's
construction of his own "self", the use of roles or masks, the
importance of the other's look, the construction of the "other",

a unique definition of insanity, the paradox of death's irreality,
and the impossibility of communication. Let us see how these
coincide with the well-known views of Sartre, particularly as
he has expressed them in his major philosophical treatise Being
and Nothingness and his short essay: L'existentialisme est un
human isme.

When Pirandello speaks of life as pure consciousness he
is describing man's way of being. Sartre speaks of man as
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consciousness of objects and of itself. Consciousness (or man)
has no essence. Sartre states in Being and Nothingness:

Now as we have seen, consciousness of being is
114
the being of consciousness.

In other words, man's mode of being is that of being conscious
of the being of objects. Now Sartre situates this consciousness
in the world as totally free - as he would say, surrounded
by nothingness. Man himself orders everything around him and
perceives things in his own way. He chooses his manner of
perceiving and ordering things and is responsible for his choice.
(See also L'existentialisme est un humanisme p31 for a practical
example).

Not only does man "choose" or construct his reality, but
he chooses and constructs himself. Sartre states quite clearly
that:
115
Man is nothing but what he makes himself.
The use of the mask or role is for Sartre, as for Pirandello,
a form of bad faith because one's whole being cannot be expressed
in that role. For Pirandello it is a denial of the infinity of
one's possibilities. For Sartre, it is a denial, a restriction of

one's total freedom.

Nevertheless the role constitutes in some

. . 116
sense our being.
Sartre does not discuss the multiplication of "selves" which
so fascinates Pirandello, but he does state that;

(man) can be nothing (...) unless the others
recognise him as such. To obtain any truth
about me, I must pass through the other. The
other is indispensable to my existence, as well
moreover as it is to the knowledge which I have
of myself.117

Thus we see in Sartre as well as in Pirandello the need for the
other's look. Sartre writes in Being and Nothingness:

I am a slave to the degree that my being is
dependent at the centre of a freedom which is
not mine and which is the very condition of my
being. In so far as I am the object of values
which come to qualify me without my being able
to act on this qualification or even to know it,
I am enslaved. By the same token, in so far as
I am the instrument of possibilities which are
not my possibilities whose pure presence beyond
my being I cannot even glimpse, and which deny
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my transcendence in order to constitute me as
a means to ends of which I am ignorant - I am in
danger. This danger is not an accident but the
permanent structure of my being-for-others.

I need the other's look in order to construct myself and yet I
apprehend it as a danger, an unpleasant experience because:

To be looked at is to apprehend onself as the
unknown object of unknowable appraisals - in
particular, of value judgments.

Again Pirandello and Sartre agree.

Our construction of others, apart from the communication of
their "look" is always in the mode of an object. In their "look"
we become aware of their subjectivity, but since by definition
we cannot enter into that subjectivity, the other is always
constituted as an object of our subjectivity, seen in the light
of his relation to me. While Pirandello goes further and explains
how we approached the other in a particular role or at a certain
moment in time or in one specific action and try to limit his
being to that role or that moment or that action, and thus do

not apprehend his whole being, the entire set of his possibilities;
Sartre speaks more of each individual's subjectivity, his total
freedom and the impossibility of our participating in that in any
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way. I construct the other in my own way, and he constructs me
in his, but apart from the other's look on which I depend, the
construction of others by me or of me by others does not have
importance for Sartre as it does for Pirandello. The reason for
this difference lies in the attitudes of these two authors toward
the absurd. For Pirandello, our awareness of others' construction
of our "self" and the consequent doubling or multiplication of
this "self" is another way in which we become aware of the
absurd. The important thing for Pirandello as for Camus is to
live with this awareness. For Sartre what is most important is
the affirmation of our total freedom and hence he doesn't worry
about our construction of others or their construction of us
except in so far as it might influence the use of our freedom.

For the same reason, Sartre is not concerned with insanity
except as it can be a form of bad faith which we use to mask
from ourselves our freedom,

The paradox of death's irreality is another subject with
which Sartre does not deal at length. While sharing Pirandello's
views concerning the reality of one's "being-for-others":

My being-for-others is a real thing. If it
remains in the hands of the Other like a coat
which I leave to him after my disappearance, this
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is by virtue of a real dimension of my being - a
dimension which has become my unique dimension
- and not in the form of an unsubstantial
120
specter.

Sartre does not play, as it were, with the paradoxical consequences
of this, namely, that I exist as long as I am thought to exist.
He does state, however, that

the very existence of death alienates us wholly
in our own life to the advantage of the Other.
121
To be dead is to be a prey for the living.
and again

Now that his life is dead, only the memory of the
Other can prevent Pierre's life from shrivelling
up in its plenitude in-itself by cutting all its
moorings with the present.

The unique characteristic of a dead life is that
it is a life of which the Other makes himself
122
the guardian.
Taking into account these statements as well as Sartre's
treatment of related topics, such as the "Other" as an object, or

the necessity for the "Other's look", it is clear that Pirandello's
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treatment of the paradoxical irreality of death is in complete
accord with these views,

Sartre's views on the possibility of interpersonal communication seem to be slightly more optimistic than those of Pirandello.
It is through the word that we are made aware to some extent
of the nature of our "being-for-others". However he states:

,.. all this I am for the Other with no hope of
apprehending this meaning which I have outside
and still more important, with no hope of changing
it. Speech alone will inform me of what I am;
again this will never be except as the object
of an empty intention; any intuition of it is
forever denied me.

He also indicates that the meaning of a sentence "is not in itself
to be considered as a given but rather as an end chosen in a
124
free surpassing of means".

And also;

Since the verbal unity is the meaningful sentence, the latter is a constructive act which
is conceived only by a transcendence which surpasses and nihilates the given toward and end.
To understand the word in the light of the sentence is very exactly to understand any given
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whatsoever in terms of the situation and to
understand the situation in the light of the
125
original ends.
If this is the case, then we are not at all far from Pirandello's
insistance on the difficulty or perhaps even impossibility of
communication, the difference being Sartre's emphasis on the
primacy of the Being-for-itself and Pirandello's fascination with

the self-for-others giving rise to a multiplication of the self (U
nessuno e_ centomila). One must note here a certain inconsistency
in both writers in that they each seem to take for granted at
least a certain level of communication while at the same time
stressing the difficulty or even impossibility of it!

Thus we may conclude from this chapter that Pirandello's
views concerning the self and others are consonant with those
of the existentialist movement.
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CHAPTER VI - CONCLUDING SUMMARY

Since the evidence in support of the conclusion that Pirandello
be recognised as an Existentialist avant la lettre is cumulative
and has appeared throughout this work, these concluding remarks
will not state any new conclusion but will be confined to a brief
summary of that evidence.

The aim of this thesis has not been to defend those loosely
related "systems" of philosophy or better, philosophical attitudes
known as Existentialism, but rather, to show that Luigi Pirandello
not only manifests in his works a philosophy so similar in its
concepts and attitudes to those of Sartre and Camus as to entitle
him to be rightly accepted as an Existentialist avant la lettre,
but that by categorising Pirandello in this manner, we make the
study of existentialism more fruitful through the acceptance of
his extraordinarily clear elucidation and illustration of certain
existentialist themes which otherwise remain slightly vague. Two
examples of this latter are Pirandello's treatment of personal
identity (see especially Chapter V Section B) —an area in which

many critics have found Sartre unintelligible, and his contributio
to the problem of other minds, an area not necessarily limited,
of course, to existentialism, (see especially Chapter V Sections C
and D).
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It has been shown through an analysis of all of Pirandello's
writings that his works clearly contain themes, the philosophical
content of which, in Sartre's day, would come to be known as
existentialism. More than merely themes, his works contain a well
thought out if not a fully developed philosophy which chooses to
express itself in plays, novels, and short stories and only rarely
in essays, rather than in a formally written set of metaphysical
theses. Is the evidence of these themes and this typically
existentialist way of presenting them sufficient reason to accept
Pirandello as an existentialist avant la let tret It is this
writer's opinion that it is, but there are two further reasons
which justify such a categorisation. 1) Not only does Pirandello
develop themes which later existentialists also developed, but in
certain instances he carries them further or in another direction
from the other existentialists. Sartre sees man as rising up
in the world and then choosing what he is to be. Pirandello's
account of what it means to construct oneself is much more
detailed and much deeper.(This has been shown in Chapter IV and
V.) His whole discussion of the "self" is more well-developed than
Sartre's description of the being-£or-itself. Sartre's description

of bad faith is not at all as detailed and complete as Pirandello's
innumerable examples of the numerous ways in which man seeks to
deceive himself. (See Chapter III Section D.) As has been shown in
Chapter IV, on the nature of reality, Pirandello's account of the
nature of reality carries Sartre's ideas much further,
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The second reason to categorise Pirandello with the existen-

tialists is that his literary production relative to existentialis
themes was so much greater than either Sartre or Camus, that
by sheer force of numbers, his examples of these themes elucidate
existentialist concepts much more frequently and clearly than
the other writers. Apart from the number of his illustrations
of existentialist themes, they are clearer and more persuasive

because, as should be clear from the very many illustrations cited
in this thesis, they rarely deal with those abnormal psychological conditions so typical of other existentialist literature, but
rather with ordinary people whom one might accept more readily
as typical or normal human beings.

Since, then, we find in Pirandello all of the major existentialist
themes as well as most of the minor ones, since he develops
certain themes even further than the recognised existentialists

and since his literary works elucidate these existentialist themes
even better than some works by Sartre or Camus, let us recognise
the Italian writer Luigi Pirandello as an existentialist avant la
lettre.
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